为什么房地产税没有让房价归零 Why Property Tax Hasn’t Sent House Prices to Zero

By Yang Xinghua

近来，有数篇文章试图探讨税收与产权完整性、市场自由度之间的关系。据这些文章的观点，税率与后二者之间存在着严格的负相关关系，税收越高，产权完整性越差，市场自由度越低。其中，房产税的例子被反复提及。

例如，其中一篇文章问道：为何永久产权的土地，却只能卖出非常低的价格？“比如，澳洲一个大型农场有20万公顷，售价7500万澳元，平均每平米合计人民币一毛八分钱。一亩地才卖124元人民币。离地球灭亡还有几十亿年吧，一年一平米产出1毛钱，一平米也得值几亿啊，为什么一平米只卖一毛八？”

作者自问自答：“要搞清这个问题，就需要回到一个经济学的基本概念，那就是贴现率。”

根据作者的理论，之所以永久产权的土地和房产卖不出高价，甚至不如内地和香港70/75年产权的价格，归根结底是因为房产和土地在未来的主观价值无限趋近于零；这还不够，由于房产税的普遍存在，拥有房产、地产等于把自己投入“割肉机”，加速了房产价值归零的趋势。“房产税之所以伤害力大，因为他影响所有人对长久未来的预期……不少华人跑到美国去投资房产，大多后悔，因为中国城市房产的价值其实更高。”

显然，按照相同的逻辑，如果我们抛开房产税——正如中国内地城市的现状（姑且认为上海重庆模式并非真正的房产税）——一处房产仍然要面对自然损耗和日常维护的支出。它可能表现为物业费、城市税、房产保险、学位冷却期等各种形式，却与损害财产权的对持有的征税完全不同，而是财产持有本身的成本。根据相同原理，他们同样使房产和土地的未来价格加速归零；但经验证据却不支持这一推断。

事实上，按照这一逻辑，任何需要维护的不动产都不仅仅在遥远的未来价值趋近于零，而且在看得见的特定将来将表现出价格加速归零的现象。

即使是1美元出售的房产，也并未表现出如此特征。卖方之所以愿意以1美元的价格出售房产，是因为房产对他的主观价值趋近于零，买方之所以愿意购买1美元的房产，是因为房产对他有着相当大的主观价值，并且其愿意承受持有的各项花费。这与一亿美元成交的房产并无区别。如果1美元的成交价是因为买方预见到自己够得房产后每年需要缴纳数万美元房产税，他完全可以通过议价要求卖方支付其中一部分，即要求卖方贴钱出售房屋。这将是十分荒谬的。

这一理论的错误在于，贴现率并不是经济学概念，而是会计学概念；主观价值理论中关于人的时间偏好的理论与对于特定未来商品现值的会计学处理方法是完全不同的概念，尽管它们在外表上表现出了某些一致性。混淆二者将得出普遍错误的结论。

对于特定的房/地产，无论其产权是30年、50年、70年、99年、250年、990年还是永久，他们在（正的）时间偏好角度并无差别。时间偏好理论关注的是获得同一财货的时间点的早晚，而不关注其持续性；尤其是，对于不动产这样“保质期”以十年、百年计算的财货之间的比较，是不能等同于保质期3天的鲜牛奶与6个月的灭菌牛奶的对比的。换言之，正的时间偏好告诉我们，同一房产现在比将来对我更有价值。如果我100年后才能取得某房产，那么我现在几乎不会花多少钱去购买这一100年后才能交付的房产；而时间偏好理论并不是说，如果我本来拥有这处房产，它100年后对我的价值相比于当下几乎为零——进而得出这一错误结论：时间偏好理论认为此处房产的产权究竟是1年、100年还是永久对其价值并无影响。

诚然，如果某处房/地产的产权年限为1年，且法律没有明确的续期规定，那么其价值显然会受到负面影响。但是这一影响并不是通过会计学的处理方法计算得出的，而是因为一年的产权在满足人的主观需求上很可能存在着不足，因此降低了其对人的主观价值。也正因此，作为一种普遍无法满足消费者需求的1年产权房产，在各个国家都难觅踪迹。

