An Interview with Ivan “Wu Feizhong”, a Principal UK-based Participant in the Shanghai Independence Movement “我要给上海人创造一套文字”：专访上海独立运动英国地区主要参与者Ivan“吴非中”

By Timothy Huang

上海独立运动是诸夏独立风潮中相当特别和洋气的一支，一直以文明、西化、专注本地区事务而在海外华裔异见者群体中独树一帜。2025年4月25日至27日，筹备近一年的上海独立大会在纽约举行并获得成功，在海内外引起巨大轰动。2025年夏，上海民族党党员、上海独立运动英国地区主要参与者之一Ivan（网名“吴非中”）接受了《自由之声》杂志主编Timothy Huang（即笔者本人）的专访。

本文为笔者根据采访录像整理的文字稿件。

Timothy：感谢Ivan接受我们的采访。可否先做个简短的自我介绍？我想大家看到你的网名“吴非中”，会更自然地联想到你目前从事的上海独立运动。

Ivan：大家好，我是Ivan，网名叫吴非中。我在2024年6月份加入了沪民党，当时通过手持“我自愿加入上海民族党”的标语牌并拍摄视频的形式完成入党程序。这是加入沪民党的标准流程。

Timothy：你提到的加入沪民党的程序是非常新颖的一点。在中国人秘密结社的传统下，似乎入党是一种不太见得光的仪式，比如在一个阴暗狭小的房间里，轻声齐语“我志愿加入中国共产党”……

Ivan：对。我认为这其实是我们沪民党的一种组织策略。首先是为了拓展我们党的知名度，让更多的人了解到我们，同时也是对上海独立运动本身的一个宣传；此外，上海独立运动的发展壮大对中共本身和中国人心中的大一统思想是一种极强的冲击。相比较之下，我们并不强调党员身份的秘密性。

Timothy：看来这个策略是有效的，我本人也是这样认识你的。请问你现在在英国是专业从事上海独立运动或为上海民族党工作吗？

Ivan：不，我是业余参与，性质类似于义工。我认为从事政治活动保持业余状态更好。我们都需要首先解决生存问题，我要赚钱养活自己，而参与政治运动在目前阶段很难满足这个需求，所以我必须一边工作、一边用业余闲暇时间参与政治活动或者从事语言文字方面的研究。这对我而言也算一种劳逸结合。

Timothy：接下来请Ivan简单介绍一下上海独立运动吧。

Ivan：好。“上海独立运动”顾名思义，就是主张上海作为一个城市从中国独立出去。目前我们所说的“上海”的范围，主要是指中国目前的上海直辖市区划的领土范围。我们认为上海原本就是一个独立于中国的开放的、西化的城市。它虽然不是严格意义上的殖民地，但是它一开始便是作为租界的性质登上历史舞台，是西方的海洋文明、商业文明的自然延伸和产物；上海一开始便是西方文明与中国交往的中心点。在租界时期的早期，租界仅供洋人居住；但是到后来，尤其是太平天国运动后，也允许当地华人居住，周围的居民被允许迁入进行工作和生活。当时上海租界设置了类似于地方自治的市议会的政府机构——工部局（Municipal Council），起初仅仅有公共工程建设的职能，但很快发展出警察、法庭、监狱等体系，实际上就是上海自治政府。我们现在的旗帜也是根据工部局的旗帜改进而来，我们把当时的万国旗改成了上海独立运动旗帜中间的蓝色圆圈。

Timothy：上海独立运动目前主要在美国发展，它在我们所在的英国都有哪些发展？

Ivan：主要是街头政治活动和社区活动，包括其他族裔组织的一些其他活动。我们也希望在不久的将来能够举办一些沪裔群体自己的活动，它们未必以上海独立为主题，比如可能关注更广泛的中国人权问题。

Timothy：上海独立运动会尝试去领导中国的民主化运动或者肢解中国的运动吗？

Ivan：领导与否取决于所有具体参与者的才能，通常是能者居之。我们上海独立运动能够确保的是对中共的统治和大一统观念的冲击，这是我们力所能及的范围。我之所以强调上海独立运动独特的冲击性，是因为我们平常所接触到的台湾独立、香港独立，或者新疆西藏的独立，它们都属于帝国边境范围，直到近代才被中国侵略和完全控制；而我们城市如果宣布独立，则对于大部分困居中国的人而言，认识到很多地方自古不属于中国，是中国强行圈定的概念，是政治手段塑造出来的东西，那对于人们观念的冲击是非常大的。所以上海独立运动未必是一个引领者，但它是一个破局者。

