自由市场下私营部门的自发退出机制The Private Sector's Voluntary Exit Mechanism under the Free Market

By Timothy Huang

自发性秩序下的自由市场并不排除个体自由选择的政府市场参与，也并不因为私营部门的自发退出而改变其经济自由与否的本质。本文将从以下角度说明这一论断：首先，特定市场领域的某些特点将最终导致自由的市场参与者出于自身的最大利益选择唯一的产品或服务供应商，且这一现象与特定市场的初始状态无关；其次，政府的市场参与究竟是自由市场的一部分，还是对自由市场的损害，取决于这一参与在原理上是否足以仅利用市场机制（而不借助行政或法律强制）排除竞争，而非是否存在法律或政策确立这一参与的合法性甚至独占性；最后，这一自发退出理论并非对自由市场理论任何部分的否定，更不从任何角度论证政府干预市场的经济上的或道德上的合理性，这种退出——外在表现为政府对市场的有效正面干预——始终是自由市场本身的逻辑一环。自由市场从不排除政府的参与，只要它遵守平等的规则。

一

我在之前的文章中，试图提出以“因税亏损”的概念取代“转移支付比例”在调整单纯考察实际税率以判断经济自由程度的过程中的偏颇之处的作用。二者最大的区别在于，因税亏损剔除了相当一部分的转移支付内容，它们在自由市场条件下，排除政府参与，可以获得质量的提升和价格的下降。我将以此为出发点，首先解释为何另一部分未被剔除的、几乎在世界各国都由政府提供的产品或服务即使在自由市场条件下，由政府进行提供仍是最优的选项。

消防服务是一个典型的例子。许多凯恩斯主义者以及其他学派的干预主义者将消防服务作为典型的市场失效的例子，认为类似于消防这样的涉及公共利益和巨大成本的、经不起任何市场给予参与者第二次机会之情形的产品或服务，必须由政府提供，或由政府直接管制。然而，恰恰相反，消防服务由政府提供是一个典型的自由市场发挥作用的例证，这一原理，即一般市场主体的自发退出的理论基础，正是本文将要重点解释的。^[i]

在一个消防服务完全市场化的情境中，消防服务可由自由市场上的不同服务商提供，但是火灾不会区分消费者的多样化选择，一旦邻居家发生对自家构成潜在威胁的火灾，而其恰恰又与自己选择了不同的消防服务提供商，则自家的服务商将陷入两难的状态。一方面，它不可能也不应当被要求向未购买自身服务的消费者提供服务，然而，另一方面，一旦自己的客户因邻家的火灾而受到实际的威胁，则火势必定已经发展到难以控制的阶段，其客户的最大利益并无法得到最大的保障。

对此，消费者和消防服务提供商都会采取一定的措施加以应对。对于消费者而言，最简单直接的方式便是与上下楼层和隔壁房屋的业主们商议购买同一家消防服务提供商的服务，这样便可以避免上述难题；而消防服务提供商则会建立沟通和相互补偿机制，约定任何一家服务商接到其客户的报警，即使火灾发生在其客户的邻居的房产范围，仍应当由最先赶到的消防服务商进行灭火，而后由发生火灾的家庭所购买的服务商向最先赶到的服务商支付合理的费用，从而最大限度地保障各自客户的最大权益。

显然，在特定区域内，消费者和服务提供商的应对措施最终会指向由单一消防服务提供商对该相当大的特定区域提供消防服务——相邻的消费者越来越趋向于选择同一服务商，而任何事故发生后提供了最快捷最有效消防服务的服务商都会秋风扫落叶般地收割当地竞争对手的客户，毕竟他们谁也承担不起消防服务缺陷的后果，而邻居家起火后最先赶到的消防服务商无疑将是自己的最佳选择。因此，无需任何政府或其他权力机构的背书，自由市场上的消费者会在相当短的一段时间内自由地选择单一消防服务供应商。如果这一被消费者们自由统一选择的消防服务提供商不满足于细水长流式的躺着数钱，而妄图利用所形成的垄断地位提高价格或者降低服务质量，那么仅需一场火灾就足以如同摧毁其原先的竞争对手一般摧毁自己。

有趣的是，根据一般的市场竞争理论，在自由市场中，某一领域占有较大市场份额的供应商，如果试图利用自身的优势甚至垄断地位，提高价格或者为了节约成本而降低服务质量，则马上会有廉价的、优质的新的供应商加入市场竞争并且迅速蚕食其市场份额。甚至，市场上不时会有不惜以低利润、零利润甚至赔钱赚吆喝的方式寻求快速占领市场份额的竞争者。规模效应带来的额外利润是递减的，而为此所需额外支付的运营和管理成本却是递增的，占有优势地位的市场参与者通过薄利多销来延缓其市场份额被蚕食的努力效果是有天花板的。因此，一家独大的市场形态是不稳定的，自由市场天然地会形成多头竞争的格局。