这一错误的根源在于，不同于会计学的抽象处理，人对特定对象的财产权不能划分为无数时间段，并对每段期限的财产权单独定价。无论坚持主观价值理论还是客观价值理论，财产权的时限都只是其本身的性质和因素，而不是对单一产权等分的约数。如果我拥有一处100年产权的房产，我不能说我拥有它分别于2021年、2022年、2023年……2120年的产权的集合，更不能以此为基础，用时间偏好理论去判断2120年及其之前数十年的产权对我的价值几乎为零，然后贸然定论此房产的期限究竟是30年、50年还是100年对我而言区别不大。

永久产权与否之所以没有在房/地产价格上发挥重大的影响作用，归根结底还是受到人的生物特性对其主观价值判断的制约，如果人均寿命在可预见的将来也只有80岁左右，那么，以25岁购房计算，不仅990年产权和永久产权没有区别，就连70/75年产权也是可以接受的（当然，这个问题从孙辈口中可能有不同的答案）。并且，内地一线城市和香港的房产对婚姻、子女教育、居住权、体面、社会保障等一系列方面（它们与产权年限并无直接关联）的重要性，以及法律对于土地使用权续期的规定，在一定程度上掩盖了非永久产权的负面影响。

在这里，人的正的时间偏好似乎如同许多奥地利学派学者所预言的那样发挥着作用，即自己死后的房产的价值对权利人来说几乎等于零；然而，事实上，这只是单纯因为房产在人死后无法带来任何满足。否则，请简单询问自己：75年产权无所谓，25年如何？

现在，我们可以回答，为什么房产税没有让房价归零。如果拥有某处房/地产意味着我每年要向税务部门缴纳其评估价值1%的房/地产税，我的子女继承它时还需缴纳其评估价值50%的遗产税，这的确会使此处房/地产对我的主观价值受到负面影响；尤其是，他可能会使我产生如下错误的想法：连续缴纳50年房/地产税并由子女继承，等于又搭进去一套房/地产。

但是，这并不影响我持有的房/地产在居住、投资、建设、耕种、开发等方面的需求，而仅仅是每年增加了其评估价值的1%的持有花费。它在何种程度上满足了我的需求，并不受房/地产税或遗产税的影响。如果需求是给定的，而我因为新增的房/地产税或其他费用而负担不起它的持有花费，我只能退而求其次，例如选择租房而非买房，或者把持有的房产出售。而出售这一房/地产必然伴随着折价和对应的损失，这直接反映了税收对财产权的侵害。

罗斯巴德著名的“税收无法向前转嫁”清晰的论证了这一点：“商品的价格由供需关系决定，需求不受税收的影响，任何企业制定的价格都在其净收益最大点上，价格上涨会降低收益，因此，对产品征税不可能转嫁给消费者。

假设均衡投资回报率5%，对于一栋10000美元的住宅征收1%的年财产税，使房主资产收益率由5%降至4%，该房产的资本价值将不得不跌至8333美元以维持5%的资产收益率。”

当然，这并不是说，房产税可以立竿见影地使房价下跌，而只不过是改变了价格的组成成分。前例中的房产税并没有改变市场上的供求关系，房屋出售者获得的现金/房屋购买者支付的现金将减少，减少部分则以房产税的形式由购买者随后向政府支付。购买者没有从房产税中获得实惠，政府借购房者之手拿走了本属于售房者的利益。

简而言之，房/地产税理论上不会改变房/地产的真实价格，而对于名义价格，新征收财产税对房价的影响程度是有上限的，即为了维持原有资产收益率所需达到的资产价格的降幅。

因此，运用贴现率等会计术语将被错误分割成段的产权的未来价值误判为零，是完全错误的做法。它甚至比税收本身更大地伤害了持有者的财产权，它用一种貌似正确、实则大谬的方式将我们所有人的财产权在未来归零。

买一辆布加迪，每年还要搭进去一辆奥迪，但我们不能说，后续支出使得豪车价值无限趋近于零。我们仅能谨慎地提醒买主：你准备好两个两千万了吗？

Recently, several articles have attempted to explore the relationship between taxation and the integrity of property rights as well as the degree of market freedom. According to these articles, there is a strictly negative correlation between tax rates and the latter two: the higher the taxes, the worse the integrity of property rights and the lower the level of market freedom. Among these discussions, the example of property tax has been repeatedly mentioned.