Timothy：你多次提到中国的大一统观念，相比于民族地区的独立运动，它会是上海独立运动的主要阻碍吗？

Ivan：上海独立反对的正是这种大一统观念，所谓的“大一统”实质是“大侵略”，是中国侵略他国并把它们并入到自己的领土内，强制进行一个同化和洗脑的过程。而实际上，很多地区的文明、习俗都是在本地区自行发展出来的，和传统意义上的“中国”并无关联。“大一统”现在已经变成了大杂烩，类似于这样一种心态：只要我吃进来，所有东西都是我的。这种侵略他国、侵略他人的行径，对于任何追求自由民主的人都是一种阻碍，也是我们自然而然会去反对的东西。

Timothy：现在也有很多人抱持一种“大中华联邦”的构想，他们支持各地独立，但是各地独立、中共政权倒台后，他们主张建立一个类似于甚至是超越欧盟的联邦制国家。你认为这是否也是一种你前面提到的大一统思想的残余？

Ivan：我认为“中国联邦”的构想很难实现。中国各地的语言、文化、风俗、习惯都是差异极大的，目前仅仅依靠中共的暴力镇压才维持在一起。在各地纷纷独立后，再试图通过民主的程序把大家团结在一起，我认为不太可能。并且这个联邦构想不一定非要叫“中国联邦”，而是可以叫“东亚联盟”，相近的文化或者意识形态的范围内可以形成主权国家的联合体，比如上海共和国可以和吴越国去构建这样的联邦或联盟，甚至包括南粤国、韩国、日本；这样的国际联盟反而是更好的选择。

Timothy：你如何回应这样一类观点：上海已经被中国侵略两千余年，最早的吴、越被灭后，上海本地的政权往后仅仅以割据政权的形式存在，缺乏独立建国的历史基础。

Ivan：我们所反对的中国就是目前的中华人民共和国，上海在历史上如何被其他的中国政权侵略并不重要。中国当然可以自己去编纂什么唐宋元明清的历史，但这仅仅是他们的一种观点。不同朝代都是不同的政权、不同的人群、不同的统治者，他们的经济政治文化观念也都是各异的，甚至元朝、清朝都不是汉族政权。他们和今天的中华人民共和国怎么能算作同一个国家呢？我们从来不认可大中华主义者们编造出来的不同朝代之间的传承性，所以，可以认为，历史上侵略上海的政权已经纷纷灭亡了，与我们今天的生活再无联系；从政权的视角出发，我们的敌人只有中华人民共和国。

Timothy：上海民族党有哪些适用于独立后的上海共和国政府的具体的政治主张和诉求？

Ivan：我并不能代表沪民党在这里宣布政治主张。但就我个人而言，一方面，我们要尽可能地去实现上海的开放，消除大部分的行政限制，激发上海的经济活力；另一方面，我们要对上海文化进行复兴，塑造“上海人”的身份认同，来了上海就是上海人，而非来了上海还是中国人。

Timothy：你刚才提到希望建设一个非常开放的人员交流体系，但是很多人会担心，上海独立运动的支持者毕竟不多，甚至在上海成功独立后也会有相当大一部分反对者。在这样开放的人员流动下，会不会给上海独立运动带来新的挫折？

Ivan：这个问题非常有趣。我们看像新加坡、卡塔尔这样的城市国家，虽然人口流动性极大，但是整个社会有共同的准则，这当中就包括了国家认同。即使从维护上海本地治安的角度出发，我们也肯定不会允许以反对上海独立为目的的人员来沪自由活动。我们可能无法对自由流动的人员的思想进行审查，但是我们可以确立需要共同遵守的规则。

Timothy：上海独立运动和独立后的上海共和国与周边地区独立运动的关系如何？如果仅仅有上海从中国独立出去，周边地区仍处在中共或者支持大一统的其他政权的统治之下，这会是一种现实的危险吗？上海独立是否和其他地区的独立是紧密相连、甚至互为因果呢？