然而，根据前述分析，以消防服务为代表的一些市场领域却呈现出完全相反的特点。

人们会怀疑，此时的统一消防服务是否必然由政府提供呢？如果我们真的认可自由竞争原则，我们会发现消防服务最终会自由地由政府提供。原因在于，随着市场的发展，各种商业形态日趋成熟，人们发现，自己无需为消防服务进行太多的付费，而只需要为自己的房屋购买保险即可——同样的费用，支付给消防服务商，消防服务商或许都难以发出工资，而如果以保费的形式支付给保险公司，保险公司竟能赚得盆满钵满的同时为自己提供更大程度的保障^[ii]——自然地，购买保险所获的经济收益和服务质量都远大于为消防付费，以利润为导向的私营部门在短暂联合后必然不得不彻底退出这一无利可图的市场。虽然最终“接盘”的是政府，但他们的竞争对手并非政府，而是降维打击的保险公司^[iii]。最终，政府成为了消防服务市场的唯一服务提供者；这并不是由于政府使用行政权力强制排除了市场竞争，而是政府即使进行补贴也无法鼓励竞争者回到这一市场，而不得不采用低效的、政府直接下场的方式进行供给。显然，在退出消防服务市场这件事情上，私营企业比政府拥有更大的自由。

这一现象并非消防服务所独有。例如，所有具有公示目的的登记业务，例如婚姻、房产等，在相当长的历史时期内都是由私营部门或者分散于各个地方的政府、自治团体、宗教部门等各自运行，但是随着世界逐步融为一体，公示的对象群体越来越大，不同文化传统和政治经济制度的国家的婚姻登记、不动产登记等迅速发展为以州甚至国家为单位的统一登记。原因类似，即使在自由竞争阶段，特定区域内的民众也会希望自己以公示为目的登记行为获得最优的效力，而不会去考虑购买廉价服务——这一方面是因为登记行为的经济成本本来就极低，不足以形成价格上的差异化竞争，因此规模越大、客户越多的登记部门，就无疑会被用户自由选择为唯一考虑使用的登记部门；另一方面，登记服务运营越久，其掌控的记录和公示效力就越成为新的竞争者难以逾越的护城河，除非被政府机关强制要求转移记录、停止运营。

甚至，我们眼下就有另一个实例。手机充电接口原本五花八门，然而仅仅经过十余年的发展，即使对于市场引领者苹果公司而言，他们也不得不放弃自身一贯坚持的lightning接口，不得不归入type-c阵营，于是，手机充电接口标准服务领域的“消防服务商联盟”便成立了。欧盟通过行政命令强制苹果公司改用type-c接口，可是其他公司却是自由地放弃了在充电接口标准领域的竞争，而选择与竞争对手在某种程度上建立联盟。这再一次说明，世间万物皆可在自由市场上由不同的供应商进行竞争，但并不是所有的领域都有利可图；那些暂时或者根本无利可图的商品或服务的供应商，自由地集中甚至退出市场都是十分常见的。

二

我们该如何评价这种集中呢？这取决于，自由市场究竟要求商品或服务的供应商应当时时刻刻处于充分自由竞争的状态，还是仅仅要求商品或服务的供应商具有不受政府干预的初始状态（而不论其自由发展的结果为何）？

回答这一问题的关键，在于明确，多个具有竞争力的供应商是否为充分自由竞争状态之必须？换言之，判断某个领域是否处于自由竞争状态，是否以该领域存在多个具有竞争力的参与者为前提？

我想明确提出这一观点：自由市场中特定领域的充分自由竞争之状态，不以该领域存在多个有竞争力的参与者为前提。

诺齐克曾用这样一句简短的话来表述自己对于判断正义与否的原则：如果初始状态是正义的，转移过程也是正义的，得到的状态必然是正义的。很多人将这一原则嘲讽为废话、大白话，学术一点的表达则是循环论证——转移过程的正义与否，如果不能凭诺齐克本人一句话确定，就只能继续往里套这一“公式”，最终还得凭他一句话去定。然而，大白话同时也是超越学派争议的大实话，他在阐述国家理论中所面临的逻辑难题在论证自由市场对竞争形态的要求时恰好被避开了。

如果我们相信自由市场是正义的——否则我们就没有必要讨论非正义或附条件的正义的通行要求——那么，只要初始状态是正义的，即商品或服务的供应商具有不受政府干预的初始状态，自由市场下的发展为何会得到非正义（即减损自由竞争和消费者利益）的结果呢？

