霍尔木兹海峡的“空城计”与战略文盲：从历史演义到现代海战 The 'Empty Fort Strategy' and Strategic Illiteracy in the Strait of Hormuz: A Deep Deconstruction from Historical Romance to Modern Naval Warfare

作为连接波斯湾与阿拉伯海的战略通道，这条最窄处仅约33公里的水道，承载着全球约20%的石油消费量、超过四分之一的海运石油贸易，以及全球五分之一的液化天然气（LNG）供给。近来，随着中东地区冲突的不断升级，伊朗频繁释放出将“封锁”霍尔木兹海峡的战略威慑。特别是在2026年3月，随着局势的极度恶化，美国中央司令部（CENTCOM）宣布在海峡附近摧毁了16艘伊朗布雷舰及多艘军舰，这一激烈的军事对抗瞬间将全球能源市场的恐慌情绪推向了顶峰。在媒体的渲染与公众的认知中，霍尔木兹海峡似乎随时可能被彻底切断，进而引发全球经济的停摆。

然而，如果剥离掉地缘政治表层的喧嚣，深入到军事物理学、现代海战战术法则以及全球航运商业逻辑的内核之中，便会发现所谓的“彻底封锁”更多是一种基于战略信号传递的“表演性威慑”（Performative Deterrence），而非具备绝对可行性的军事现实。这种将局部战术骚扰等同于战略性物理封锁的认知偏差，在很大程度上源于公众乃至部分决策群体在军事认知能力上的结构性缺陷。在当代战略研究领域，学者们将这种缺乏对军事后勤、资源调度与概率进行理性分析，转而依赖感性、道德化或文学化叙事的现象，称为“战略文盲”（Strategic Illiteracy）。

在这一语境下，古典军事演义——尤其是中国历史中广为人知的《三国演义》里的“失街亭”与“空城计”——为我们提供了一个极佳的隐喻和跨界分析框架。这两个在中国文化语境中家喻户晓的典故，不仅精准地映射了伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡所面临的战术困境与采用的心理博弈策略，更深刻地揭示了深受传统演义文化影响的受众在面对现代复杂多域战（Multi-domain warfare）时，所展现出的深层认知谬误。本文旨在融合海战理论、航运经济学、风险定价机制以及战略文化批判，对霍尔木兹海峡的封锁威胁进行深度解构，论证为何伊朗的封锁策略在本质上是现代版的“马谡守街亭”与“诸葛亮抚琴”，并借此剖析历史文学叙事如何导致了现代公众在军事认知层面的深层板结。

物理拒止与制海权的鸿沟：现代海战语境下的“失街亭”

在评估任何试图阻断全球主要海上交通线的军事行动时，现代海军学说中有一个核心的概念分野：即“制海权”（Sea Control）与“海上拒止”（Sea Denial）。这两者在所需调动的国家资源、兵力规模以及最终达成的战略效果上有着天壤之别，而混淆这两个概念，正是产生“封锁幻觉”的理论根源。

伊朗对霍尔木兹海峡的控制策略，在形式与实质上高度契合了“马谡守街亭”的战术逻辑。在《三国演义》及真实的历史记载中，马谡被诸葛亮委以重任，把守具有重大战略意义的咽喉要道街亭，以捍卫刚刚就地打通的粮道。马谡放弃了当道扎营、利用城墙与营寨抹平器械差距的稳妥策略，转而选择屯兵于缺乏水源的孤山之上，试图依托“居高临下、势如破竹”的兵法教条，以期出其不意地歼灭魏军先锋张郃。这一决策的根本错误并不在于兵法原理本身的失效，而在于资源与兵力的绝对不对称：马谡在兵力、装备和补给上远逊于魏军前锋，更遑论司马懿的主力大军，他缺乏实现其设想战果所必需的物质基础。一旦张郃切断水源，将遭遇战转化为围困战，蜀军在又渴又饿且一露头便暴露在敌方先发制人火力下的状态下，所谓的“居高临下”便沦为任人宰割的绝境。

伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）在霍尔木兹海峡北岸的军事部署，同样面临着这种“守街亭”式的物理与资源困境。从表面上看，伊朗拥有显著的地理优势：其庞大的岸基反舰导弹射程足以覆盖整个海峡，美军在中东的基地是固定的明牌，而来往的商业油轮在缺乏护航时如同暴露在蜀军火力下的魏军一般脆弱。此外，伊朗还拥有大量廉价的非对称武器，例如成本低至1500美元的接触式水雷、快速攻击艇以及自杀式无人机。这些因素共同构建了一种极具压迫感的视觉威慑。然而，正如古代兵书未能告诉马谡如何在无水之山上抵御围困一样，静态的战略威慑理论也掩盖了现代海战中残酷的战术时间差与生存性危机。

在现代侦察打击一体化（察打一体）的高科技作战环境下，伊朗的岸基武器从驶出地下掩体、展开、发射到重新隐蔽，需要数分钟的窗口期；而拥有绝对制空权、卫星监视网络和电磁优势的美军及盟友力量，其锁定并实施精确打击的反应时间已被压缩至数十秒。2026年3月10日美军对伊朗布雷舰的毁灭性打击，生动地证明了在缺乏制空权和全面制海权的情况下，任何暴露的岸基或近海打击平台都会立刻成为反击的活靶子。伊朗革命卫队的导弹与无人机储备“打一发少一发”，而面对美国、以色列及海湾国家昂贵但极其庞大的拦截系统与反无人机装备，其弹药消耗比极不平衡。因此，一旦伊朗的武器阵地暴露，就等于召唤毁灭性打击，其保命的唯一手段是长期隐蔽于地下，这使得持续、高强度的火力封锁成为不可能完成的后勤与生存任务。

要真正实现对一条国际大通道的“物理封锁”，其战略标杆并非区域性的导弹袭扰或短暂的航道布雷，而是第一次世界大战期间大英帝国皇家海军对德国公海舰队及其海上生命线实施的封锁。当时，英国采取了“远海封锁”（Distant Blockade）战略，通过第十巡洋舰队（Tenth Cruiser Squadron）在苏格兰、挪威与冰岛之间的广袤海域进行不间断的常态化巡航，并在英吉利海峡布下密集的水雷阵与反潜网。这支规模从8艘迅速扩充至40艘舰艇的舰队，在三年半的时间里冒着严寒与U型潜艇的致命威胁，对所有试图突破封锁的商船进行拦截与搜查，最终切断了德国的全球贸易命脉，导致其国内经济与后勤体系崩溃。这种级别的封锁是典型的“优势战役”，遵循《孙子兵法》中“十则围之”的严密逻辑——封锁方必须拥有数倍乃至十倍于被封锁方的兵力、资源与战舰，并付出巨大的时间、燃料与实际战损代价，以确保漏网之鱼降至最低。而试图用“劣势兵力”去完成“优势战役”的战略目标，是对军事常识的严重违背。