Ivan：上海独立运动肯定需要包括整个长三角地区在内的全体东亚国家和人民的支持，这是非常重要的。我认为，任何被中国占领的地区试图单独独立出去，都会有非常大的难度，因为中共去单独镇压或者“收复”都是比较容易的。因此我们当然希望有更多的地区通过组织他们本地区的独立来一同参与独立运动，以便尽可能的让上海周边的国家对我们保持友善的态度。

Timothy：你们打算如何说服生活在海内外的沪裔人民支持上海独立？

Ivan：我认为很多人不支持上海独立运动的原因是他们根本不知道有上海独立运动这回事，他们不敢想象上海独立这样的情景。在中共的洗脑下，思维转变是很困难的。此外，我们需要帮助大家克服对于反共的恐惧感，这也是人性的弱点之一。但是因为反共困难就躺平不干的心态是不对的。我听到很多质疑的声音说，上海独立之后，粮食怎么办？资源怎么办？这是很幼稚的观念。上海独立之后势必要与周边国家继续进行经贸往来和交流，这些并不是现实的问题。上海独立不仅是上海自身摆脱中国侵略的过程，也是对整个东亚地区秩序的重塑。

Timothy：我们从理论转回现实。你在英国从事上海独立运动的主要困难是什么？

Ivan：最大的困难就是居住在英国的沪裔人口数量太少了，可能不到一万人，并且居住非常分散，几乎很难遇到。这是一个非常现实的问题。我们的活动几乎都要和别的群体进行联合，这是不利于壮大上海独立运动声势的。可能整个英国的上海人都不如纽约多，这也是上海独立运动主要在美国发展的原因之一。

Timothy：说完人的问题我们再来说钱的问题，你目前从事政治活动的资金来源是什么？你对于政治活动的资金募集有哪些个人看法？

Ivan：我现在是要用自己的生活费去补贴政治活动的花销和支出的，属于自费活动。根据我个人的观察，一些其他社群是通过自身的经贸活动或者商业行为去募集资金，包括主题餐厅、周边商店等等，但是对于上海独立运动来说，这些目前都不是特别适用。毕竟这类商业行为需要有专业能力的人进行专门的负责，而上海独立运动的规模还不支持这样的行为。

Timothy：沪民党目前在伦敦有自己的办公场所吗？

Ivan：没有，我们有活动就从各地赶来伦敦参加。

Timothy：以后会考虑在伦敦设立固定的办公室或者“党支部”吗？

Ivan：如果我们可以购入办公场所，在Google Map上标注为“上海大使馆（Shanghai Embassy）”，这本身就有很强的宣传作用。但说到底还是取决于我们有多少资金；就伦敦的地价而言，目前来说还不太现实。

Timothy：这就是我刚才想问的。你目前能够自费参与政治活动，背景是目前的活动规模和频率都处于相对较低的状态，如果以后规模逐渐扩大，肯定是不能够继续自费支持的。现在很流行一种募资手段就是发行虚拟货币，你对发币这件事怎么看？

Ivan：我知道李老师前不久发币了，引起了很大争议。我认为发币、买币都是个人（私人部门）的行为、合法的行为。如果我们为了在伦敦建立党支部或者流亡政府部门这样的项目去单独发币，类似这样的项目，发行的虚拟货币几乎是没有交易价值的，不可能在日常交易中流通或使用，这样的项目就等于是大家在捐钱了。如果这样的话，我个人反而倾向于直接去进行募捐。当然加密货币是一种吸引大家投资的玩法，增加参与度，调动积极性。

Timothy：咱们上次一起参加了越南的抗议活动，你认为他们的海外反抗运动对于上海独立运动有哪些帮助或者值得借鉴之处？

Ivan：我想先说明一点，越南人在海外反对越共的活动在整个世界都具有特殊性。他们从1975年流亡海外后，组织的反共社区和活动是最出色、最有成效的，甚至在美国政界都形成了一定的影响力。他们反共的意志是极为坚定的，与此同时，他们也很好地保持了越南传统的文化和精神，是整个诸夏、百越地区都可以去学习的。他们在保守自己传统文化的同时，还兼具了多样化的儒家文化、天主教文化、佛教道教文化等，在整个中国占领的地区勉强能和他们媲美的，恐怕也只有香港人的独立运动了。我也我观察了缅甸人，其实我对缅甸这个群体我最佩服一点是缅甸人的群体，他们非常团结，就是从来不内斗，反军政府和反中共的路线之间也几乎不内斗。在这一点上，越南人甚至也有只反北越的状况出现。

