“国旗保护那些蔑视她的人”？ Does the National Flag Protect Those Who Despise It?

By Timothy Huang

    最近，台湾陆配宣扬武统被台湾政府驱逐，美国绿卡持有者公开支持哈马斯被美国政府驱逐，这种关于言论自由是否可以触及所在国的核心价值观，甚至以支持其所在国的敌对势力的形式被容忍的问题，再一次引发了热议。理论界和实务界都经常纠结于一个问题：言论自由是否包括了反对言论自由的自由？对于那些身在自由世界、享受言论自由却又大肆攻击所在国的价值观和制度的行为，我们又该怎么评判？这些国家又应该如何应对这种利用言论自由反对言论自由的行为呢？

AI-generated by Timothy Huang

1.国旗真的保护那些蔑视她的人吗？

关注陆配被驱逐和亲哈马斯学生被驱逐的人，都会联想到，在上世纪下半叶，美国出现了好几起通过焚烧美国国旗表达自己不满的案例，但是美国司法系统以这种焚烧国旗的行为属于言论自由的保护范畴为由，认定焚烧国旗并不违法。在当中，有一句流传甚广的话：“美国国旗所代表的权利之一就是焚烧她的权利”；他的出处是1989年的德州诉约翰逊一案美国最高法院判决中那句“国旗保护蔑视她的人”。随后在1990年，美国诉艾奇曼一案中又重申了这一原则。

长期以来，人们对这句话的理解是不同的。有人认为，这个判决意味着，美国公民有权反美。这是一种极为憨厚耿直的理解。另一种理解则认为，这只是具体案例的判断，这一系列判决仅仅确认，美国公民有权利焚烧国旗而已，而焚烧国旗只是众多言论表达的一种，有权焚烧国旗并不意味着这种言论表达可以延展到反对言论自由这一价值本身。或者，简单说，焚烧国旗和反对美国及她所代表的价值是两件事，美国最高法院的判决只确认了焚烧国旗合法，而没有确认反美合法。

笔者毫不掩饰地赞同第二种理解。即，即使在有些国家——比如美国——他们对于言论自由的保护程度非常高，高到可以容忍焚烧本国国旗这种行为，但是容忍这种对国旗的蔑视并不等于容忍对于体制和其所坚守的价值观的直接攻击。就像判决中所定义的那样，焚烧国旗是一种具有政治象征性的言论。这也就意味着，焚烧美国国旗并不是一种现实的和即时的对推翻美国现有体制的号召。

这就类似于，民运人士在大使馆前高喊“打倒共产党！”“打倒习近平！”，跟白纸运动参与者在Telegram群组中发消息“今晚十点乌鲁木齐中路碰面”，那是完全不一样的性质。

言论自由当然意味着，容忍对言论自由本身的攻击和反对，然而，言论自由从来未被证明可以被合法地用于限制和推翻言论自由的行为本身。

很多人会疑问，这样理解会不会对言论自由形成不合理的限制？会不会否定批评体制的合法性？完全不会。

邓小平曾在联合国大会发言：

“如果中国有朝一日变了颜色，变成一个超级大国，也在世界上称王称霸，到处欺负人家，侵略人家，剥削人家，那么，世界人民就应当给中国戴上一顶社会帝国主义的帽子，就应当揭露它，反对它，并且同中国人民一道，打倒它。”

难道，邓小平的意思是说，自己大撒币买来的第三世界小兄弟有权利翻脸不认人，反过来攻击中国吗？显然不是。在台面上，他强调的东西显然是，中国反对霸权主义，中国大撒币是为了联合世界其他正义国家共同反对霸权主义，所以，如果有一天，中国也成霸权主义了，那这些正义国家也就不用为中国的金钱攻势所折腰，而应该根据当初组成团团伙伙的初衷，来把中国这个新霸权主义国家推翻掉。

当然，笔者相信，邓小平不会真的允许第三世界国家把霸权主义的中国打倒，而习近平也肯定说，这是个过时无效的历史发言。

然而，这有助于我们理解言论自由对反对言论自由的言论的容忍程度。也就是，只要言论自由下的对体制的批评不威胁到言论自由本身，那就是言论自由的保护范畴，但如果批评体制的根本目的就是为了用一个不保护言论自由的体制取而代之，例如，让中共武统台湾，让哈马斯占领美国的校园，那就应该像邓小平说的那样，揭露它，反对它，并且同体制一道打倒它。