要理解这种战略概念维度的差异，我们可以将“绝对制海权主导的物理封锁”（以一战英国远海封锁为例）与“海上拒止主导的非对称袭扰”（以伊朗霍尔木兹海峡行动为例）进行多维度的对比。在核心战略目标上，前者旨在完全阻断敌方及中立国商船的通行，扼杀敌方经济命脉，掌握制海权；而后者无法控制海域，但通过增加航行风险与成本，实施政治勒索与战略信号传递。在兵力与资源投入方面，物理封锁需要压倒性的舰队规模（如第十巡洋舰队）、不间断的常态化巡逻、庞大的后勤燃料支持与雷区维护；非对称袭扰则依赖廉价、隐蔽的非对称武器（小型布雷艇、无人机、岸基反舰导弹），进行间歇性的“游击式”打击。在战术生存与风险层面，拥有制海权的舰队具备正面对抗能力，主动寻求与敌方主力决战（如日德兰海战的战略算计），能够承受一定战损以维持封锁线；相比之下，非对称平台的生存能力极低，在面临拥有制空权敌方的察打一体威胁时，武器一经暴露即面临被定点清除的风险（如2026年3月美军摧毁16艘布雷舰）。最终在实际阻断效果上，真正的封锁能实现事实上的贸易隔绝，将敌方物资进口量降至最低（如1918年荷兰对德粮食出口降至零）；而袭扰无法实现物理隔绝，高利润驱使下的商船（关闭AIS的黑船）在承担高昂保费后依然会穿越海峡。

反观伊朗，要在最窄处33公里、适合油轮通行的深水航道宽达11公里的霍尔木兹海峡实施类似级别的物理阻断，唯一理论上的可行性是发动无限制潜艇战与大规模立体水雷战。然而，水雷封锁并非如同在即时战略游戏（如《突袭》或《红色警戒》）中用鼠标点击放置“磁暴线圈”或雷区那般简单。在宽度11公里、具备复杂洋流的海峡进行有效的三维立体水雷封锁，保守估计需要部署一千颗以上的现代化水雷。尽管美国情报评估显示伊朗拥有约6000颗各型水雷的库存，但要将静态的库存转化为动态的实战封锁线，面临着难以逾越的战术鸿沟。

伊朗革命卫队目前残存的主要是非专业的微小型布雷艇，单次出航布雷数量极度受限（不超过二三十颗）；要完成一千颗水雷的密集部署，需要进行三五十次高强度的海上联合作业。在美军复仇者级（Avenger-class）扫雷舰（采用木质与玻璃纤维混合船体以降低磁性特征）、濒海战斗舰（LCS）以及空中先进反水雷平台的高压巡逻与猎杀下，这种大规模、长时间的布雷行动无异于自杀。美军甚至先发制人地摧毁了伊朗用于储存水雷的地堡，直接从源头上瘫痪了其发动大规模水雷战的能力。因此，许多缺乏军事常识的人将伊朗的水雷库存简单等同于霍尔木兹海峡封锁线的“血条”——认为5000大于1000便能成功封锁——这种剥离了作战环境与敌方反制措施的线性思维，正是“马谡式”悲剧在现代战略分析中的重演。

商业逻辑与风险定价机制：全球航运体系中的“空城计”

既然伊朗在军事物理学上无法达成对霍尔木兹海峡的绝对封锁，为何全球舆论和金融市场依然对其行动感到极度恐慌？油价的飙升、伦敦保险市场的撤保声明以及部分航运公司的绕航决定，是否意味着伊朗的封锁在实质上已经取得了成功？要解答这一问题，必须将分析维度从纯粹的军事对抗引入航运经济学与全球海洋风险定价机制。正如该问题在军事逻辑上等同于“失街亭”，其在商业逻辑上则完美对应了古典演义中的另一个经典桥段——“空城计”。

现代军事观察家与历史学者普遍认为，《三国演义》中诸葛亮在西城面对司马懿十万大军时大开城门、抚琴退敌的故事充满了文学虚构与神化色彩。在真实的军事行动中，一队精锐的侦察兵便足以探明虚实，司马懿的抱头鼠窜完全不符合基本的战术侦察逻辑与战斗机制的预设。空城计之所以能在文学世界中成功，依赖于对敌方统帅心理绝对且无误差的掌控，这在充满迷雾的真实战争中是极其罕见的。然而，在霍尔木兹海峡的现实博弈中，那些因恐慌而停滞不前的各国商船与油轮，正扮演着“空城外犹豫不决的魏军”的角色；而全球海洋保险市场的价格信号机制，则充当了决定船只是否前行、打破空城幻象的“侦察兵”。

在全球航运体系中，对军事冲突区域的风险定价主要由伦敦保险市场的高级联合战争委员会（Joint War Committee, JWC）负责。该委员会由劳合社（Lloyd's）及其他保险巨头的资深承保人与独立安全顾问组成，负责划定“除外区域”（Listed Areas）或“高风险水域”。当商船航经这些被评估为具有高度战争风险（如导弹袭击、水雷、国家扣押）的海域时，常规的船体与机械保险将自动失效，船东必须向承保人申报并进行商业谈判，缴纳一笔额外的“战争险保费”（Additional Premium, AP），这笔保费通常按船体总价值的一定百分比计算，覆盖期仅为7天。

在危机爆发初期，面对不明朗的局势和激增的物理风险，保险公司往往会采取极端避险措施，大幅提高战争险费率，甚至发出取消承保的通知（Notice of Cancellation），以争取时间重新评估风险模型并调整费率。此时，海峡的通过成本急剧上升，部分风险厌恶型的航运公司会选择关闭船舶应答器（AIS）、在波斯湾外锚泊观望，或者做出代价高昂的绕航决定.这种短期内的航运停滞与物流混乱，在表面上制造出了一种“海峡已被成功封锁”的假象，恰如司马懿面对空城时的短暂退却。

然而，商业逻辑的核心在于价格激励与利润驱动。正如马克思所言，只要资本的利润给得足够高，自然会有敢于铤而走险的入局者。如果用商业逻辑判断封锁是否成功，就必须一以贯之地运用商业逻辑，而不能在军事逻辑有利时谈军事，在商业现象有利时谈商业。当原油价格因地缘政治溢价而从每桶80美元飙升至100美元甚至120美元时，这种高额的价格信号足以覆盖激增的保险费率和聘请武装安保人员的额外成本。此时，局势便从宏观的“绝对封锁”降维成了微观的“山匪劫道”博弈模型。

在这个过程中，“空城计”中本该出现的侦察兵角色，由伊朗本国的油轮、与伊朗关系暧昧国家的船只（如俄罗斯、印度等），以及部分敢于承担高风险以博取高额运费的独立船东（如部分希腊船东）所扮演。这些“侦察兵”通过实际的、提着脑袋赚钱的试探性航行，向全球市场传递出三个明确的事实信号：

第一，霍尔木兹海峡并未被水雷或战舰物理封锁，航道依然保持物理通畅；第二，伊朗的打击具有高度的选择性与表演性，其官方口径也承认对特定国家的船只予以放行；第三，伊朗革命卫队的海上力量既无力、也无理对绝大多数通过的国际船只进行无差别打击，因为这不仅会招致毁灭性的国际军事干预，也会切断自身的经济命脉。