自由市场是程序的理论、规则的理论，它从来不向人许诺包含某种绝对程度的结果的梦想。自由市场不是政府的敌人，也不把在市场竞争中消灭一切政府存在作为目标。如果一个人信奉自由市场下的自由竞争，却又在内心预设了这种竞争所应当达到的某种结果——无论这种结果描述了供应商的成分和状态，还是消费者的权益增减——他无疑在理论上是割裂的。

正是因为消费者无从得知谁能够提供最适合自己的产品和服务，我们才需要自由竞争的机制对供应者进行筛选，筛选的结果当然可以是某个垄断集团甚至政府最合适、最受欢迎，而无关理论家是否支持或喜欢这一结果。如果自由竞争的结果是可以预知的，或者是可以进行价值评价的，那便完全不是所谓的“自由竞争”，而是打着竞争的幌子，用虚假的竞争为既得利益正名和洗白的过程；那显然无异于说皇家马德里夺得冠军是好的，而巴塞罗那夺得冠军是令人遗憾的，那便不再是自由竞争了；甚至，如果有球迷叫嚣，为什么皇马和巴萨如此强大，却还要年年夺冠，天理何在，赫塔费、加迪斯、巴拉多利德也应该参与冠军争夺，要塑造西甲自己的莱斯特城——对于这种认知状态，我们还有什么必要与之聊球呢？

因此，自由市场仅仅要求，在给定的领域内，商品或服务的供应者应当具有不受政府干预的初始状态；相反，为了维持所谓的均衡竞争而运用政府力量调整自由竞争之结果，往往是政府经济权力扩张并且不断侵蚀自由市场的发端。

很多人会怀疑，以消防服务为例，在现实生活中，其并非一开始处于充分自由的竞争状态，甚至完美的自由市场都并不存在，消防服务从一开始便处于政府的严格管理下。他们声称，罗马的消防服务最初由某位执政官的私人组织提供，并非严格意义上的自由市场竞争者；而消防服务由纳税人负担、政府供养已经成为现代世界的惯例，而历史上并不存在一个消防服务首先由私人相互竞争、进而形成垄断集团最终公有化的过程。前述虚构的假设及其推演并不能解释现实世界的运行规则。

从历史的角度看，似乎确实没有文献记载过某个自由市场中的消费者自由地选择了消防服务的提供者这一历史事件。然而，正如反驳者们也十分乐意承认的那样，完美的自由市场并不存在，而这并不影响我们根据严谨的假设和无懈可击的逻辑进行推演。自由市场的反对者从来不是以“它不存在”作为辩驳的理论基础的。尤其是，要求任何观点的提出者必须附带历史证据本身违背了社会科学的性质所决定的一些基本原则，这其中就包括了社会无法进行实验，也无法充分控制影响因素。正如性恶论者不必抓来天生的恶人给性善论者看，而必须尝试用道理来说服对方。

况且，历史发展的阶段从来都不是平均分配的。工业革命近三百年的人类历史发展程度，超过了人来诞生以来的几十万年，如果用横轴平均记录时间的坐标系来描述人类的发展，则这个坐标系完全是没有办法观察细节的。如果一个文明比人类发达的多的外星文明观察地球，他们甚至可能宣称人类的历史仅仅只有三百年而已——因为前工业革命时代的历史对于他们太过渺小了。

那么，消费者为何要在“一段历史时期”这么长的时间内，各自选择不同的私人消防服务商，而不是从一开始就思考自己和邻居家消防服务商不一致的危险呢？消费者又为何要在“一段历史时期”这么长的时间内，对低廉的财产险保费不屑一顾，而和消防服务提供商就高的多的服务费用来回扯皮，以至于整个生意都做不成而被迫公有化呢？消费者难道都是牛马，不撞南墙不回头，非得等到自己家被邻居家的火烧了而自己的消防服务商在门外看着，才知道要和邻居商量选同一家服务商吗？消费者难道如此头铁，非要到整个市场崩溃掉、连行业龙头都要金盆洗手把市场交给国家后，才会去寻找价格更低廉的替代服务吗？

答案显然是否定的。

因此，我们可以明确回答本文第一部分所提出的问题：某些市场领域所出现的私营部门自发地结成垄断联盟甚至退出竞争或公有化的现象，完全符合自由市场的原则或要求，是自由市场条件下并存的多种竞争形态的一种。