2.我们该如何评判身在自由世界反自由的人

前述理论以反对者本身是本国公民为背景的，也就是他们首先受到保护言论自由的体制的宪法性保护。但是，在现实中，很多支持武统的陆配，支持哈马斯的欧美国家居民，本身并没有取得台湾或者欧美国籍。在这种情况下，批评体制是否是为了用一个不保护言论自由的体制取而代之，便是比较高的标准了；我们此时应该直接关注他们所持有的签证的限制条件。

对于永久居留权或者绿卡算不算一种签证，的确存在不同的理解。有些国家的绿卡确实在实践中提供了部分在理论上本国公民才有的待遇。比如美国绿卡持有者，偶尔能够在原籍国和美国之外的第三国得到美国的领事保护，但是这种保护始终是人道主义性质的，不是美国的法律义务。所以，本部分论述的基础是将永久居留权也视为一种可无限续签的长期签证，并不认为永久居留权在这一点之外跟普通签证有任何的法律意义的区别。好事之人无需评论永久居留权的法律性质。

我们拿王志安举例。他2024年初在台湾参加有偿的商业活动，违反了他持有的观光签证的条件，即“不得从事有偿工作或者活动”，导致台湾撤销他的签证，五年内不准入境。这一决定和处罚的根据，是他违反了签证的限制条件，而不是他在节目中公然歧视侮辱残障人士。这是一个典型的违反签证限制条件而受到处罚和限制的例子。自然而然，类似地，我们只需要去看陆配或者美国绿卡的签证条件限制，就可以确认他们有没有权利发表支持武统或者哈马斯的言论。

我们知道，陆配支持武统显然是违反《两岸关系条例》的。然而，行政限制性条件每个国家都不一样。世界上有至少几十个称得上是自由民主的国家，万一有的国家的永居权限制条件允许，有的不允许，有的压根没提，那这部分论述也就无法继续了。

因此，我们将从签证的本质出发，论证非本国公民没有权利发表支持敌对势力颠覆其所在国体制的言论。

签证是一国边境管理部门允许别国公民进入本国边境的授权证明；尽管它通常由驻外领事馆签发，但这仅仅是出于双方的便利考量，不影响它属于国边境管理事务的范畴。那么，签证事务属于行政事项，而在行政事项上，行政部门对行政相对人而言，在法律规定的范围内，拥有任意裁量权；如果行政相对人复议或者诉讼，证明行政决定是错误的，行政部门再改过来就是了，造成任何损失再进行赔偿。这不仅是中国的行政法体系的规定，也是世界各国行政法的主流规定。

这就意味着，国边境管理部门授权非本国公民入境时，其决定权是任意的，施加任何条件也是任意的，允许和拒绝也是任意的。当然，边境管理部门本身必然有工作标准，签证的有效期、滞留时长、允许从事何种事项、可以享受哪些福利等等，分门别类，就形成了我们熟悉的各种签证类型。

到此，我们可以说，签证附条件，是它的固有性质决定的，是它作为一项行政部门的决定和授权通知的本质决定的。签证附加的条件，属于行政命令而非法律规定，没有所谓的“法无禁止即可为”的要求；如果语焉不详或者有歧义，行政部门仅仅是承担后续复议或者诉讼的不利后果，而相对人并不因此获得对应行为的合法性背书。

又因为，对于签证所附带的条件限制，自然而然地，既可以是书面的，也可以是口头的，既可以是普适的，也可以是特殊的，既可以来源于直接的行政命令，也可以来源于签发国的任何法律渊源。这也就意味着，对于某些限制条件，如果它过于公认和普遍，它就极有可能以共识或者默许的方式确立。这当中当然存在很多有利于签证持有人的条件，比如有权接受警察保护，有权接受医疗救助，有权住酒店，等等，这些显然是不需要在签证批准的确认信中一一列举的，而是一个文明国家为任何本国居民——包括本国公民和侨居的外国公民——所应提供的基础的条件。

但与此同时，也会存在很多对签证持有人的限制性条件。有些限制，比如无权违法，显然也是不需要单独列举的。如果任何确认信中笼统地要求签证持有人在居留期间不得违反本国法律，那我们只能认为纳税人的油墨钱被浪费掉了。

而签证持有人不得直接参与或号召推翻签发国现行体制的限制，同样属于这种不言自明的限制。这是一种逻辑的必然。一国的国边境管理部门允许非本国公民进入本国境内，这是一种优待，一种特权，而这种特权自然不可能包括对本国现行体制的挑战，这不但适用于民主国家捍卫自由的情形，他甚至适用于中国这样的独裁国家捍卫共产党独裁的情形。有谁会天真到认为，中国签发签证，能允许签证持有人去北京打倒习近平呢？