Timothy：你认为诸夏独立运动是不是都比较缺乏这样的反抗意志？似乎大家都只是有这样一种独立的愿望，但是缺乏死磕到底的决心、技巧和实践？

Ivan：我觉得是有这样的情况的。越南人和中国人搞反共活动的不同点之一就是，他们在海外有抵抗中心的，这些中心很难被拆散或渗透。就拿我们上海独立而言，虽然人数还很少，但也形成了类似的中心；但对于规模更小的独立运动而言，他们仅仅是有几个人出来说我要独立要反中共，还没有形成中心化的组织。

Timothy：那根据你的观察，越南人是如何从西贡陷落至今五十年的海外流亡和抗争中保持这种抵抗中心的呢？这种中心具体指的是一种流亡政府或者其他机构，还是语言文字？

Ivan：他们不是以流亡政府为核心。当然，越南共和国有流亡政府，并且不止一个。他们其实是以一种“黄旗精神”作为凝聚海外反抗势力的中心，作为越南共和国的精神。另外，语言文字也是很重要的。包括越南的华人在内，他们不写正体中文，而是写越南的国语字，这是和港人的本质区别。此外，越南的海外反抗势力非常热衷于社区内部的相互帮助和抱团取暖，有一大批真心贡献的人在活动。

Timothy：他们是如何获得西方政界支持的？

Ivan：首先越南共和国是一个合法国家，越南共和国政府本身是一个被推翻的合法政府，他们本身就有一定的基础。他们并没有勉力维持南越政府的形式，但是在这个合法政府被推翻、越南反抗者流亡海外的背景下，就可以孕育出很多“临时政府”、“流亡政府”之类的组织，以及越兴党、民主兄弟会、大越党等等不同的组织，他们会更容易借助越南共和国或者南越政府的合法性去为自己提供法统方面的支持。此外，有很多越南裔的人已经在美国等国家担任议员等职位，或者在美国军队任职，他们参与政治、争取支持、与政府高层合作都是非常方便的。

Timothy：这么看，上海独立运动所能借鉴的成分其实并不多。

Ivan：是的，目前来讲，我们首要的目的还是要树立“上海人不是中国人”这样的概念。

Timothy：这个观念还是挺费劲的。据我观察，很多同情甚至支持上海独立运动的人，他们也仅仅是支持上海从中国分裂出去，支持上海人独立建国，但并不认为上海人不是中国人。

Ivan：“上海人不是中国人”这个口号一定要明确地喊出来。Chinese本身也是一个很笼统、很混乱的概念，中国人是中华人民共和国中央人民政府实际控制下的占领区人民，我们要脱离这样的谎言，就必须喊出上海人不是中国人这样的观点。这就像韩国人不是中国人、越南人不是中国人一样，他们在人种上和中国人没有什么区别，但绝不会自称中国人。蒙古人、哈萨克人也不会自称中国人。

Timothy：那你们希望如何去说服人们接受“上海人不是中国人”的观点？

Ivan：对于中国或者中国人的定义权其实掌握在中共手上。中国原本是一种华夏中心主义叙事，但如果我们真的来看上海的历史，它有自己的、与中原地区截然不同的服饰、饮食、语言、文化，这是一种天然的不同。其实，不光中共有大中国、大一统的观念，国民党也是有的，它们都要把现在这片被称为中国的土地统一起来在自己的管辖范围内，才提出来中国人这种概念。而现在的中国甚至都不再是传统上在河南地区的中国，而是以北京、以中南海为核心的“中国”。这个中国对上海的控制我们肯定是反对的。说到这里，孙中山在美国流亡期间，用粤语演讲“我们都是中国人”，这是非常别扭的场景——他甚至都没有用“中国”的语言去说这句话。后来，他和继任者在苏联的支持下进行北伐，推翻了当时合法的以五色旗为国旗的中华民国政府，搞了一个党国体制政府。这同样也是大一统观念的荼毒。

