海外华人应当如何改善形象？How Should Overseas Chinese Improve Their Reputation?

By Timothy Huang

近日，在伦敦大学学院(UCL)攻读博士学位的中国留学生邹振浩因在中国和英国迷奸数十名女性并拍摄视频，而被伦敦当地法院判处终身监禁，最低服刑期限24年；且这一判决仅仅根据其中十名受害者的案件作出，检方已经确认，另有数十名受害者已经与其取得联系，后续的补充起诉正在进行中。

然而，新闻媒体报道中的“Chinese Student”却在华人社区引起了不小争论。很多人认为，直接在标题中称中国留学生为强奸犯会导致英国社会对华人的污名化，甚至助长英国的排华情绪，损害全体海外华人的形象，这对遵纪守法的“良民”群体是不公平的。那么，海外华人应当如何认识这样引起轰动的个案所造成的声誉影响，又应当如何维护和改善自己的国际形象呢？

一、个体的无力感

我们不得不承认，对于任何尚处于少数族裔地位的旅居海外者而言，不存在将个人形象与族裔形象完全区分开的可能性。人们大可在中国完全具体地评价中国人，或者在英国完全具体地评价英国人，但无法在英国完全具体地评价中国人。原因很简单，完全具体地评价个人是需要成本的，而华裔群体在英国社会所占的比重不值得人们花费这样的成本。英国人宁愿简单而错误地评价以色列人在加沙进行种族灭绝，甚至连BBC都宁愿匿名引用哈马斯指挥官家人的言论用于纪录片制作，也不愿真正前往那片土地看看究竟发生了什么。以华裔的族群规模，又凭什么觉得自己比以色列人或加沙人更冤枉呢？

每个人的精力都是有限的，每个人为特定事件付出成本的意愿是有上限的，而这个意愿的上限多半是低于能力的上限的；人们不得不根据未尽自己全力收集到的信息甚至是各种标签化的印象去评价他人。对于被评价者，尤其是对于被错误评价者，这当然是不公平的；他们甚至有资格在证明对方错误后获得道歉。但同样，他们也没有权利要求评价者不计成本地研究自己，得出在其能力范围内最为全面客观的结论。没有人配得上这样的待遇。

而这正是海外华人面对个案所带来的整体名誉受损时的无力感的来源。如果说，对于中国共产党、中国政府乃至生活在中国的同胞所带来的恶名标签，海外华人尚可通过他们本身移居海外这一事实而进行或多或少的隔离或洗白，那么对于像邹振浩这样，本身属于海外华人的一员，而进行如此穷凶极恶之行径者，其所带来的名誉伤害就实实在在地由全体海外华人共同承受了。

唯一值得庆幸的是，本次事件几十名受害者全部是中国人，这在一定程度上避免了族群矛盾的产生，实属不幸中的万幸。但仅此而已了。

二、族裔背景的保持与切割

每当面临这种情境，两种相反的声音总是此起彼伏。一方面，移居海外的少数族裔保持其族裔背景，无论对于在现实中获取对于弱势群体的优待，还是在理念上增强族裔内部的团结和认同感，都是有极大好处的；另一方面，由于人们以族裔代表的形象评价同族裔个体的行为无法被苛责，对于希望避免自己的形象被同族裔败类所损害和污染的人而言，他们宁愿自己在外不要有族裔标签。笔者认为，后一种情况应当是越来越普遍、且越来越应当被理解和效仿的。

首先，与本族裔切割是与移居海外者逻辑自洽的表现。海外华人旅居海外的理由各异，无论高尚与庸俗、主动与被迫，“海外”这一标签始终优先于“华人”这一标签。作为从中国移居而来的少数族裔，海外华人本身就有融入当地社区的道德义务，这也是对当地对作为少数族裔的华人的接纳的应有报偿。哪怕不以避免少数害群之马损害自身形象的功利主义角度考量，海外华人也应当主动将融入当地社区置于保持本族认同感之上。这本身就是海外华人塑造自己守法负责之公民形象的行动的一部分。将个人形象与民族、国家形象绑定本身便是中国人的民族劣根性之一，通过与族裔形象切割的方式维护自身个体形象，不仅于海外华人个人有帮助，本身也可以改善海外华人的整体形象。

其次，海外华人与作为族群形象的“华裔”进行切割，也是摆脱中国政府和中国共产党海外镇压和海外控制的必要途径。这对于并不认可中国政府和中国共产党统治的海外华人而言，意义自不必说；而即使是身处海外、但仍但热爱中国和支持中国共产党的华人而言，这也是必要的。原因在于，海外华人对中国共产党和中国政府的支持，之所以有实际意义，正是因为他们的支持在外观上是自由地作出的，而不是像中国境内的中共支持者一样，是在中共的压迫和洗脑下作出的。然而，如果中共的海外镇压与控制有朝一日真正地公之于众、为各国政府和民众所周知，那么他们身处海外的支持便没有了任何意义，他们即使从待价而沽的角度，也应当摆脱中共的海外镇压与控制，成为真正意义上的“外宾”，从而获得中国政府和中国共产党赋予的“超国民待遇”；这是智商和逻辑正常的“离岸爱国者”们自利驱动下的必然选择。