三

综上，我希望明确：在充分的自由竞争下，私营部门完全可以自愿退出市场、退出与政府的竞争，或者与政府组成垄断的集团，而丝毫不减损这一市场的自由竞争的程度。

对于这一问题的重要性，我想在此稍作赘述。

长期以来，各派自由市场的信徒——无论是政治学上的古典自由主义者、自由至上主义者、保守主义者、无政府主义者，还是经济学上的芝加哥学派、奥地利学派——纷纷把政府与市场对立起来。他们对自由市场的理解、解释、坚持程度各异，但都习惯性地将政府视作对市场和自由竞争的威胁。排除自由竞争、扭曲价格信号、扰乱市场秩序、侵犯经济自由，政府仿佛天生就要和市场对着干。以至于，坚持自由市场的学者在事实上形成了“两个凡是”的错误观念：凡是政府的市场参与，都在客观上侵犯了其他主体的权利和经济自由；凡是政府提供的服务，都可以通过自由市场提供更加物美价廉的替代品。

但是，我们不能忽略政府在市场面前的双重角色。政府在大部分情形下，确如上述各学派从各个角度所言，是市场秩序的破坏者、自由竞争的排出者、经济自由的损害者、消费者主权的侵犯者，但在少数情形下——正如本文第一部分所着重举例的消防服务领域——政府也可以成为消费者自由选择的市场服务提供者。它们或许有着相似的外在表现，比如通过税收收取费用^[iv]、无差别的低质量服务、政府垄断供应等，但却和公立医疗和教育服务、国防服务等有着完全不同的内在逻辑。

忽视这一点，实际上阻碍了我们更加深入地分析和普及通常情况下的政府的经济干预如何以及如何深刻地阻碍了市场竞争和经济发展。如果笼统地将政府视为自由市场的敌人，甚至在自由市场自发形成的政府参与中对其大肆攻击，那么对敌人的批判就愈发沦为情感上的正确而非道理上的正确，那些宣扬政府调控市场的拥趸也更加难以辨别哪些是学派之间的攻讦、哪些是蕴含着深刻道理的批判，索性不再加以理会，而冠之以各种原教旨狂徒的称号。这对于自由市场的发展和巩固是不利的。

必须再次强调，本文并非对自由市场理论任何部分的否定，更不从任何角度论证政府干预市场的经济上的或道德上的合理性，而仅仅是为了试图拓展和加深人们对于自由市场及相关现象的认知和理解。如果能够认识到，就连政府也会在合适的情况下自发成为自由市场和自由竞争的一坏，那么这一理论的说服力显然就大大增强了。如果说教育、医疗、国防是压在自由市场身上的“三座大山”的话（见拙作“掀翻压在自由市场身上的三座大山”），消防就是久被忽略的“世外桃源”，它通过政府在市场原理和自由竞争下的绝对参与雄辩地说明，自由市场不仅包罗万象，而且海纳百川；不但教育、医疗、国防这些所谓的公共事业无法摆脱自由市场的规律，就连政府本身也要在市场规则下投身于自由竞争之中，并且获得了慷慨且公平的对待，在特定领域取得了成功。

^[i] 当然，我们并不能说干预主义者对消防服务的论述错误到不值一驳，但它显然与一些经验证据无法相符。许多涉及更广泛公众意义的、更大额运营成本的、更加经不起安全隐患的产品和服务都已经在实质上或名义上由私人部门提供，并取得了良好的效果，尤其是取得了比私有化改革以前更好的效果，航空、通信、水电气等生活能源、军工、皆属此例，而消防服务就其被赋予的试图用来排除自由竞争的特征而言，并无法从前者中脱颖而出。

^[ii] 很多人会误判因果，认为正是由于保险行业的市场化才使得其能够提供质优价廉的服务，而正是因为消防服务由政府独家提供，才会年年入不敷出向财政部门伸手要补贴，形成了消防行业被保险行业降维打击的错觉。

这里必须澄清的是，一方面，从历史上看，保险行业的诞生要远早于消防行业，这说明在消防行业产生时，保险行业远不足以通过保险服务的形式满足消费者对消弭或控制火灾风险的需求，否则一种新的商业模式怎么可能出现、发展并最终被政府收编呢？然而，正是由于保险这种商业模式的巨大发展潜力在历史的长河中被充分挖掘了出来并得到市场应用，相对地，消防服务的商业模式在一定时期内具有竞争优势，却因为这一商业模式本身较低的天花板而又被历久弥新的保险行业所击溃。

另一方面，正如许多反对者心知肚明的那样，包括消防服务在内的诸多今天看来理应由政府提供的所谓“公共服务”，在相当长的一段历史时期内都是由私人提供并且存在相当程度的竞争的，保险行业市场化而消防行业公有化，本就是自由市场长期发展的结果。在自由市场上，行业内部的竞争和行业之间的竞争同时存在是完全可能的，而成为没有私营部门愿意参与的、被政府收编的行业，正可谓是自由市场下行业间竞争落败者的结局。