Timothy：这就是列宁主义与中国传统文化的结合了，并且是属于两者最坏部分的结合。

Ivan：是的。东亚其实普遍缺乏一种人文主义的精神，没有一种相互尊重的文化氛围或者人文关怀，而是流行弱肉强食的意识形态。这同样助长了中原王朝对各地区独立传统的侵略和打压。

Timothy：那独立后的上海共和国有能力把前面提到的文化上的劣根性或者糟粕去除掉吗？

Ivan：我认为是可以的。就比如2019年之前的香港，同为华人社会，整体上仍然是有一种多元共存、自由讨论的文化氛围在，所以我认为独立后的上海也有能力做到这一点。其实，香港的发展本身也是因为上海的发展遭遇了阻碍。比如，1949年之后，上海作为远东的自由航行中心的地位不复存在，香港便接替了它的地位。所以说，香港是一种后发的崛起，在很大程度上继承了上海的特质。很多香港人本身就是从上海迁移或者逃难过去；香港的文化、习俗、饮食、服装也都与上海有一定的传承关系，最典型的就是旗袍。

Timothy：你们有没有什么在海外宣扬上海文化的活动？

Ivan：我自己在从事语言文化研究类的活动，包括对上海话进行整合。但是我现在面临一个难点。比如越南人、韩国人他们都有自己的文字，上海话就缺少标准的文字，上海人说的话和写的话是一种割裂的状态。上海以前有上海话的招牌，但从没有正式的文字，或者用上海话写的公文。就像我们搞上海独立运动，发的推特也都是用中文和英文，没有办法用上海话去发。包括我们喊口号也用普通话和英语去喊——当然这也涉及到受众的原因，我们希望能让更多的人听到我们的声音，而不仅仅是上海话的使用者。

Timothy：这样看，从文化传承角度，上海话只有方言没有文字的现状是一个难点。

Ivan：未必。它是一个现实，上海话与越南语、韩语相比，确实是处于前现代化阶段，文和口是脱离的。没有人去整理上海的文字，也缺少明确使用上海话行文的机构或者组织。类似于越南独立后，陈朝的行政文书还是在用汉语书写，而不是用越南语书写。这个情况在今日的香港也是一样的，你在香港买的报纸，文章的文字还是用中文书写，而不是真正意义上的南方人的文字去写。上海话的文字是存在的，但是没有人去做成一个系统性的沟通工具。我现在在做各种小语种的输入法。目前在做粤语、吴语、晋语，这既是我个人的兴趣爱好，也是上海文化传承的一部分。我先整理粤语，是因为它有更加丰富的资料，也为上海话的工程积累经验。我也要给香港人或者说粤语使用者创造一种文字，让他们能够以完全口语化的方法去在书面上表达自己的观点和思想。这也不是单独给他们创造的文字。我做完之后，还要和不同的语言去比对，去寻找不同民族语言文字之间的相似度，要尽量让更多的民族能够看得懂。比如我从香港坐飞机，去西贡或者基隆，不同文字要差异不大。我最终的目的是把粤语、台语、客家话，甚至吴语、晋语，都要有一定的文字上的通用性。

Timothy：这是个相当大的工程。这是我们这一代人能够实现的吗？

Ivan：不，完成这个过程的能力要求，我是具备的。但同时，制作完成后还需要有一个传播的过程，这个反而是难的，是我个人无法控制的。文字本身的整理工作，其实半年就能做好。据我了解，越南当年推广国语字，只花了四五个月的时间。当然，他们有一种行政力量在背后推动，并且文字本身也比较简单，肯定是比汉字要简单得多。

Timothy：前年有部电视剧《繁花》，有专门的沪语版。我认为用沪语制作的文艺作品对于上海文化的宣传和保存也是非常有帮助的。你们有这方面的考虑吗？

Ivan：可能会。但是就像前面提到过的，这不仅需要资金，也是需要专业技能的人士；这不在我专业范围，我个人当然无法从事这项工作。但是这显然对于世人将上海看作单独的文化概念是非常有帮助的。在日后条件允许的情况下，招募这类人才是很有必要的。据我了解，香港人和越南人都有专门的以保存和弘扬本民族语言文字为目的的艺术创作组织，但是上海人目前还没有这样的团体。寻找这样同时了解语言文字和艺术创作、并且有心在海外反抗中共的人才确实有一定难度。这就又回到人口基数问题了。