整个商业逻辑与风险定价机制的运作可以分为三个商业博弈阶段。首先是危机爆发期，此时保险市场（JWC及承保人）会发布“除外区域”警告，发出撤保通知，大幅上调战争险附加保费（AP）。作为反应，风险厌恶型的航运企业会选择停航、观望，或选择绕行好望角（增加12天航程与高额成本）。这导致市场的宏观结果是运力短期骤降，运费飙升，原油价格因危机溢价急剧上涨，从而制造出“封锁成功”的假象。接下来是试探与套利期，保险市场开始重新评估风险模型，根据海军护航与实际遇袭概率调整费率。同时，高风险偏好船东（即“侦察兵”）在超额利润驱动下，关闭AIS强行闯关穿越海峡。这一阶段传递出的价格信号和宏观结果是，市场发现物理航道并未封闭，高油价足以覆盖高保费，黑市交易与冒险航行填补了运力真空。最后是渐进常态化期，随着北约及美军护航的介入，风险概率下降，保险市场的AP费率逐步压缩回落。算账后的主流承运企业发现支付AP维持原航线仍优于绕航，于是纷纷重返霍尔木兹航线。最终，市场信心恢复，物流节奏重新建立，价格信号促使替代手段入场，以市场机制宣告了“物理封锁”的破产。

随着这些信息的透明化，市场的不确定性开始急剧降低。北约及其盟国的海军巡逻、护航任务（如驻扎在巴林的美国第五舰队）以及北约航运中心（NATO Shipping Centre）的情报共享，进一步降低了船舶遇袭的实际概率。保险市场在接收到这些安全信号后，会逐步压缩战争险附加保费的比例，促使更多运营商在权衡绕航成本与保费成本后，选择重返这条更短、更经济的航线，最终实现航运秩序的渐进式常态化。

因此，军事封锁的战略目的是从物理事实上彻底阻断人员与物资的流通；而商业上的“停航”仅仅是对风险溢价与保险条款变动的短期应激反应。只要油价在一定区间内上下波动，而非呈现出由于供给彻底中断而导致的指数级爆炸（例如涨至每桶200美元以上），就恰恰证明了波斯湾的石油正在通过更昂贵的对冲手段和高风险路径持续向全球输出。价格信号机制的存在不仅证明了市场在进行高效率的自我调节，更通过实际通航的数据，宣告了伊朗试图通过恐吓来实现“封锁”战略的彻底破产。

表演性威慑与非对称升级：重塑地缘政治的戏剧学

既然物理封锁在军事上不可行，商业阻断又会被市场强大的价格机制与套利行为所消化，那么伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡乃至整个中东地区实施的一系列激进军事行动，究竟意欲何为？要深刻理解这一点，必须将分析框架从传统的克劳塞维茨式“总体战”或硬杀伤理论，转移到非对称战争（Asymmetric Warfare）中的“信号传递理论”（Signaling Theory）与“表演性威慑”（Performative Deterrence）上。

在现代国际关系和威慑理论中，仪式化与表演性的政治军事行为不仅是为了表达某种外交立场，更是为了在现实世界中“构建”出一种社会与心理事实。表演性政治（Performative Politics）具有强烈的戏剧性（Theatricality），这种戏剧性本身就蕴含着生产性的权力——它能够通过视觉奇观、情感震慑和信息的跨国界传递，对目标受众（无论国内外）施加巨大的心理压力，从而直接改变其决策预期与战略计算。

伊朗在面对美国和以色列的压倒性军事优势时，深知在常规军事力量层面进行对称式对抗无异于以卵击石。因此，为了确保政权生存并在中东新兴秩序中攫取话语权，伊朗的战略重点从传统的、可预测的“对等报复”（Calibrated Retaliation），断然转向了“无约束的升级”（Unbridled Escalation）。这种升级战略表现出鲜明的非对称特征，并分为横向与纵向两个维度：

在横向升级（地理空间的扩张）方面，伊朗及其代理人不再将冲突局限于单一国境或前线，而是将其打击范围迅速扩大至以色列、多个海湾合作委员会（GCC）国家、约旦、叙利亚甚至更远的目标，试图将整个中东塑造为一个危机四伏的“禁区”，从而在全球能源供应链的神经丛上散布广泛的恐慌情绪。

在纵向升级（打击目标的多元化与敏感化）方面，伊朗的打击目标突破了纯粹的军事基地或雷达站，直接扩展至民用公寓、大型航空枢纽（如迪拜国际机场和多哈机场受袭导致数以千计的国际航班取消），以及至关重要的能源基础设施和数据中心。例如，针对沙特拉斯坦努拉（Ras Tanura）炼油厂等设施的无人机袭击，其目的不仅在于破坏设备，更在于制造出震撼全球市场的“燃烧的油轮”与“停产的炼厂”的视觉图像。

在这种“去边缘化”的打击策略中，伊朗大量使用了自杀式无人机与近海快速攻击艇等廉价非对称武器。这些武器被防务分析人士称为“现代战争的IED（简易爆炸装置）”，它们的作用不在于摧毁美军的航母战斗群，而在于对“软目标”和全球航运制造连绵不绝的微观伤害。

综合来看，伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡及其周边的这些行动，其核心目的并非要在军事上彻底消灭美军或瘫痪敌国经济，而是进行一场规模宏大的、带有强烈表演性质的“战略敲诈”与“决心测试”。通过在海峡制造爆炸声和阻断全球供应链的潜在威胁，伊朗试图向全世界传递一个明确的信号：如果西方及其地区盟友试图颠覆德黑兰政权或改变中东现有的权力平衡，伊朗有能力也有决心让整个区域乃至全球经济付出极其高昂的连带成本。

这正是“空城计”在现代国际安全语境下的精妙重演。在《三国演义》中，诸葛亮在城楼上的抚琴，并不是一种能够杀伤敌人的物理火力输出，而是一种通过极致的“镇定”、“反常”以及对过往声誉的透支，来扰乱敌方指挥官认知框架的心理战术。同样，伊朗在海湾地区的军事演习与袭船战，也是一场精心编排的“决心剧场”（Theatre of Resolve）。战略理论家托马斯·谢林（Thomas Schelling）曾指出，通过展示可见的、甚至看似非理性的能力与决心，行为体可以有效地改变对手的心理预期。伊朗正是在利用这种视觉上的奇观与现代社交媒体的放大效应，迫使包括美国在内的强权在采取进一步行动时投鼠忌器，从而在不引发全面政权颠覆战争的前提下，确保自身在重塑中东新秩序过程中的生存空间。

然而，“表演性威慑”存在一个致命的悖论与脆弱性：其有效性完全建立在对手的认知框架与容忍度之上。如果美国或以色列的决策层看穿了这一策略的底牌，认定这些威胁是缺乏后续支撑的“虚张声势”（正如空城计被识破一般），威慑便会瞬间失效；反之，如果外界将其一举一动都视为即将全面爆发总体战的先兆，极易引发误判与灾难性的过度军事反应。在这种走钢丝般的战略博弈中，一旦戏剧的帷幕被实质性的武力撕破——例如美军开始系统性、无死角地清除伊朗的布雷舰、导弹发射车与雷达阵地——“空城计”的心理幻象便会立刻在钢铁与炸药的物理现实面前彻底崩塌。