^[iii] 当然，人们会强调，如果消防服务完全不存在，那么就房屋火灾这一项风险，保险公司也完全无法运行，因为任何火灾都将导致整个区域的毁灭，保费将变得极高且毫无竞争力。然而，换个角度看，消防服务如此低廉的收费与私营保险部门的蓬勃发展和薄利多销正是市场竞争条件下行业间的价格平衡。商业竞争，尤其是行业间的竞争，从来不向政治斗争一样你死我活，正如马车退出交通运输业后在休闲旅游业重新找到了自己的位置，消防服务行业也彻底沦为了靠政府供养的、毫无盈利空间的廉价必需品供应行业。

^[iv] 不必对税收感到恐慌。税收是强制的，是对经济自由的侵犯，可是具体到税收中用于消防服务的一笔费用，自由市场的信徒只需要用最土最笨的方法去验证：自己成立一家消防公司，看看能把价格做到多少，能不能抢下市场份额。

The free market under the spontaneous order does not exclude the participation of the government market of individuals' free choice, nor does it change the essence of economic freedom because of the voluntary withdrawal of the private sector. This article will illustrate this assertion from the following perspectives: first, certain characteristics of a particular market segment will eventually lead to free market participants choosing the only product or service provider in their own best interests, and this phenomenon has nothing to do with the initial state of a particular market; Secondly, whether government market participation is part of the free market or harms the free market depends on whether this participation is sufficient in principle to exclude competition only by using market mechanisms (without administrative or legal coercion), rather than whether there is a law or policy to establish the legitimacy or even exclusivity of this participation. Finally, this theory of voluntary withdrawal is not a denial of any part of the free market theory, let alone the economic or moral justification of government intervention in the market from any angle, and this withdrawal—which is outwardly manifested as effective positive government intervention in the market – is always a logical part of the free market itself. The free market never excludes government participation, as long as it follows the equal rules of the free market.

I

In my previous article, I tried to propose the role of replacing the "transfer payment ratio" with the concept of "tax loss" in adjusting the bias in the process of judging the degree of economic freedom by simply examining the actual tax rate. The biggest difference between the two is that a considerable part of the transfer payment content is excluded due to tax losses, and they can obtain quality improvement and price reduction under free market conditions, excluding government participation. I will start by explaining why the provision of another part of the product or service that has not been excluded and is provided by the government in almost every country in the world is still the best option even under free market conditions.

The fire service is a prime example. Many Keynesians, as well as other interventionists, have cited firefighting services as a typical example of market failure, arguing that products or services such as firefighting, which involve public interest and enormous costs, and that cannot withstand any situation where the market gives participants a second chance, must be provided by the government or directly regulated by the government. However, on the contrary, the provision of fire services by the government is a typical example of the role of the free market, and this principle, that is, the theoretical basis of the spontaneous withdrawal of general market players, is what this article will focus on.^[i]

In a situation where fire services are completely market-oriented, fire services can be provided by different service providers in the free market, but fire will not distinguish the diversity of consumers' choices, once a fire that poses a potential threat to their own home, and they choose a different fire service provider from themselves, their service provider will be in a dilemma. On the one hand, it cannot and should not be required to provide services to consumers who have not purchased its own services, but on the other hand, once its customers are actually threatened by a neighbor's fire, the fire must have developed to an uncontrollable stage, and the best interests of its customers cannot be maximally protected.

Consumers and fire service providers will take certain measures to deal with this. For consumers, the easiest and most direct way is to negotiate with the owners of the neighbouring or upper floors and the next floor to purchase the services of the same fire service provider, so as to avoid the above problems. The fire service provider will establish a communication and mutual compensation mechanism, stipulating that if any service provider receives an alarm from its customer, even if the fire occurs in the property area of its customer's neighbor, the fire service provider who arrives first should still extinguish the fire, and then the service provider purchased by the family where the fire occurred pays a reasonable fee to the service provider who arrives first, so as to protect the maximum rights and interests of their respective customers.

Obviously, within a given area, the response of consumers and service providers will ultimately lead to a single fire service provider providing fire protection services to that sizable specific area - neighboring consumers are increasingly inclined to choose the same service provider, and the service provider that provides the fastest and most effective fire protection service after any accident will harvest the customers of local competitors like autumn winds, after all, none of them can afford the consequences of fire service defects, and the fire service provider who arrives first after the neighbor's fire will undoubtedly be your best choice. Therefore, without any government or other authority endorsement, consumers in the free market are free to choose a single fire service provider for a fairly short period of time. If this fire service provider, which is freely and uniformly chosen by consumers, is not satisfied with lying down and counting money, but tries to use the monopoly position formed to raise prices or reduce the quality of service, then a fire alone is enough to destroy itself as if it were destroying its original competitors.