所以说，那些利用言论自由去攻击言论自由、妄图让敌对势力去武统所在国的人，一开始便是没有资格引述什么“第一修正案”的。他们一开始便是违反了持有签证居住在外国的行政限制条件上的。简而言之，非本国公民就是没有权利宣扬武统，没有权利支持哈马斯占领校园；如果不服。他们应该先去行政复议、行政诉讼，去把这个限制条件打掉，而不是假装自己是个人，还要求所在国对其进行人权保护。

3.自由世界如何应对利用言论自由反对言论自由的行为？

我们必须承认，即使有上述牢不可破的逻辑和理论基础，自由世界应对这类利用自由反对自由的行为，仍然是比较吃力的。

比如，台湾对陆配的遣返、美国对哈马斯支持者的遣返，都是个案处理。它们可能有示范作用，也有号召性，但始终无法形成一条明确的法律规定。因为，言论本身是否属于反对言论自由、是否属于号召用否认言论自由的体制代替现行体制，都只能个案判断。台湾大可以修律，要求所有签证持有人不得宣扬武统，但具体的言论是否属于宣扬武统，仍是一个十分具体的问题。这种限制本身会损害自由的价值，会形成一种“自由也有所畏惧”的形象，会摧毁真理越辩越明的自信。因此，自由世界必须忍受大量的反对自由的声音存在，这是自由的代价之一。

但自由世界仍应该有所作为。

第一，自由世界的行政和司法部门必须主动去辨别可能危害言论自由的言论，主动将这类事务推进行政和司法程序，暴露在公众面前，利用自由世界道理越辩越明的特点，把这种威胁公开化，让人民去决定以何种方式去应对。这样，无论最后采取什么手段，自由世界都可以首先坚持了民主和自由的立场与行为方式，首先在道义上取得了胜利。

第二，自由世界的本国公民必须提高自身对于敌国意识形态宣传的警惕性和辨识力。“Freedom is not free”，为了捍卫自由，自由世界的人民必须付出额外的时间和代价，去抵抗试图颠覆和消灭自由的努力，而不是躺在自由上睡大觉。而我必须再次呼吁，捍卫自由的第一步那就是认清谁是自由世界的头号威胁，他不是俄国总统，更不是美国总统，而是中国的习近平。

第三，对于我们这些自由世界的新移民而言，我们必须主动帮助所在国的政府和公民，利用我们对于原籍国嘴脸和骗局的深刻认识，与他们一道抵御这种意识形态入侵。言论自由的生命力与脆弱性在很大程度上是一体两面，而新移民对自由的向往和对移居国的接纳饿感激，理应促使他们为新的祖国的自由捍卫事业做出更多的贡献。

提及此事，令人感到非常愤怒的是，3月15日，数千华人第二次前往已经被中国政府购入的英国皇家铸币厂旧址强烈抗议中国大使馆新址计划，与此同时却有另外一波华人，在大英图书馆，顶着文化交流的名号，宣发《戏说英国》这本统战教材。我一贯的观点是，来自落后世界的新移民若想不被歧视，若想融入新的社会，第一件事就是要和原有的专制政府彻底割席，并且发挥自己对他的深刻了解，去帮助所在国更好地认识和对抗这种邪恶帝国的扩张，在这种并肩作战中各取所需，建立牢不可破的联系；而不是像有些人一样，动不动就要提醒族裔背景，动不动就要说什么“民族的才是世界的”，动不动就干什么文化宣传，生怕别人脸盲把自己错认成日本人、韩国人，甚至伦敦的喜茶门店用英文菜单都要搞个大新闻，都要批判一番——如果中餐用英文写出来令人不知所云，有没有一种可能：这种混乱、这种拿不上台面，就是他们所热爱的中餐的本质呢？

综上所述，对于本国公民而言，反对本国是否应该被允许，取决于这种反对是一种政治象征性言论，还是试图用否认各种价值观的体制取代现行体制的煽动与号召，而对于非本国居民而言，我们可以毫不保留地反对这种利用言论自由反对言论自由的行为。

Does the National Flag Protect Those Who Despise It?