战略文盲与演义史观的文化溯源：走出传统军事认知的迷思

既然伊朗的封锁能力在军事和商业逻辑上均存在无法克服的先天缺陷，为何不仅是普通受众，甚至部分专业媒体与地缘政治评论家也会盲目跟风，轻易相信“霍尔木兹海峡已被彻底掐断，全球经济即将崩盘”的宏大叙事？这一现象触及了探讨的核心——深受古典文学与演义文化影响的受众，在面对复杂的现代地缘政治与军事科学时，普遍存在着一种被称为“战略文盲”（Strategic Illiteracy）的认知障碍。

在当代战略研究领域，“战略文盲”不仅指代缺乏基本的军事技术常识，更深层地指向一种固化的认知偏差：习惯于用感性的、道德化的、甚至是宿命论的历史叙事，去替代严谨的、基于数据的、综合考量物流与概率的理性分析。在中国乃至整个受中华文化辐射的东亚圈，这种认知偏差的根源很大程度上可以追溯到《三国演义》、《水浒传》等古典长篇历史小说在民间社会与精英阶层中的深远影响。

作为传统文化中影响最广的文学巨著之一，《三国演义》被许多人（甚至包括部分近现代的政治领袖）视为军事战略与政治谋略的入门指南与智慧宝库。然而，文学创作的本质是戏剧化冲突的构建与人物性格的极致塑造。在“尊刘贬曹”的道德史观与追求戏剧张力的导向下，决定战争胜负的庞杂因素往往被简化并归结为个别英雄人物（如诸葛亮、周瑜）的智力碾压、神机妙算，或是某将领（如马谡）的刚愎自用、违抗军令。这种历史叙事的文学化改造（即所谓“七分真实，三分虚构”），潜移默化地塑造了公众对军事战略的三层根深蒂固的错误认知。

第一层错误认知，在于对“表演性威慑”与“战略捷径”的狂热崇拜。在古典文学叙事中，受《孙子兵法》影响深远的“不战而屈人之兵”往往被曲解为可以通过奇谋巧计（如空城计）实现空手套白狼式的胜利。受此文化基因影响，许多人在评估现代国际冲突时，极易被表面上的新式武器展示、盛大的阅兵式或是几段导弹发射的公关视频所震慑，误以为战争仅仅是威慑与恐吓的艺术，是单纯的心理博弈。他们幻想在不需要建立庞大后勤网络、不经历残酷火力绞杀的情况下，单凭部署几架无人机或几颗水雷就能“吓退”像美国这样的超级大国，这本质上是对现代战争工业体系复杂性的极端无知。

第二层错误认知，源于对具体军事科学与量化分析的深刻反智主义（Anti-intellectualism）与“重道轻器”的传统。中国古代军事理论相较于西方克劳塞维茨的《战争论》，更侧重于高度抽象的战略原则与哲学思辨（如“知己知彼”、“避实击虚”），而极少涉及具体的战术执行细节、行军编队、火力覆盖率或辎重补给的量化计算。克劳塞维茨强调战争中的“摩擦”（Friction）无处不在，强调物资消耗与对敌人武装力量的彻底肉体消灭才是胜利的基础；而传统的演义文化则放大了对计谋的推崇，将繁琐的后勤、装备代差、气象变化、通信中断等决定战争走向的具体因素视为无足轻重，一味吹捧“运筹帷幄之中，决胜千里之外”的才子佳人式智谋。反映到对霍尔木兹海峡现实危机的评判中，便是舆论场上充斥着对着地图指点江山、将兵力与水雷库存数据当作游戏血条进行简单加减法的“红警思维”战略家，他们完全无视了一千颗水雷如何在敌方制空权下完成复杂海况布设这种极具挑战性的现代工程学难题。

第三层错误认知，则表现为在“英雄史观”与“宿命论”之间来回横跳的分析逻辑与目的论谬误（Teleological Fallacies）。当面对军事失败或地缘挫折时，缺乏现代军事素养的评论者往往拒绝进行系统性、制度性与概率性的复盘分析，而是习惯于将其归咎于某个偶然的突发事件（如上方谷的大雨、魏延踢倒七星灯）或某个将领的个人失误（如挥泪斩马谡）。这种思维方式导致在分析如中东乱局这样的复杂事件时，公众倾向于寻找一个万能的、阴谋论式的“大棋局”解释，忽视了战争作为一种充满偶然性（Contingency）、涉及成千上万个体决策和极其复杂资源调度的系统工程，其走向往往受到最微小的后勤链条断裂或战术执行偏差的决定性影响。这种被叙事谬误（Narrative Fallacy）与认知偏见（Cognitive Biases）深深禁锢的思维模式，使得人们在面对真实世界的地缘博弈时，丧失了客观判断概率、风险与因果关系的能力。

综上所述，伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡所实施的所谓“战略封锁”，在本质上是一场精妙但物理基础极其脆弱的非对称心理战。从军事科学的硬现实来看，缺乏制空权与制海权的伊朗武装力量，其岸基导弹与有限的水雷部署能力，根本无法构筑起如同第一次世界大战中英国皇家海军那般的绝对物理阻断；其在战术层面的窘境，与两千年前在街亭孤山上渴望以一当十却面临断水围困的马谡如出一辙。从全球商业与航运经济学的角度来看，保险市场的风险定价机制与资本的套利行为，犹如一道富有弹性的缓冲网，将区域性的军事危机转化为可量化的物流成本，无可辩驳地证明了资本逐利本性下商业航线的强大韧性与自我调节能力。

这场在海湾地区上演的现代版“空城计”，虽然通过无人机袭击、扣押商船等“剧场化”的非对称威慑手段，在短期内推高了国际油价并引发了全球舆论的震动，成功实现了其特定的政治信号传递与地缘勒索目的，但绝不应被缺乏辨识力的旁观者夸大为足以实质性掐断全球能源大动脉的战略性胜利。

当我们审视围绕霍尔木兹海峡危机的种种荒诞言论与盲目恐慌时，必须深刻反思文化沉淀对现代人认知模式的潜在负面影响。过度沉溺于古典文学所塑造的宏大谋略与英雄叙事，忽视甚至鄙视后勤学、运筹学、工程学以及概率论在现代战争中的决定性作用，是导致当今许多人在面对国际冲突时展现出“战略文盲”特质的根本原因。在由大数据、无人机蜂群、精确制导武器与全球互联金融系统构成的现代多域战时代，任何试图用古代评书逻辑去解析现代航母打击群与全球能源供应链博弈的企图，都注定会滑向荒谬的深渊。要真正理解并应对21世纪的大国竞争与区域冲突，我们必须走出古典演义的认知迷梦，重塑基于实证、数据与逻辑的现代战略常识，方能在纷繁复杂的全球变局中保持清醒的洞察与理性的判断。

Serving as the strategic conduit between the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, this waterway— the Strait of Hormuz, a mere 33 kilometres at its narrowest—carries approximately 20 per cent of global oil consumption, over a quarter of seaborne oil trade, and one-fifth of the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply. In recent years, as Middle Eastern conflicts have escalated, Iran has frequently issued strategic deterrents threatening to 'blockade' the Strait. This culminated in extreme tensions in March 2026, when US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the destruction of 16 Iranian minelayers and several warships near the Strait, sending global energy markets into a frenzy of panic. Amplified by media narratives and public perception, the Strait of Hormuz often appears perpetually on the brink of a total shutdown, which would ostensibly trigger a global economic standstill.