Interestingly, according to the general theory of market competition, in the free market, if a supplier with a large market share in a certain field tries to use its own advantages or even a monopoly position to raise prices or reduce service quality in order to save costs, cheap and high-quality new suppliers will immediately join the market competition and quickly eat away at its market share. Even, from time to time, there will be competitors in the market who do not hesitate to seek to quickly occupy market share by making low profits, zero profits, or even losing money. The additional profits brought by the scale effect are decreasing, while the additional operating and management costs required for this purpose are increasing, and there is a ceiling to the efforts of market players in a dominant position to delay the erosion of their market share through small profits and quick turnover. Therefore, the market form of a dominant company is unstable, and the free market will naturally form a pattern of bull competition.

However, according to the above analysis, some market segments represented by fire protection services show completely opposite characteristics.

One wonders if the unified fire service at this time will necessarily be provided by the government? If we really endorse the principle of free competition, we will find that fire services will eventually be provided by the government through the free choice of consumers. The reason is that with the development of the market, various business forms are becoming more and more mature, and people find that they do not need to pay too much for fire services, but only need to buy insurance for their own houses - the same fee, paid to the fire service provider, the fire service provider may be difficult to pay wages, and if it is paid to the insurance company in the form of premiums, the insurance company can make a lot of money while providing a greater degree of protection for itself^[ii]Naturally, the economic benefits and quality of services from buying insurance are far greater than paying for fire protection, and the profit-oriented private sector will inevitably have to withdraw from this unprofitable market altogether after a short union. Although it was the government that finally "took over", their competitors were not the government, but the insurance companies that reduced dimensionality^[iii]. In the end, the government became the only service provider in the fire service market; This is not because the government uses administrative power to forcibly exclude market competition, but because even if the government subsidizes, it cannot encourage competitors to return to this market, and has to use an inefficient and government-direct way to supply. Obviously, private companies have more freedom than the government in withdrawing from the fire service market.

This phenomenon is not unique to the fire service. For example, all registration services with the purpose of publicity, such as marriage and real estate, have been operated by the private sector or scattered governments, autonomous organizations, religious departments, etc. in various places for a long period of time, but with the gradual integration of the world, the target groups of publicity are getting larger and larger, and marriage registration and real estate registration in countries with different cultural traditions and political and economic systems have rapidly developed into unified registration at the state or even national level. The reason is similar, even in the stage of free competition, people in a specific area will hope that their registration behavior for the purpose of publicity will obtain the best effect, and will not consider purchasing cheap services - on the one hand, this is because the economic cost of registration behavior is extremely low and not enough to form differentiated competition in price. On the other hand, the longer the registration service operates, the more the records and publicity effects it controls become an insurmountable moat for new competitors, unless the government is forced to transfer records and stop operating.

Even, we have another example right now. Mobile phone charging interfaces were originally varied, but after only more than ten years of development, even for the market leader Apple, they had to give up their own Lightning interface and had to belong to the type-c camp, so the "Fire Service Provider Alliance" in the field of mobile phone charging interface standard services was established. The European Union forced Apple to switch to the Type-C interface through an executive order, but other companies have freely abandoned competition in the field of charging interface standards and chose to form alliances with competitors to some extent. This once again shows that everything in the world can be competed with different suppliers in the free market, but not all areas are profitable; It is common for suppliers of goods or services that are temporarily or not profitable to freely concentrate or even withdraw from the market.

II

How should we evaluate this concentration? It depends on whether the free market requires suppliers of goods or services to be in a state of full free competition at all times, or simply requires suppliers of goods or services to have an initial state free from government interference (regardless of the outcome of their free development).

The key to answering this question is to clarify, is it necessary for multiple competitive suppliers to compete in a state of full free competition? In other words, whether a field is in a state of free competition is premised on the existence of multiple competitive players in the field?

I would like to make this point clear: the state of full free competition in a particular area of the free market does not presuppose the presence of multiple competitive players in that field.

Nozick once used such a short sentence to express his principle of judging justice: if the initial state is just, the transfer process is also just, and the obtained state must be just. Many people ridicule this principle as nonsense and vernacular, and the expression of an academic point is a circular argument - if the justice of the transfer process cannot be determined by Nozick himself, he can only continue to set this "formula" inside, and in the end it has to be determined by his words. However, the vernacular is also a truth that transcends school controversy, and the logical problems faced in state theory are avoided when arguing for the free market's requirements for competition forms.

If we believe that free markets are just – otherwise we would not need to discuss the universal requirement of unjust or conditional justice – then why can development under a free market result be unjust (i.e., derogate from free competition and consumer interests) as long as the initial state is just, i.e., the supplier of goods or services has an initial state of no government interference?