By Timothy Huang

Recent events, such as the expulsion of a mainland Chinese spouse from Taiwan for advocating armed reunification, and the deportation of a US green card holder for openly supporting Hamas, have once again ignited debate over a fundamental question: Should freedom of speech extend to those who challenge the core values of their host country - even to the extent of supporting hostile forces? Both theorists and practitioners frequently grapple with this dilemma: Does freedom of speech include the freedom to oppose freedom of speech itself? And how should we evaluate the actions of those who, while enjoying the liberties of the free world, aggressively attack its values and institutions? How should liberal democracies respond to those who exploit freedom of speech to undermine it?

1. Does the Flag Really Protect Those Who Despise It?

Anyone following the deportations of mainland Chinese spouses or pro-Hamas students will likely recall several high-profile cases in the latter half of the 20th century where Americans protested by burning the US flag. The American judiciary ruled these acts fell within the protection of free speech, concluding that burning the flag was not illegal. One oft-quoted line from this era is: "One of the freedoms represented by the American flag is the freedom to burn it" - a sentiment derived from the landmark 1989 Texas v. Johnson ruling, in which the US Supreme Court affirmed that "the flag protects those who hold it in contempt." This principle was reaffirmed a year later in United States v. Eichman (1990).

Interpretations of this statement have long varied. Some believe the ruling implies that American citizens have the right to be anti-American. This is a rather naive and literal understanding. A more nuanced view is that these rulings address specific legal scenarios: that Americans have the right to burn the flag, but that this act is merely one form of political expression. The right to burn the flag does not extend to a general licence to oppose the foundational values of free speech itself. Put, burning the flag and opposing the values the United States embodies are two different matters. The Supreme Court rulings confirmed only the former.

We are unequivocal in supporting the latter interpretation. Even in nations like the United States, where freedom of expression is fiercely defended - so much so that burning the national flag is tolerated - this tolerance does not equate to accepting direct attacks on the political system and its core values. As defined in the rulings, burning the flag is a form of political expression laden with symbolic meaning. It is not an immediate or practical call to overthrow the US system.

This is akin to dissidents shouting "Down with the Communist Party!" or "Down with Xi Jinping!" outside an embassy - actions fundamentally different from a message in a Telegram group instructing participants of the White Paper Protests to gather at a specific place and time for direct action.

Freedom of speech, of course, entails tolerating even attacks upon itself. However, no democratic legal system has ever established that freedom of speech may be lawfully used to restrict or overthrow freedom of speech itself.

Some may worry that such an interpretation would unreasonably curtail free expression or even negate the legitimacy of criticism against the system. It’s not necessary at all.

Deng Xiaoping once declared at the United Nations:

"If one day China changes colour, becomes a superpower, and seeks hegemony, bullying and exploiting others, the people of the world should expose it, oppose it, and work with the Chinese people to overthrow it."

Did Deng genuinely mean that China’s Third World allies, whose loyalty had been bought with lavish handouts, were free to turn against China? Clearly not. He was framing China's opposition to hegemonism: if China itself became hegemonic, these allies should, in principle, reject it - true to their shared anti-hegemonic purpose.

Of course, I doubt Deng would ever have tolerated these nations actually overthrowing a hegemonic China. Xi Jinping would surely dismiss such remarks as outdated and void.

Nonetheless, this illustrates our point well. Criticism of the system is protected so long as it does not seek to replace it with one that denies free speech. For example, advocating for the CCP to annex Taiwan by force, or for Hamas to seize control of a US campus, crosses a crucial line. Following Deng’s logic, such positions must be exposed, opposed, and defeated.

2. How Should We Judge Anti-Liberal Individuals Living in Liberal Democracies?

The foundational rights underpinning freedom of speech typically apply to a country's own citizens, who are constitutionally protected. However, many of those advocating armed reunification or supporting Hamas do not hold citizenship in Taiwan or Western countries. In these cases, rather than judging whether their speech seeks to replace a free system with an unfree one - a high bar - we can look more pragmatically at the conditions of their visas.

Debate exists over whether permanent residence or a green card constitutes a visa. Some countries extend privileges to permanent residents that verge on those afforded to citizens. For instance, a US green card holder may receive consular assistance abroad. However, such protection is humanitarian, not a legal entitlement. For the purposes of this discussion, We treat permanent residence as a long-term visa that can be renewed indefinitely, with no fundamental legal distinction from other visa types.

Take Wang Zhi’an, for example. In early 2024, he participated in paid commercial activities in Taiwan on a tourist visa that explicitly prohibited such work. Taiwan revoked his visa and barred him from entry for five years - entirely because he violated the visa’s conditions, not because of offensive remarks he made to the disabled in his programme. This is a textbook case of punishment for breaching visa restrictions. Similarly, we need only examine the visa conditions of mainland spouses or US green card holders to determine whether they are permitted to express support for armed reunification or Hamas.