Timothy：所以说上海独立和反对中共是高度绑定的吗？

Ivan：目前来看肯定是的。反对中共、反对共产主义和上海独立是高度绑定的事情，反对大一统或列宁主义的管理模式也是和上海独立高度绑定的。当然，历史上未必如此。比如，上海在文革时期，属于共产主义国家内部之间不同团体的内战，可能形成上海作为小的共产主义中心去对抗北京这个大的共产主义中心的情形。或者在80年代的越南，又支持共产主义，又反对中共，但这实际上是中共和苏共支持的越共之间的争斗。共产主义本身就是一种制造分裂和仇恨的意识形态，所以前面提到的共产党恨共产党、共产党和共产党之间争斗的情况很常见。但是，现在来看，中共也好，共产主义也好，就是明确的敌人了。我又支持共产党，又支持上海独立，在我看来是不可能的。

Timothy：那独立后的上海共和国会效仿东欧一些国家，制定成文的反对共产主义的法案吗？

Ivan：这个很难说。如果是公开宣传叛乱、反对上海共和国，这个肯定要立法禁止。但如果笼统地针对共产主义意识形态，那可能更多会采用一种文化上的抵制和去共产化。比如通过教育，把共产主义塑造的人与人之间相互争斗的文化给去除掉，但是禁到什么程度，我很难具体去表述。比如我禁止传播共产主义的书籍，这就是无法定义或者实施的东西了。但在整体上，反对共产主义和相关文化，这是必须的。但是另一方面，共产主义中国在上海留下的工业体系，该继承的肯定是要继承，这些本身也是上海人民的劳动成果和创造。

“I Want to Create a Writing System for Shanghainese”:

An Interview with Ivan “Wu Feizhong”, a Principal UK-based Participant in the Shanghai Independence Movement

By Timothy Huang

The Shanghai Independence Movement occupies a distinctive place within the wider “All Xia” (Zhu Xia) current of independence activism. It has long set itself apart among overseas Chinese dissidents through its emphasis on civility, Westernisation, and a focus on strictly local affairs. From 25 to 27 April 2025, after nearly a year of preparation, the Shanghai Independence Convention was held in New York to notable success, generating considerable attention at home and abroad. In the summer of 2025, Ivan (online alias “Wu Feizhong”), a member of the Shanghai National Party and one of the movement’s principal participants in the United Kingdom, sat down with Voice of Liberation magazine’s editor-in-chief, Timothy Huang (the present interviewer). This article is an edited transcript prepared from the interview recording.

Timothy: Thank you, Ivan, for speaking with us. Could you begin with a brief self‑introduction? Many people, seeing your online handle “Wu Feizhong”, will naturally associate you with the Shanghai Independence Movement.

Ivan: Hello everyone, I’m Ivan, online name “Wu Feizhong”. I joined the Shanghai National Party in June 2024. I completed the joining procedure by holding a placard reading “I voluntarily join the Shanghai National Party” and filming a video. That is the Party’s standard admission process.

Timothy: The procedure you mention is strikingly novel. In the Chinese tradition of clandestine associations, joining a party is often imagined as a furtive ritual—say, in a dim, cramped room murmuring “I volunteer to join the Chinese Communist Party”…

Ivan: Exactly. I think this is, in fact, one of our organisational strategies. First, it expands our visibility so more people become aware of us; at the same time it publicises the Shanghai Independence Movement itself. Moreover, the growth of the movement delivers a powerful shock to both the CCP and to the entrenched ideology of “Great Unification” in Chinese minds. By contrast, we place little emphasis on secrecy regarding Party membership.

Timothy: It seems the strategy works—I learned of you that way myself. Are you engaged full‑time in the UK on Shanghai independence work or for the Party?