The free market is the theory of procedures, the theory of rules, and it never promises people dreams of some absolute degree of results. The free market is not the enemy of the government, nor does it aim to eliminate all government existence in market competition. If a person believes in free competition in a free market, but presupposes in his heart a certain outcome that such competition should achieve—whether this result describes the composition and state of suppliers or the increase or decrease of consumer rights and interests—he is undoubtedly theoretically fragmented.

It is precisely because consumers have no way of knowing who can provide the most suitable products and services for them that we need a mechanism of free competition to screen suppliers, and the result of the screening can of course be the most suitable and popular for a monopoly group or even the government, regardless of whether the theorist supports or likes the result. If the result of free competition is predictable or can be valued, then it is not the so-called "free competition" at all, but the process of using false competition to justify and whitewash vested interests under the guise of competition; That is obviously tantamount to saying that it is good for Real Madrid to win the championship, and it is regrettable that Barcelona wins the championship, so it is no longer free competition; Even, if there are fans clamoring, why are Real Madrid and Barcelona so strong, but they still have to win the championship every year, what is the reason, Getafe, Cadiz, Valladolid should also participate in the championship competition, to shape La Liga's own Leicester City - for this cognitive state, what do we need to talk to about it?

Therefore, the free market only requires that the supplier of goods or services in a given field should have an initial state free from government interference; On the contrary, the result of the use of government power to adjust free competition in order to maintain so-called balanced competition is often the beginning of the expansion of government economic power and the continuous erosion of the free market.

Many people will suspect that in real life, for example, fire services are not in a state of full free competition at the beginning, and even a perfect free market does not exist, and fire services have been under the strict management of the government from the beginning. They claim that Rome's fire service was originally provided by a private organization of a certain consul and was not strictly a free-market competitor; It has become a practice in the modern world that fire protection services are borne by taxpayers and supported by the government, and there is no process in history where fire protection services are first competing with each other by private individuals, and then forming the final public ownership of monopoly groups. The aforementioned hypotheses and their deductions do not explain the rules of operation in the real world.

From a historical point of view, there does not seem to be a documented historical event in which a consumer in a free market freely chose a provider of fire protection services. However, as the naysayers are happy to admit, there is no perfect free market, and this does not prevent us from deducing based on rigorous assumptions and impeccable logic. Opponents of the free market have never used "it does not exist" as a theoretical basis for their arguments. In particular, the requirement that the proposer of any point of view must be accompanied by historical evidence itself violates some basic principles determined by the nature of the social sciences, including the inability of society to conduct experiments and to adequately control the influencing factors. Those who hold the view of human nature being evil do not have to catch inherently evil people to show their opponents, but must try to persuade each other with reason, which is precisely what it means.

Moreover, the stages of historical development have never been evenly distributed. The degree of human history development in the past 300 years of the Industrial Revolution has exceeded the hundreds of thousands of years since the birth of man. If an alien civilization with a much more developed civilization than humans observes the Earth, they may even claim that the history of humanity is only 300 years - because the history of the pre-industrial revolution era is too small for them.

So why do consumers choose different private fire service providers for such a long period of time, instead of thinking about the danger of inconsistency between themselves and their neighbors' fire service providers from the beginning? Why do consumers disdain low property insurance premiums for such a long period of time, and fight back and forth with fire service providers over high service fees, so that the entire business cannot be done and is forced to be publicized? Do consumers have to wait until their home is burned by the fire of their neighbor's house and their fire service provider is watching from the door before they know that they want to discuss with their neighbors to choose the same service provider? Are consumers so hard-headed that they have to wait until the entire market collapses and even the industry leaders have to wash their hands in a golden basin before looking for cheaper alternative services after the market is handed over to the state?

The answer is obviously no.

Therefore, we can clearly answer the question raised in the first part of this article: the phenomenon of the private sector spontaneously forming monopoly alliances or even withdrawing from competition or public ownership in certain market areas is fully in line with the principles or requirements of the free market, and is one of the various forms of competition that coexist under the conditions of the free market.

III

In summary, I would like to make it clear that under full free competition, the private sector can voluntarily withdraw from the market, withdraw from competition with the government, or form a monopoly group with the government, without detracting from the degree of free competition in this market.

I would like to elaborate on the importance of this issue here.

For a long time, believers in the free market - whether they are classical liberals, liberal supremacists, conservatives, anarchists in political science, or the Chicago School and Austrian School in economics - have pitted government against the market. They have different understandings, interpretations, and adherence to free markets, but they all habitually regard the government as a threat to the market and free competition. Excluding free competition, distorting price signals, disrupting market order, and infringing on economic freedom, the government seems to be born to work against the market. As a result, scholars who adhere to the free market have in fact formed the wrong concept of "two whatevers": all government participation in the market objectively infringes on the rights and economic freedoms of other subjects; All services provided by the government can be provided through the free market to provide better and cheaper alternatives.