最后，海外华人与中国形象切割，在现实意义上对于塑造群体特性和声音是有利的。无论政治立场和观点如何，海外华人能够以“Overseas Chinese”的身份发出声音——甚至是几种不同声音——总归好过做传声筒、发出中国共产党和中国政府的声音。这是一个十分简单明了的稀缺性与自身价值关系的道理，完全处于能够看破中共谎言或者明悉“离岸爱国”好处的海外华人的认知范围。

因此，无论从何种角度讲，海外华人与中国共产党和中国政府进行切割，是提升海外华人形象的必要举措。

三、切割之外

除了与本族裔进行切割外，海外华人为了改善形象，能做的还有很多。

比如，以这次的邹振浩事件为例，他迷奸数十名女生的行为并未与中国政府或中国共产党有任何关联，而是作为海外华人一员的完全个人行为。在这种情况下，海外华人为了避免自身形象和声誉受到波及，不单应该与中国共产党和中国政府进行切割，还应该公开和明确地对邹振浩的行为进行谴责，对英国当地法院的判决表达支持，并表明愿意为警方的后续调查提供帮助。对违背公序良俗的“同胞”进行公开谴责，非但不会损害族群内部的团结，反而对外彰显了公正的族群形象，是转危为机、变废为宝的重要举措。

又比如，通过积极参与当地公益和社区服务来树立正面形象。海外华人可以定期参加慈善义卖、社区环保行动或助老助残志愿活动，不论是节假日为敬老院送温暖，还是响应徒步筹款、公益跑步等社会热点，都能让更多主流民众了解华人不是沉默的少数，而是乐于奉献、勇于担当的社区一分子。很多时候，一句“早上好”，一次邻里小聚，就能让人对华人产生亲近感。不要挂着“我是华人”的大旗，去“灌输”什么；而是在普通的聊天里，让对方自然而然地发现你的价值和个性。你喜欢跑步，他聊起比赛；你热爱摄影，他请你拍照留念。一来二去，华人群体的形象，就会在点滴的友好互动中慢慢被重塑。

总之，华人改善形象，与转学生新交朋友无异，无非是友好、开放、公道而已。

然而，华人形象问题颇有“谋事在人、成事在天”的感觉。正如前文所述，即使有如此多的改善形象的手段，海外华人的整体形象仍然更多取决于与自己无关的他人，以及少数跳出来“帮助”本地社区定义华人形象的极端案例。这是作为新移民所不得不面临的困难之一；这和语言、文化、制度等方面的陌生感和隔阂都是一样的。悲观地讲，作为第一代移民，要破除这种隔阂，包括试图通过自己的努力改善华人群体形象的努力，几乎都是收效甚微的。而只有当自己的子女与当地子女从小玩到大、建立起真正的友谊后，“海外华人”这一标签才能真正被扫进历史的垃圾堆。届时，这一群体的形象如何，便也与自己无关了。

How Should Overseas Chinese Improve Their Reputation?

By Timothy Huang

Recently, a Chinese postgraduate at University College London, Zou Zhenhao, was sentenced to life imprisonment by a London court—with a minimum term of 24 years—for the rape and video‑recording of dozens of women in both China and the UK. That conviction was based on ten victims’ cases, and the Crown Prosecution Service has confirmed that dozens more victims have come forward; further charges are pending.

        Yet much of the British press simply referred to him as a “Chinese student”, a label that has sparked fierce debate within the wider Chinese diaspora. Many argue that branding him as a rapist in headlines stigmatises all Chinese people in Britain and fuels anti‑Chinese sentiment, which they see as unfair to law‑abiding “good citizens”. So how should overseas Chinese regard the reputational fallout from such a sensational case? And more importantly, how can they protect and enhance their collective image abroad?

1. The Sense of Individual Powerlessness

We must recognise that for any minority community living overseas, it is almost impossible to dissociate an individual’s actions from the group’s image. In Britain few will make the effort to judge every Chinese person individually. That is simply too costly in time and mental energy, and the Chinese diaspora is simply too small a proportion of the population to merit it. People would rather draw sweeping, and often inaccurate, conclusions—much as they might on distant conflicts—than invest in detailed research.

        Every individual’s capacity for attention is limited, and the willingness to invest effort is almost always lower than one’s capacity. As a result, people rely on whatever snippets of information or stereotypes they can access. Of course, this is unfair—those misjudged deserve an apology once the error is exposed—but they cannot demand that everyone expend limitless resources to reach the most balanced conclusion possible. No one is entitled to such treatment.