However, peeling back the noisy veneer of geopolitics to examine the core principles of military physics, modern naval tactical doctrine, and the commercial logic of global shipping reveals a different reality. The so-called 'total blockade' acts more as a 'performative deterrence' designed for strategic signalling, rather than a militarily viable absolute. Equating localised tactical harassment with a strategic, physical blockade stems largely from a structural deficit in military comprehension among the public and certain decision-making circles. In contemporary strategic studies, scholars term this phenomenon 'strategic illiteracy'—a failure to rationally analyse military logistics, resource allocation, and probabilities, relying instead upon emotional, moralistic, or literary narratives.

Within this context, classical military romance—most notably the tales of 'Losing Jieting' and the 'Empty Fort Strategy' from the widely known Chinese epic, Romance of the Three Kingdoms—provides an excellent metaphor and cross-disciplinary analytical framework. These two stories, universally recognised in the Chinese cultural sphere, not only accurately mirror Iran's tactical dilemmas and psychological gambits in the Strait of Hormuz, but also profoundly expose the deep-seated cognitive fallacies of an audience steeped in traditional romanticised culture when confronted with the complexities of modern multi-domain warfare. This article integrates naval warfare theory, shipping economics, risk pricing mechanisms, and strategic cultural critique to thoroughly deconstruct the threat of a Hormuz blockade. It argues that Iran's blockade strategy is fundamentally a modern-day reenactment of Ma Su defending Jieting and Zhuge Liang playing the lute, thereby illustrating how historical literary narratives have led to a profound calcification of modern public military comprehension.

The Chasm Between Physical Denial and Sea Control: 'Losing Jieting' in the Context of Modern Naval Warfare

When evaluating any military operation aimed at severing major global sea lines of communication, modern naval doctrine draws a fundamental distinction between 'sea control' and 'sea denial'. These concepts differ vastly in the state resources required, force scale, and ultimate strategic effects achieved; conflating the two is the theoretical root of the 'blockade illusion'.

In both form and substance, Iran's strategy for controlling the Strait of Hormuz closely aligns with the tactical logic of 'Ma Su defending Jieting'. In Romance of the Three Kingdoms and actual historical records, Zhuge Liang entrusted Ma Su with the critical task of guarding the strategic chokepoint of Jieting to protect a newly secured supply route. Ma Su abandoned the prudent strategy of camping on the main road and using city walls and fortified camps to offset equipment disparities. Instead, he chose to station his troops on an isolated, waterless hill, relying on the military dogma of 'striking like a fierce tiger descending a mountain' in hopes of wiping out the vanguard of the Wei army led by Zhang He. The fundamental error in this decision was not the failure of the military principle itself, but the absolute asymmetry of resources and forces. Ma Su was vastly inferior to the Wei vanguard in manpower, equipment, and supplies, let alone Sima Yi's main army; he simply lacked the material foundation required to achieve his envisioned outcome. Once Zhang He severed their water supply, turning the encounter into a siege, the Shu army—starved, parched, and exposed to preemptive enemy fire the moment they showed themselves—found their 'commanding heights' reduced to a death trap.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deployments on the northern shores of the Strait of Hormuz face a similar 'defending Jieting' dilemma in terms of physics and resources. Superficially, Iran holds a significant geographical advantage: its vast array of coastal anti-ship missiles can cover the entire Strait, US bases in the Middle East are fixed targets, and passing commercial oil tankers lack escorts, making them as vulnerable as the Wei forces exposed to Shu fire. Furthermore, Iran possesses an abundance of cheap, asymmetric weaponry, such as contact mines costing as little as $1,500, fast attack craft, and suicide drones. Together, these elements project a highly oppressive visual deterrence. Yet, just as ancient military manuals failed to instruct Ma Su on how to survive a siege on a waterless mountain, static deterrence theory obscures the brutal tactical timing and survival crises inherent in modern naval warfare.

In a modern high-tech combat environment characterised by integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities, Iranian coastal weapons require a window of several minutes to emerge from underground bunkers, deploy, fire, and retreat. Conversely, US and allied forces, enjoying absolute air superiority, satellite surveillance networks, and electromagnetic dominance, have compressed their reaction time for locking on and executing precision strikes down to mere tens of seconds. The devastating US strike on Iranian minelayers on 10 March 2026 vividly demonstrated that without air superiority and comprehensive sea control, any exposed coastal or littoral strike platform immediately becomes a sitting duck for retaliation. The IRGC's stockpile of missiles and drones diminishes with every launch. Faced with the expensive yet massive interception systems and anti-drone equipment of the US, Israel, and Gulf states, this ammunition attrition rate is starkly imbalanced. Consequently, the moment Iranian weapon positions are exposed, they invite catastrophic strikes. Their only means of survival is remaining hidden underground, which renders a sustained, high-intensity physical blockade a logistical and existential impossibility.

To genuinely achieve the 'physical blockade' of an international maritime artery, the strategic benchmark is not regional missile harassment or brief channel mining, but the distant blockade executed by the British Royal Navy against the German High Seas Fleet and its maritime lifelines during the First World War. Britain adopted a 'distant blockade' strategy, employing the Tenth Cruiser Squadron for continuous, regular patrols across the vast waters between Scotland, Norway, and Iceland, while laying dense minefields and anti-submarine nets in the English Channel. This fleet, which rapidly expanded from 8 to 40 vessels, spent three and a half years braving freezing conditions and the lethal threat of U-boats to intercept and search all merchant ships attempting to breach the cordon, ultimately severing Germany's global trade lifelines and precipitating the collapse of its domestic economy and logistical systems. This scale of blockade is a quintessential 'war of superiority', adhering to the strict logic of Sun Tzu's Art of War: 'When ten to the enemy's one, surround him.' The blockading force must possess several times the manpower, resources, and warships of the blockaded party, and must be willing to endure immense costs in time, fuel, and actual combat losses to ensure minimal leakage. Attempting to achieve the strategic goals of a 'war of superiority' using an 'inferior force' fundamentally violates military common sense.

To grasp the disparity between these strategic concepts, we can compare 'physical blockades driven by absolute sea control' (exemplified by the British distant blockade in WWI) across multiple dimensions with 'asymmetric harassment driven by sea denial' (exemplified by Iranian actions in the Strait of Hormuz). Regarding core strategic objectives, the former seeks to entirely sever the passage of enemy and neutral merchant vessels, strangle the enemy's economic lifeline, and secure sea control; the latter cannot control the waters but executes political extortion and strategic signalling by escalating navigational risks and costs. In terms of force and resource commitment, a physical blockade demands an overwhelming fleet size (like the Tenth Cruiser Squadron), relentless regular patrols, and colossal logistical support for fuel and minefield maintenance; asymmetric harassment relies on cheap, concealed asymmetric weapons (small minelayers, drones, coastal anti-ship missiles) to mount intermittent, 'guerrilla-style' strikes. On the level of tactical survival and risk, a fleet with sea control can engage in direct confrontation, actively seeking decisive battles with the enemy's main force (such as the strategic calculations of the Battle of Jutland), and absorbing combat losses to maintain the blockade line. Conversely, the survivability of asymmetric platforms is exceedingly low; when facing an adversary with air superiority and integrated strike capabilities, exposing a weapon invites targeted elimination (as seen when US forces destroyed 16 minelayers in March 2026). Ultimately, a genuine blockade achieves a de facto trade quarantine, reducing enemy imports to a bare minimum (such as Dutch food exports to Germany falling to zero in 1918) ; harassment fails to achieve physical isolation, as profit-driven merchant ships ('dark vessels' with disabled AIS) will continue to traverse the strait after accepting exorbitant insurance premiums.