However, we cannot ignore the dual role of the government in front of the market. In most cases, the government is indeed a destroyer of the market order, an expulsion of free competition, a victim of economic freedom, and an infringer of consumer sovereignty, but in a few cases, as the fire service field emphasized in the first part of this article, the government can also be a market service provider of consumers' free choice. They may have similar external manifestations, such as charging fees through taxes^[iv], indiscriminate low-quality services, government monopoly supply, etc., but they have a completely different internal logic from public medical and education services, national defense services, etc.

Ignoring this actually prevents us from analyzing and popularizing more deeply how and how government intervention in the economy under normal circumstances profoundly hinders market competition and economic development. If the government is regarded as an enemy of the free market in general, and even attacked in the spontaneous participation of the free market, then the criticism of the enemy will become more and more emotionally correct rather than reasonably correct, and it will be even more difficult for those who advocate the government's regulation of the market to distinguish which are attacks between schools of thought and which are criticisms with profound truth. This is not good for the development and consolidation of the free market.

It must be emphasised once again that this article does not deny any part of the free market theory, let alone demonstrate the economic or moral rationality of government intervention in the market from any angle, but only tries to expand and deepen people's knowledge and understanding of the free market and related phenomena. If it can be recognised that even the government will spontaneously become a bad thing about free markets and free competition under the right circumstances, then the persuasiveness of this theory will obviously be greatly enhanced. If education, medical care, and national defense are the "three mountains" that weigh on the free market (see my work " Overthrowing the Three Great Burdens on the Free Market"), fire protection is a long-neglected "paradise", which eloquently illustrates through the government's absolute participation in market principles and free competition that the free market is not only all-encompassing, but also inclusive; Not only can the so-called public utilities such as education, medical care, and national defense not escape the laws of the free market, but even the government itself must devote itself to free competition under the rules of the market, and have been treated generously and fairly, and have achieved success in specific fields.

^[i] Of course, we cannot say that the interventionists' discourse on fire services is so wrong that it is not worth refuting, but it clearly does not match some empirical evidence. Many products and services that involve a wider public sense, have greater operating costs, and are less resistant to safety hazards have been provided by the private sector in substance or nominal and have achieved good results, especially better results than before the privatization reform, such as aviation, communications, water and electricity, and military industry, while fire services do not stand out from the former in terms of the characteristics they are given to try to exclude free competition.

^[ii] Many people will misjudge cause and effect, thinking that it is precisely because of the marketization of the insurance industry that it can provide high-quality and low-cost services, and it is precisely because the fire protection services are exclusively provided by the government that they will not be able to make ends meet every year and reach out to the financial department for subsidies, forming the illusion that the fire protection industry is hit by the dimensionality reduction of the insurance industry.

It must be clarified here that on the one hand, historically, the insurance industry was born much earlier than the fire protection industry, which shows that when the fire protection industry was born, the insurance industry was far from enough to meet consumers' needs to eliminate or control fire risks in the form of insurance services. However, it is precisely because the huge development potential of the insurance business model has been fully tapped and applied in the market in the long river of history, relatively speaking, the business model of fire protection services has a competitive advantage in a certain period of time, but because of the low ceiling of this business model itself, it has been defeated by the timeless insurance industry.

On the other hand, as many opponents are well aware, many so-called "public services" that seem to be provided by the government today, including fire services, have been provided by private individuals for a long period of time and have a considerable degree of competition. In the free market, it is entirely possible for competition within and between industries to exist at the same time, and becoming an industry that the private sector is willing to participate in and is incorporated by the government can be described as the end of the loser of the competition between industries in the free market.

^[iii] Of course, one would emphasize that if the fire service is completely absent, then the insurance company will not be able to operate at all in terms of the risk of house fire, because any fire will lead to the destruction of the entire area, and the premiums will become extremely high and uncompetitive. However, from another perspective, such low fees for fire services and the vigorous development and small profits of the private insurance sector are the price balance between industries under market competition. Just as horse-drawn carriages have regained their place in the leisure tourism industry after withdrawing from the transportation industry, the fire service industry has also completely become a cheap necessities supply industry supported by the government with no room for profit.

^[iv] Don't panic about taxes. Taxation is compulsory and an infringement of economic freedom, but when it comes to the cost of fire services in taxes, believers in the free market only need to use the most clumsy and stupid method to verify: set up a fire protection company to see how much the price can be achieved and whether it can grab market share.