For instance, one article asked: why is it that land with perpetual ownership can only be sold at a very low price?

“For example, a large farm in Australia covers 200,000 hectares and is priced at 75 million Australian dollars. On average, that works out to just RMB 0.018 per square metre—only RMB 124 per mu (a Chinese unit of area). There are still billions of years left before the Earth’s extinction, so if each square metre produced RMB 0.1 of output annually, a square metre should be worth billions. Why, then, is it sold for only 0.018 RMB?”

The author then answered his own question:

“To understand this problem, we must return to a basic economic concept: the discount rate.”

According to the author’s theory, the reason why land and housing with perpetual ownership cannot be sold at high prices, and are sometimes even less expensive than properties with 70/75-year leases in mainland China and Hong Kong, is ultimately because the subjective value of land and housing in the future tends towards zero. Moreover, due to the widespread existence of property taxes, owning housing or land is equivalent to putting oneself into a “flesh-shredding machine”, which accelerates the trend of property value moving towards zero.

“The destructive power of property tax lies in the fact that it affects everyone’s expectations of the distant future… Many Chinese people who went to the United States to invest in property mostly regret it, because the actual value of urban property in China is higher.”

Obviously, following the same logic, even if we set aside property tax—as is currently the case in mainland Chinese cities (assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Shanghai and Chongqing models do not constitute genuine property taxes)—a property still faces natural depreciation and daily maintenance costs. These may take the form of service charges, city taxes, property insurance, “school place cooling-off periods”, and so forth.

However, they are fundamentally different from coercive taxation that directly infringes upon property rights, as they are merely the inherent costs of holding property itself. According to the same reasoning, these costs should also accelerate the trend of housing and land values falling towards zero. But empirical evidence does not support this conclusion. In fact, following this line of reasoning, any immovable property requiring maintenance would not only see its value approach zero in the far future but would also display a visible and accelerating decline in price in the foreseeable future.

Even properties sold for one dollar have not exhibited such characteristics. The reason a seller is willing to sell a property for one dollar is because the property’s subjective value to them has nearly reached zero. The buyer, however, is willing to purchase it for one dollar because the property has considerable subjective value to them, and they are willing to bear the various costs of holding it. This is no different from a property sold for one hundred million dollars.

If a property priced at one dollar were sold at that price solely because the buyer anticipated that after acquiring the property, they would need to pay tens of thousands of dollars annually in property tax, the buyer could simply demand that the seller bear part of these costs—that is, require the seller to pay them to take the property. This would be absurd.

The mistake in this theory lies in the fact that the discount rate is not an economic concept, but an accounting concept. The economic theory of subjective value and human time preference is completely different from the accounting method used to calculate the present value of specific future goods, even though they may appear superficially similar. Confusing the two will lead to universally erroneous conclusions.

For a given piece of housing or land, whether its ownership period is 30 years, 50 years, 70 years, 99 years, 250 years, 990 years, or perpetual, there is no difference from the perspective of positive time preference. Time preference theory focuses on the timing of obtaining the same good, not on its duration. In particular, for immovable property whose “shelf life” is measured in decades or centuries, it cannot be compared to fresh milk with a three-day shelf life versus sterilised milk with a six-month shelf life. In other words, positive time preference tells us that the same property is more valuable to me now than in the future. If I can only obtain a certain property 100 years from now, I will hardly spend any money to purchase it today. However, time preference theory does not say that if I already own this property, its value to me 100 years later will be nearly zero—leading to the false conclusion that whether this property’s tenure is 1 year, 100 years, or perpetual makes little difference to its current value.

Certainly, if the tenure of a certain property is only one year, and the law does not clearly stipulate renewal terms, then its value will obviously be negatively affected. However, this impact is not calculated through accounting methods, but because a one-year tenure may not adequately meet a person’s subjective needs, thereby reducing its subjective value to them. For this reason, one-year ownership rights, which generally cannot satisfy consumer demand, are rarely seen anywhere in the world.