        This is the source of the diaspora’s collective powerlessness when a single individual causes reputational damage. Overseas Chinese might, to some extent, distance themselves from the disreputable acts of the Chinese Communist Party or the Chinese government by virtue of living abroad. But when one of their own—one who already counts as an overseas Chinese—commits heinous crimes, every law‑abiding member of the community shares in the fallout.

        The only silver lining is that, in this instance, all known victims are also Chinese nationals, which spares the community from accusations of inter‑ethnic tension—an unfortunate relief, to be sure, but relief nonetheless.

2. Maintaining or Severing Ethnic Background

Faced with such scenarios, two opposing schools of thought invariably emerge. On one hand, members of an ethnic minority overseas gain tangible benefits—both in practical terms and in fostering internal solidarity—by retaining and celebrating their cultural identity. On the other hand, many who wish to avoid being tarred by the misconduct of a fellow community member would prefer to downplay their ethnic label altogether. I contend that the latter approach is increasingly appropriate and deserving of understanding.

        Firstly, severing association with one’s ethnic label is a logical consequence of choosing to live abroad. Individuals emigrate for myriad reasons—noble or mundane, voluntary or compelled—but “overseas resident” inherently takes precedence over “Chinese national”. As an immigrant, one owes a duty of integration to the host society, repaying its acceptance with responsible, law‑abiding citizenship. Even setting aside the utilitarian aim of shielding oneself from fellow countrymen’s misdeeds, overseas Chinese should actively prioritise integration over the maintenance of ethnic solidarity. This is itself a powerful gesture of good citizenship that enhances the community’s reputation. The impulse to bind one’s personal image to a national stereotype is, indeed, a quintessentially Chinese weakness; by deliberately decoupling from ethnic collective identity, individuals can both safeguard their own standing and elevate the group’s overall image.

        Secondly, distancing oneself from the label “Chinese” is also essential to escape Beijing’s extraterritorial repression and influence. This holds true not only for those who openly reject the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party, but even for those who remain patriotic or supportive of the Party. After all, the significance of supporting the Chinese government abroad lies in the appearance of free choice; it contrasts sharply with the coerced allegiance of citizens within China. Should evidence of the CCP’s overseas meddling become widely known to host governments and public opinion, such support would lose all legitimacy. Even for opportunists, the rational move would be to shed that association, thereby securing “guest‑of‑state” status and enjoying extraterritorial privileges. Pure self‑interest logically drives such offshore patriots to sever official ties.

        Finally, breaking from the image of “the Chinese” enables the diaspora to craft its own distinct voice. Irrespective of political stance, it is far preferable for overseas Chinese to speak as “overseas residents of Chinese origin”—perhaps even in several divergent voices—than to function as echo chambers for PRC propaganda. This is a straightforward matter of scarcity and value: possessing the clarity to see through CCP falsehoods or to exploit offshore patriotism’s benefits is an asset that both individuals and the community should leverage.

        For all these reasons, disavowing any formal linkage with the Chinese government and Communist Party is indispensable to improving the diaspora’s image.

3. Beyond Disassociation

Simply breaking ethnic ties, however, is not sufficient. There are many proactive steps overseas Chinese can take to enhance their reputation.

Take the Zou Zhenhao case as an example. His appalling crimes bear no connection to the Chinese government or CCP—they were entirely personal. In this context, the diaspora should not only distance itself from official Beijing, but also publicly condemn Zou’s actions, support the British court’s ruling, and offer assistance to law‑enforcement agencies. A clear, public denunciation of a “fellow countryman” who violates public morality will not weaken communal solidarity; rather, it showcases a commitment to justice and transforms a potential crisis into an opportunity to demonstrate integrity.

Another effective approach is active participation in local charities and community service. By volunteering at fund‑raisers, environmental clean‑ups or elderly‑care initiatives—whether delivering gifts to care homes at Chinese New Year or joining a charity run—overseas Chinese can show that they are not a silent minority, but dedicated, responsible members of society. Often, a simple “Good morning” or a small gathering of neighbours is enough to foster goodwill. There is no need to wave a “We are Chinese!” banner and lecture others; instead, let your values and personality shine through everyday interactions. Perhaps you run, and your neighbour asks for tips; perhaps you enjoy photography, and someone asks you to take their portrait. Gradually, the diaspora’s image will be reshaped through countless acts of friendliness.

        In short, improving the diaspora’s image is no different from making friends as a new transfer student: be friendly, open, and fair.

        Yet the reality is that community image often feels at the mercy of forces beyond one’s control. As outlined above, no matter how many positive measures are adopted, the diaspora’s reputation still hinges on the deeds of unrelated individuals and the occasional sensational case that captures headlines. This challenge is intrinsic to being a minority in a new land, alongside barriers of language, culture and legal systems.

        Pessimistically, for first‑generation immigrants, efforts to bridge the gap—including striving to enhance the community’s standing—may yield only marginal results. It is only when the next generation grows up side by side with their peers—forming genuine friendships from childhood—that the label “overseas Chinese” can finally be consigned to history’s scrapheap. Only then will the group’s image cease to matter to individual lives.