Looking closely at Iran, implementing a comparable physical obstruction across the Strait of Hormuz—which is 33 kilometres at its narrowest and features an 11-kilometre-wide deep-water channel suitable for oil tankers—is theoretically possible only through unrestricted submarine warfare and massive, three-dimensional mine warfare. However, a mine blockade is not as simple as clicking a mouse to place a 'Tesla Coil' or minefield in a real-time strategy game like Sudden Strike or Command & Conquer: Red Alert. Effectively deploying a three-dimensional mine blockade in an 11-kilometre-wide strait with complex ocean currents requires, conservatively, over a thousand modern naval mines. Although US intelligence estimates suggest Iran has a stockpile of approximately 6,000 mines of various types, translating a static inventory into a dynamic, combat-ready blockade line involves an insurmountable tactical divide.

The IRGC currently relies primarily on non-specialised, micro-minelaying craft, which are severely limited in the number of mines they can carry per sortie (no more than twenty or thirty); deploying a dense field of a thousand mines would necessitate thirty to fifty high-intensity, joint maritime operations. Under the intense patrols and hunting operations of US Avenger-class minesweepers (which use wood and fibreglass hulls to reduce magnetic signatures), Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), and advanced airborne counter-mine platforms, such large-scale, prolonged minelaying operations equate to suicide. US forces have even pre-emptively destroyed Iranian bunkers used to store naval mines, crippling their ability to launch massive mine warfare at the source. Consequently, many commentators lacking basic military knowledge simplistically equate Iran's mine stockpile to a 'health bar' for the Hormuz blockade line—assuming that because 5,000 is greater than 1,000, a blockade is guaranteed. This linear thinking, stripped of the combat environment and enemy countermeasures, is the very reincarnation of the 'Ma Su-style' tragedy in modern strategic analysis.

Commercial Logic and Risk Pricing Mechanisms: The 'Empty Fort Strategy' in the Global Shipping System

Given that Iran cannot achieve an absolute physical blockade of the Strait of Hormuz through military physics, why do global public opinion and financial markets remain deeply panicked by its actions? Do surging oil prices, withdrawal notices from the London insurance market, and the rerouting decisions of some shipping companies imply that Iran's blockade has practically succeeded? Answering this requires shifting the analytical dimension from pure military confrontation to shipping economics and global maritime risk pricing mechanisms. Just as the military logic of this issue equates to 'Losing Jieting', its commercial logic perfectly aligns with another classic trope from historical romance: the 'Empty Fort Strategy'.

Modern military observers and historians generally agree that the story of Zhuge Liang throwing open the gates of Xicheng and playing his lute to repel Sima Yi's army of 100,000 is steeped in literary fiction and myth-making. In a genuine military operation, a single squad of elite scouts would suffice to ascertain the reality of the situation; Sima Yi's panicked retreat completely contradicts basic tactical reconnaissance logic and combat engagement presets. The success of the Empty Fort Strategy in literature relies on absolute, flawless mastery over the enemy commander's psychology—a rarity in the fog of real war. Yet, in the real-world manoeuvring around the Strait of Hormuz, those multinational merchant ships and oil tankers stalled by panic are playing the role of the 'hesitant Wei army outside the empty fort'. Meanwhile, the price signalling mechanisms of the global marine insurance market act as the 'scouts', determining whether vessels proceed and thus shattering the illusion of the empty fort.

Within the global shipping system, the pricing of risk in military conflict zones is primarily governed by the Joint War Committee (JWC) of the London insurance market. Comprising senior underwriters from Lloyd's and other insurance giants, alongside independent security advisers, this committee designates 'Listed Areas' or 'high-risk waters'. When a merchant vessel sails through waters assessed to carry a high risk of war (such as missile strikes, mines, or state seizure), standard hull and machinery insurance automatically lapses. Shipowners must declare their transit to underwriters and negotiate an Additional Premium (AP) for war risk coverage; this premium is generally calculated as a percentage of the ship's total hull value and usually covers a period of just seven days.

During the initial outbreak of a crisis, confronted with ambiguous circumstances and soaring physical risks, insurance companies often adopt extreme risk-aversion measures. They may drastically hike war risk rates or even issue Notices of Cancellation to buy time to recalibrate their risk models and adjust premiums. At this juncture, the cost of navigating the strait spikes dramatically. Some risk-averse shipping companies opt to switch off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders, drop anchor outside the Persian Gulf to monitor the situation, or make the costly decision to reroute—for example, sailing around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds approximately 12 days to the voyage and incurs additional fuel and operational costs of up to $120,000 per day. This short-term shipping paralysis and logistical chaos superficially projects the illusion that 'the strait has been successfully blockaded', much like Sima Yi's momentary retreat when faced with the empty fort.

However, the core of commercial logic lies in price incentives and profit motives. As Karl Marx observed, if the profit margin is sufficiently high, capital will naturally attract those willing to take the risk. To judge the success of a blockade using commercial logic requires applying that logic consistently; one cannot invoke military logic when it suits a military narrative and commercial phenomena when they support a commercial narrative. When geopolitical premiums drive crude oil prices from $80 a barrel to $100 or even $120, this robust price signal more than compensates for inflated insurance premiums and the added expense of hiring armed security. At this point, the macro 'absolute blockade' is downgraded into a micro 'highway robbery' game model.

In this process, the 'scout' role that was missing in the 'Empty Fort Strategy' is fulfilled by Iran's own oil tankers, vessels from nations with ambiguous ties to Iran (such as Russia and India), and independent shipowners (like certain Greek operators) willing to shoulder extreme risks for exorbitant freight rates. Through actual, life-risking exploratory voyages, these 'scouts' broadcast three unequivocal factual signals to the global market:

First, the Strait of Hormuz has not been physically blockaded by mines or warships; the maritime channel remains physically open; Second, Iran's strikes are highly selective and performative, with its official statements acknowledging safe passage for vessels of specific nationalities; Third, the IRGC's naval forces possess neither the capability nor the justification to launch indiscriminate attacks against the vast majority of passing international ships, as doing so would not only provoke devastating international military intervention but also sever Iran's own economic lifeline.