The root of this error lies in the fact that, unlike accounting abstractions, a person’s ownership of a specific property cannot be divided into countless time periods and priced separately for each segment. Whether one adheres to subjective value theory or objective value theory, the time limit of ownership rights is simply one of its inherent characteristics, not a divisible unit to be separately priced. If I own a property with a 100-year tenure, I cannot claim to possess a collection of separate ownership rights for 2021, 2022, 2023… up to 2120. Nor can I, on this basis, use time preference theory to judge that the rights from 2120 and the preceding decades have almost zero value to me, and then rashly conclude that whether this property’s tenure is 30 years, 50 years, or 100 years makes little difference to me.

The reason perpetual tenure does not have a significant impact on the price of housing or land ultimately lies in the biological limitations of humans’ subjective value judgments. If the average human life expectancy in the foreseeable future remains around 80 years, then for someone purchasing property at age 25, there is no practical difference between a 990-year tenure and a perpetual tenure. Even a 70/75-year tenure is generally acceptable (though future generations may hold different views).

Furthermore, in mainland China’s first-tier cities and Hong Kong, the importance of housing for marriage, children’s education, residency rights, social status, and social security—all of which have little direct relation to tenure length—as well as the legal stipulations regarding the renewal of land use rights, to some extent mask the negative effects of non-perpetual ownership.

Here, humans’ positive time preference appears to function much as many Austrian School scholars have predicted: the value of one’s property after one’s death is nearly zero to the right-holder. In reality, however, this is simply because property cannot bring any satisfaction to a person after death. Otherwise, just ask yourself this simple question: If a 75-year tenure is acceptable, what about 25 years?

Now, we can answer the question of why property tax does not cause housing prices to fall to zero. If owning a certain piece of housing or land means that I must pay an annual property tax equivalent to 1% of its assessed value, and my children must also pay inheritance tax equal to 50% of its assessed value when they inherit it, this will indeed have an adverse effect on the property’s subjective value to me. In particular, it may lead me to form the following mistaken belief: paying property tax continuously for 50 years and then passing it on to my children, who must pay inheritance tax, is equivalent to paying for another entire property.

However, this does not affect the way this property satisfies my needs for living, investment, construction, farming, or development. It merely increases the annual holding cost by an additional 1% of its assessed value. If my demand is fixed but I can no longer afford the new property tax or other costs, I have no choice but to downgrade my options—for example, renting instead of buying, or selling the property I hold.

Selling will inevitably involve a discount and corresponding loss, which directly reflects the harm taxation inflicts on property rights. Murray Rothbard’s famous argument that “taxes cannot be shifted forward” clearly illustrates this point:

“The price of a good is determined by supply and demand. Demand is unaffected by taxation, and any business sets prices at the point of maximum net return. Raising prices will reduce returns, so a tax on a product cannot be passed on to consumers.”

Suppose the equilibrium rate of return on investment is 5%. For a house worth $10,000, imposing a 1% annual property tax would reduce the property owner’s return from 5% to 4%. To restore the 5% rate of return, the capital value of the property must fall to $8,333.

Of course, this does not mean that property tax can instantly cause housing prices to fall. It merely changes the composition of the price. In the above example, property tax does not alter supply and demand in the market. The cash received by the seller and the cash paid by the buyer both decrease, while the reduced portion is subsequently paid by the buyer to the government in the form of property tax. The buyer does not benefit from the property tax, while the government, through the buyer, takes what originally belonged to the seller.

In short, property tax will not theoretically change the real price of housing or land. As for nominal prices, the impact of newly imposed property tax on housing prices has an upper limit—specifically, the extent to which the asset price must fall to maintain the original rate of return.

Therefore, applying accounting concepts such as the discount rate to misinterpret ownership rights as divisible time segments and then wrongly conclude that their future value is zero is completely erroneous. This practice actually harms property rights even more than taxation itself, because it uses a seemingly correct yet profoundly mistaken framework to symbolically reduce everyone’s property rights to zero in the future.

Buying a Bugatti, while knowing you must also spend the equivalent of an Audi each year on maintenance, does not mean that the luxury car’s value tends towards zero. We can only cautiously remind the buyer: “Have you prepared for two million-pound commitments?”