Ivan: No. I participate on a voluntary, part-time basis. I think it is healthier to keep political activity non-professional. Everyone must first solve basic livelihood issues—I have to earn a living. Political activism at this stage does not readily meet those needs, so I must work and then devote spare time to activism or to research on language and writing. It is, for me, a form of balance between labour and leisure.

Timothy: Please give us, next, a concise overview of the Shanghai Independence Movement.

Ivan: Certainly. As the name suggests, the “Shanghai Independence Movement” advocates that Shanghai, as a city, separate from China. The scope of “Shanghai” we currently refer to is essentially the territory encompassed by today’s Shanghai Municipality. We regard Shanghai as having originally been an open, Westernised city distinct from China. While not a colony in the strictest sense, it entered history in the form of foreign concessions—an extension and natural product of Western maritime and commercial civilisation; from the outset it was the focal point of interaction between Western civilisation and China. In the early concession era only foreigners could reside there; later—especially after the Taiping Rebellion—local Chinese were also permitted, with surrounding inhabitants moving in for work and life. At that time the concessions established a municipal body akin to local self‑government—the Municipal Council (工部局). Initially it handled only public works, but it rapidly developed police, courts and prisons, effectively becoming a self‑governing authority for Shanghai. Our present flag is an adaptation of the Council’s: we replaced the cluster of international flags with the blue disc at the centre of the Shanghai Independence flag.

Timothy: The movement is developing mainly in the United States. What activity do you have here in the United Kingdom?

Ivan: Primarily street‑level political action and community events, including engagement with activities organised by other ethnic or civic groups. We hope in the near future to host gatherings specifically for people of Shanghai origin, not necessarily themed solely around independence—perhaps addressing broader Chinese human rights issues.

Timothy: Will the Shanghai Independence Movement attempt to lead China’s democratisation or any campaign to partition China?

Ivan: Whether it “leads” depends on the talent of participants—roles fall to those capable. What we can reliably do is strike at CCP rule and at the ideology of unification; that lies within our capacity. I emphasise the unique disruptive impact of the Shanghai movement because familiar movements—Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet—are positioned at imperial frontiers, areas incorporated by China only in relatively modern times. If our city were to declare independence, it would force many trapped within China to confront the reality that numerous localities are not “since antiquity” part of China, but concepts circumscribed and manufactured politically. That cognitive shock is profound. So Shanghai may not be a “leader”, but it is a breaker of the status quo.

Timothy: You’ve repeatedly cited the ideology of “Great Unification”. Compared with independence movements in minority regions, is it the major obstacle for Shanghai independence?

Ivan: Shanghai independence directly opposes that ideology. So‑called “Great Unification” is in essence “Great Aggression”: China invades other peoples, folds them into its territory, and forces assimilation and indoctrination. In reality, many regions’ civilisations and customs arose locally, with no intrinsic link to the traditional notion of “China”. “Great Unification” has become a hodge-podge mindset: whatever I swallow becomes mine. Such aggression stands against anyone pursuing liberty and democracy, and it is naturally something we oppose.

Timothy: Many people now entertain a “Greater Chinese Federation” vision: supporting local independence, but after the CCP falls, establishing a federation surpassing even the EU. Do you see that as a residual form of the unification ideology you criticised?

Ivan: I think the “Chinese Federation” concept is difficult to realise. The languages, cultures, customs and habits across the regions are vastly divergent; only CCP coercion currently holds them together. After multiple regions become independent, trying through democratic procedure to rally them under one federal roof seems implausible. Moreover, the federation need not be called a “Chinese Federation”; it could be an “East Asian Union”—a union of sovereign states within a sphere of similar cultures or ideologies. For instance, a Shanghai Republic might form a federation or alliance with a State of Wuyue, perhaps also a Southern Yue state, Korea, Japan. Such an international alliance would, in fact, be preferable.

Timothy: How do you respond to the argument that Shanghai has been under Chinese conquest for more than two millennia—that after the ancient states of Wu and Yue were extinguished, Shanghai existed only as a local warlord zone, lacking historical foundations for statehood?