We know that mainland spouses supporting armed reunification clearly violate Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Relations Act. Of course, administrative restrictions vary from country to country. There are dozens of liberal democracies worldwide; some may explicitly prohibit such speech, others may not. This makes universal conclusions difficult.

That said, we can argue from first principles: non-citizens have no right to advocate for hostile forces to overthrow their host country's political system.

A visa is an authorisation from a country’s border authorities allowing a foreign national to enter its territory. Even though visas are often issued by consulates abroad, they fall under the purview of border management. Visa matters are administrative in nature, and administrative bodies enjoy wide discretion within legal limits. If an administrative decision is challenged and found faulty, it can be overturned, and compensation may follow - but the original discretionary power stands. This is true not only under Chinese administrative laws but across most of the world.

Thus, a visa is inherently conditional. The administrative body may attach any conditions it deems appropriate. These might be explicit or implicit, general or specific, written or oral. Many conditions, like the obligation to obey the law, are so fundamental they need not be spelled out. Likewise, the prohibition against foreign nationals engaging in activities aimed at overthrowing the host country's system is an implicit condition - rooted in logic as much as in law.

To put it bluntly, no country - whether a liberal democracy or a dictatorship like China - would grant a visa to a foreign national so they can incite rebellion against it. Anyone naive enough to think China would allow a visa holder to travel to Beijing to "overthrow Xi Jinping" is not only naïve but also stupid.

Therefore, those who exploit free speech to attack the very foundations of free speech—by calling for hostile takeovers of their host country—have no business invoking the First Amendment or similar protections. They are in breach of administrative conditions from the outset. Put simply: non-citizens have no right to advocate for armed reunification or to support Hamas in taking over campuses. If they object, they should challenge the visa conditions through legal channels, not pretend they have an inherent human right to do so.

3. How Should Liberal Democracies Respond?

Even with the solid theoretical and legal underpinnings outlined above, liberal democracies often struggle to address those who use freedom to oppose freedom.

Taiwan’s deportation of mainland spouses and the US expulsion of pro-Hamas supporters are case-by-case measures. They may serve as warnings or deterrents but cannot establish sweeping legal principles. Whether specific speech crosses the line into advocating for the destruction of a free society is a contextual question, not easily reduced to statutory language. Any legal restriction on speech risks harming the very values of freedom it seeks to protect. As a result, liberal democracies must endure a significant volume of anti-freedom rhetoric as part of the price of liberty.

Nevertheless, democracies should act decisively in certain respects.

First, administrative and judicial bodies should proactively identify speech that threatens freedom and push such cases through formal channels, exposing them to public scrutiny. This allows the public to weigh in, leveraging the strength of open debate. No matter the ultimate outcome, the democratic process itself fortifies the legitimacy of any response.

Second, citizens must heighten their awareness and vigilance regarding hostile ideological propaganda. As the saying goes, "Freedom is not free." Defending it requires effort, time, and sacrifice. Crucially, the foremost threat to global freedom is not Russia's president, nor the US president - but China’s Xi Jinping.

Third, new immigrants must actively assist their host countries by leveraging their intimate knowledge of their homelands’ tactics and deceptions. Their longing for freedom and gratitude to their new nations should drive them to contribute to the defence of liberty. Shared struggles against authoritarianism can forge unbreakable bonds between immigrants and their adopted countries.

On a personal note, I was furious to witness, on 15 March, thousands of Chinese, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Taiwanese expatriates protesting outside the soon-to-be Chinese embassy site at the Royal Mint Court in London - while, at the same time, another group of Chinese, under the guise of cultural exchange, were promoting "Ha Ha! Britain" (a CCP propaganda textbook) at the British Library. My consistent view is that new immigrants from authoritarian states, if they wish to avoid discrimination and truly integrate, must sever ties with the regimes they left behind. Their deep understanding of these regimes can and should be used to help their host countries resist ideological infiltration. Instead, too many fall back on their ethnic identity, pushing cultural propaganda and obsessing over trivial matters like whether a bubble tea shop’s English menu "dilutes" Chinese culture. If Chinese cuisine, when translated into English, sounds nonsensical - might that not reflect something intrinsic to the culture itself?

In conclusion, whether dissent by citizens should be permitted depends on whether it is symbolic political expression or a direct call to replace the system with one that denies freedom. For non-citizens, we should feel no hesitation in opposing attempts to exploit freedom of speech to undermine freedom itself.