The entire operation of commercial logic and risk pricing mechanisms can be divided into three phases of commercial game theory. First is the crisis outbreak phase, during which the insurance market (the JWC and underwriters) issues 'Listed Area' warnings, sends out cancellation notices, and sharply hikes the AP for war risks. In response, risk-averse shipping companies halt operations, adopt a wait-and-see approach, or opt to divert around the Cape of Good Hope (incurring an extra 12 days of transit and steep costs). The macro outcome is a sudden, short-term plunge in shipping capacity, skyrocketing freight rates, and a sharp rise in crude oil prices due to the crisis premium, collectively projecting an illusion of 'blockade success'. Next is the probing and arbitrage phase, where the insurance market begins reassessing risk models, adjusting rates based on naval escorts and actual attack probabilities. Concurrently, high-risk-appetite shipowners (the 'scouts'), spurred by hyper-profits, switch off their AIS and force their way through the strait. The price signals and macro results emanating from this phase reveal that the physical channel is not closed; high oil prices adequately offset high premiums, and dark market trading alongside high-risk voyages fills the capacity void. Finally comes the gradual normalisation phase. As NATO and US naval escorts intervene, risk probabilities drop, causing the insurance market's AP rates to compress and recede. Mainstream carriers run the numbers, realise that paying the AP to maintain their original route is still preferable to rerouting, and subsequently flock back to the Hormuz route. Ultimately, market confidence is restored, the rhythm of logistics is re-established, and price signals usher in alternative methods, allowing market mechanisms to declare the 'physical blockade' bankrupt.

As this information becomes transparent, market uncertainty plummets. Naval patrols and escort missions by NATO and its allies (such as the US Fifth Fleet stationed in Bahrain), alongside intelligence sharing from the NATO Shipping Centre, further diminish the actual probability of ships being attacked. Upon receiving these security signals, the insurance market gradually trims the AP proportions for war risks. This encourages more operators, after weighing rerouting costs against insurance premiums, to return to the shorter, more economical route, ultimately achieving a gradual normalisation of shipping operations.

Therefore, the strategic aim of a military blockade is the absolute, factual severing of personnel and material transit; commercial 'voyage suspensions', however, are merely short-term stress responses to risk premiums and shifting insurance clauses. So long as oil prices fluctuate within a certain band rather than experiencing an exponential explosion caused by an absolute supply disruption (for example, surging past $200 per barrel), it serves as proof that Persian Gulf oil continues to flow globally via costlier hedging mechanisms and higher-risk routes. The existence of the price signalling mechanism not only proves that the market is engaging in highly efficient self-regulation but also, through tangible transit data, proclaims the utter failure of Iran's strategy to achieve a 'blockade' through intimidation.

Performative Deterrence and Asymmetric Escalation: The Dramaturgy Reshaping Geopolitics

If a physical blockade is militarily unfeasible, and commercial disruption is inevitably absorbed by the market's potent price mechanisms and arbitrage behaviours, then what exactly is the true purpose of the radical military actions Iran has undertaken in the Strait of Hormuz and across the broader Middle East? To fully comprehend this, one must shift the analytical framework away from traditional Clausewitzian 'total war' or hard-kill theories, moving instead towards 'signalling theory' and 'performative deterrence' within asymmetric warfare.

In modern international relations and deterrence theory, ritualised and performative political-military actions are not solely designed to express diplomatic stances; they aim to 'construct' social and psychological realities within the physical world. Performative politics is inherently steeped in theatricality, and this theatricality itself harbours productive power. Through visual spectacle, emotional shock, and transnational information transmission, it exerts immense psychological pressure on target audiences (both domestic and foreign), thereby directly altering their decision-making expectations and strategic calculations.

Facing the overwhelming military superiority of the United States and Israel, Iran knows full well that engaging in symmetrical conventional warfare is akin to throwing eggs against rocks. Consequently, to ensure regime survival and seize a commanding voice in the emerging Middle Eastern order, Iran's strategic focus has decisively pivoted from traditional, predictable 'calibrated retaliation' to 'unbridled escalation'. This escalation strategy exhibits distinct asymmetric traits and unfolds across two dimensions: horizontal and vertical.

In terms of horizontal escalation (geographic expansion), Iran and its proxies no longer confine conflicts to a single border or frontline. Instead, they have rapidly expanded their strike radius to include Israel, multiple Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Jordan, Syria, and targets even further afield. The objective is to mould the entire Middle East into a perilous 'no-go zone', thereby broadcasting widespread panic across the nerve centres of global energy supply chains.

Regarding vertical escalation (the diversification and sensitisation of targets), Iran's strikes have bypassed purely military bases or radar stations, extending directly to civilian apartments, major aviation hubs (such as attacks on Dubai and Doha international airports that led to the cancellation of thousands of flights), and critical energy infrastructure and data centres. For instance, drone strikes on facilities like the Ras Tanura oil refinery in Saudi Arabia were intended not merely to destroy equipment, but to manufacture the globally jarring visual imagery of 'burning tankers' and 'shuttered refineries'.

Within this 'de-marginalisation' strike strategy, Iran has heavily deployed cheap asymmetric weapons, such as suicide drones and coastal fast attack craft. Termed the 'IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) of modern warfare' by defence analysts, their utility lies not in annihilating US carrier strike groups, but in inflicting a relentless stream of micro-damage upon 'soft targets' and global shipping.

Taken together, the core objective of Iran's actions in and around the Strait of Hormuz is not the military eradication of US forces or the economic paralysis of hostile nations. Rather, it is staging a grand-scale, highly performative 'strategic extortion' and 'resolve test'. By orchestrating explosions in the strait and projecting the latent threat of supply chain disruption, Iran seeks to broadcast a clear signal to the world: should the West and its regional allies attempt to topple the regime in Tehran or alter the existing balance of power in the Middle East, Iran possesses both the capability and the resolve to inflict exceptionally steep collateral costs upon the entire region and the global economy.

This is an exquisite modern-day reenactment of the 'Empty Fort Strategy' in international security. In Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Zhuge Liang's lute-playing atop the city walls was not a physical discharge of firepower capable of killing enemies. Instead, it was a psychological tactic leveraging extreme 'composure', 'anomaly', and the overdrawing of past reputation to scramble the opposing commander's cognitive framework. Similarly, Iran's military exercises and tanker harassment in the Gulf constitute a meticulously choreographed 'theatre of resolve'. As strategic theorist Thomas Schelling noted, by displaying visible and even seemingly irrational capabilities and resolve, an actor can effectively alter an opponent's psychological expectations. Iran leverages precisely this visual spectacle, amplified by modern social media, to compel superpowers like the United States to hesitate before taking further action. This ensures Iran's survival space while reshaping the new Middle Eastern order, provided it avoids triggering an all-out war of regime change.

However, 'performative deterrence' harbours a fatal paradox and vulnerability: its efficacy rests entirely upon the opponent's cognitive framework and tolerance. Should US or Israeli decision-makers see through the bluff—judging these threats as 'empty bluster' devoid of substantive backing (just as the Empty Fort Strategy could be seen through)—the deterrence evaporates instantly. Conversely, if observers interpret every move as the precursor to an imminent total war, it risks catastrophic miscalculation and disproportionate military retaliation. Walking this strategic tightrope means that once the theatrical curtain is violently torn down by substantive force—such as the US military systematically and comprehensively purging Iranian minelayers, missile launchers, and radar sites—the psychological illusion of the 'Empty Fort Strategy' instantly collapses in the face of the physical reality of steel and high explosives.

Strategic Illiteracy and the Cultural Roots of the Romanticised View of History: Escaping the Myths of Traditional Military Perception

Given that Iran's blockade capabilities suffer from insurmountable innate defects in both military and commercial logic, why do not only ordinary audiences but even some professional media outlets and geopolitical commentators blindly follow the trend, readily believing the grand narrative that 'the Strait of Hormuz has been completely choked off, and the global economy is on the verge of collapse'? This phenomenon strikes at the heart of our inquiry: audiences profoundly influenced by classical literature and romanticised culture exhibit a widespread cognitive impediment known as 'strategic illiteracy' when grappling with complex modern geopolitics and military science.

In contemporary strategic studies, 'strategic illiteracy' implies more than just a lack of basic military technical knowledge; it points to a deeply ingrained cognitive bias. This bias substitutes rigorous, data-driven, rational analysis—which comprehensively weighs logistics and probabilities—with emotional, moralistic, or even fatalistic historical narratives. In China, and across the broader East Asian sphere influenced by Chinese culture, the roots of this cognitive bias can largely be traced to the profound impact that classical historical novels, such as Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin, have had on both grassroots society and elite circles.

As one of the most widely read masterpieces in traditional culture, Romance of the Three Kingdoms is regarded by many (including some modern political leaders) as an introductory manual and treasury of wisdom for military strategy and political manoeuvring. However, the essence of literary creation is the construction of dramatic conflict and the extreme shaping of character personalities. Driven by a moralistic historiography that 'reveres Liu Bei and disparages Cao Cao' and a quest for dramatic tension, the myriad factors that determine victory or defeat in war are often simplified. They are reduced to the intellectual dominance or divine foresight of individual heroes (like Zhuge Liang or Zhou Yu), or the arrogance and insubordination of a specific general (like Ma Su). This literary adaptation of historical narratives (often described as 'seventy per cent fact, thirty per cent fiction') has subliminally forged three deeply entrenched misconceptions regarding military strategy among the public.

The first misconception is a fanatical worship of 'performative deterrence' and 'strategic shortcuts'. In classical literary narratives, the principle of 'subduing the enemy without fighting', heavily influenced by Sun Tzu's Art of War, is frequently misinterpreted to mean that victory can be achieved effortlessly through cunning tricks (like the Empty Fort Strategy). Infected by this cultural meme, many people evaluating modern international conflicts are easily awed by superficial displays of novel weaponry, grand military parades, or PR videos of missile launches. They mistakenly believe that war is solely the art of deterrence and intimidation—a pure psychological game. They entertain the fantasy that deploying a few drones or naval mines can 'frighten off' a superpower like the United States without the need to build a colossal logistical network or endure a brutal war of attrition. Fundamentally, this reveals extreme ignorance regarding the complexity of the modern military-industrial complex.

The second misconception stems from a profound anti-intellectualism towards concrete military science and quantitative analysis, alongside a traditional preference for 'valuing the abstract over the tangible'. Compared to Carl von Clausewitz's On War in the West, ancient Chinese military theory leaned more towards highly abstract strategic principles and philosophical speculation (such as 'knowing oneself and knowing the enemy' or 'avoiding the strong and striking the weak'). It rarely touched upon the quantitative calculation of tactical execution details, marching formations, firepower coverage rates, or logistical supplies. Clausewitz emphasised that 'friction' is omnipresent in war, and that the consumption of resources and the physical annihilation of the enemy's armed forces are the bedrock of victory. In contrast, traditional romance culture amplifies the reverence for stratagems, dismissing crucial factors like tedious logistics, generational gaps in equipment, weather changes, and communication breakdowns. Instead, it relentlessly glorifies the 'scholarly genius' who 'devises strategies in a command tent that guarantee victory a thousand miles away'. In judgements surrounding the real-world Hormuz crisis, this manifests as 'Red Alert-minded' armchair strategists dominating public discourse. They treat troop numbers and mine inventories as simple addition and subtraction of health bars in a video game, utterly ignoring the immense modern engineering challenge of laying a thousand mines in complex sea conditions under enemy air supremacy.

The third misconception manifests as an analytical logic that oscillates wildly between the 'heroic view of history' and 'fatalism', peppered with teleological fallacies. When confronted with military defeats or geopolitical setbacks, commentators lacking modern military literacy often refuse to conduct systemic, institutional, or probabilistic reviews. Instead, they habitually attribute outcomes to a random, sudden event (like the heavy rain in Shangfang Valley or Wei Yan kicking over the Seven Star Lamp) or a single commander's personal failing (like shedding tears while executing Ma Su). Consequently, when dissecting complex events like the turmoil in the Middle East, the public tends to seek out an all-encompassing, conspiratorial 'grand chessboard' explanation. They overlook the fact that war is a systems engineering endeavour riddled with contingency, involving the decisions of thousands of individuals and extraordinarily complex resource orchestration. Its trajectory is often decisively influenced by the slightest rupture in a logistical chain or a minor deviation in tactical execution. Imprisoned by the narrative fallacy and cognitive biases, this mindset strips people of their ability to objectively assess probabilities, risks, and causality when facing real-world geopolitical struggles.

In summary, the so-called 'strategic blockade' executed by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz is, at its core, a sophisticated asymmetric psychological war resting on a highly fragile physical foundation. Through the unforgiving lens of military science, Iranian armed forces, lacking both air and sea superiority, simply cannot leverage their coastal missiles and limited minelaying capabilities to forge an absolute physical barrier comparable to that of the British Royal Navy during the First World War. Their tactical predicament perfectly mirrors that of Ma Su two millennia ago, marooned on an isolated hill at Jieting, yearning to defeat ten with one whilst facing a siege that severed his water supply. From the perspective of global commerce and shipping economics, the risk pricing mechanisms of the insurance market and the arbitrage behaviours of capital act as a resilient safety net. This mechanism translates regional military crises into quantifiable logistical costs, irrefutably demonstrating the robust resilience and self-regulating capacity of commercial shipping routes driven by the profit-seeking nature of capital.

This modern-day 'Empty Fort Strategy' staged in the Gulf—despite temporarily driving up international oil prices, shocking global public opinion, and successfully achieving specific political signalling and geopolitical extortion via 'theatrical' asymmetric deterrence like drone strikes and ship seizures—must never be exaggerated by undiscerning onlookers into a strategic triumph capable of genuinely severing the global energy artery.

When scrutinising the absurd rhetoric and blind panic surrounding the Strait of Hormuz crisis, we must deeply reflect upon the latent negative impact that cultural sedimentation exerts on modern cognitive paradigms. An overindulgence in the grand stratagems and heroic narratives crafted by classical literature, coupled with the neglect—or even disdain—for the decisive roles of logistics, operations research, engineering, and probability theory in modern warfare, is the root cause of the 'strategic illiteracy' exhibited by many today when interpreting international conflicts. In the contemporary era of multi-domain warfare, defined by big data, drone swarms, precision-guided munitions, and a globally interconnected financial system, any attempt to decode the clashes between carrier strike groups and global energy supply chains using the logic of ancient storytellers is destined to plunge into absurdity. To truly comprehend and navigate 21st-century great power competition and regional conflicts, we must awaken from the cognitive slumber induced by classical romance. Only by rebuilding a modern strategic common sense grounded in empirical evidence, data, and logic can we maintain clear-eyed insight and rational judgement amidst the chaotic flux of global transformations.