Ivan: The “China” we oppose is today’s People’s Republic. How Shanghai was invaded by earlier Chinese regimes is not important. China can compile whatever narrative linking Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, Qing—that is merely its viewpoint. Each dynasty was a different regime, different populations, different rulers, with divergent economic, political and cultural conceptions. The Yuan and Qing were not even Han ethnic regimes. How can they and today’s PRC be treated as the same state? We never acknowledge the supposed continuity invented by Greater‑China nationalists. Thus one can regard past regimes that invaded Shanghai as long since defunct—irrelevant to our present lives. From the perspective of regimes, our sole enemy is the PRC.

Timothy: What concrete political principles or demands does the Shanghai National Party propose for a future independent Shanghai Republic?

Ivan: I cannot here proclaim official Party platforms. Personally, on one hand we should maximise Shanghai’s openness, removing most administrative restrictions to unleash economic vitality; on the other, we must revive Shanghai culture and forge a “Shanghai” identity—if you come to Shanghai, you are a Shanghainese, not merely a “Chinese” person in Shanghai.

Timothy: You mentioned an open system of people flows; yet some worry that supporters are few, and even after successful independence many residents may oppose it. Could such openness create setbacks?

Ivan: It is an interesting question. Look at city‑states like Singapore or Qatar: despite high mobility they maintain common norms, including national identity. Even for local security we certainly would not permit individuals whose explicit purpose is to oppose Shanghai independence to operate freely. We may not be able to scrutinise the thoughts of everyone in motion, but we can establish rules that must be observed.

Timothy: How will the Shanghai movement relate to neighbouring independence movements? If only Shanghai secedes while surrounding areas remain under the CCP or other unificationist regimes, is that a real danger? Are Shanghai’s and others’ independence efforts tightly linked—even causal?

Ivan: The movement unquestionably needs the support of the entire Yangtze Delta and of East Asian nations and peoples broadly—that is crucial. Any region occupied by China attempting to secede alone faces great difficulty because the CCP can more easily suppress or “recover” it individually. We therefore hope more regions organise their own independence efforts so that neighbouring states maintain a friendly posture towards us.

Timothy: How do you plan to persuade Shanghainese at home and abroad to support independence?

Ivan: Many do not support it simply because they do not even know the movement exists; they cannot imagine Shanghai becoming independent. Indoctrination under the CCP makes shifts in thinking difficult. We also need to help people overcome fear of opposing the Party—a common human frailty. Yet using difficulty as an excuse for inaction is wrong. I often hear sceptics ask: after independence, what about grain? what about resources? That is naïve. An independent Shanghai will necessarily continue trade and exchanges with surrounding states; these are not real obstacles. Independence is not merely Shanghai freeing itself from Chinese aggression; it reshapes the entire East Asian order.

Timothy: Returning from theory to reality: what is your main difficulty in pursuing the movement in the UK?

Ivan: The biggest problem is the very small number of Shanghainese here—perhaps fewer than ten thousand—and they are widely dispersed; one hardly ever meets them. That is a concrete difficulty. Almost all our events must be joint activities with other groups, which is not ideal for projecting the Shanghai movement’s own voice. Possibly all the Shanghainese in the UK are fewer than those in New York, which is one reason the movement’s main growth is in the United States.

Timothy: Having discussed people, let us talk about money. What funds your political activity now, and how do you view fundraising?

Ivan: At present I subsidise expenses from my own living costs—self‑funding. I observe that some other communities raise funds via their own commercial ventures—theme restaurants, merchandise shops, etc.—but these are not especially suitable for the Shanghai movement at this stage. Such ventures require dedicated professionals, and our scale does not yet support them.

Timothy: Does the Party have its own premises in London?

Ivan: No. When we have an event we converge on London from various places.

Timothy: Will you consider establishing a permanent office or “branch” in London?

Ivan: If we could acquire premises and label them on Google Maps as “Shanghai Embassy”, that alone would be strong publicity. Ultimately it depends on funding; given London’s property prices, it is not realistic for now.

Timothy: That leads to my next concern. You can self‑fund while activities are small and infrequent, but as scale grows you cannot continue indefinitely. A popular fundraising method now is issuing a cryptocurrency token. What is your view?

Ivan: I know “Teacher Li” recently issued a token, sparking controversy. Issuing or purchasing tokens is a private, lawful act. If we issued a token solely to finance, say, a London branch or a “government‑in‑exile” office, such a token would have virtually no transactional value and would not circulate in daily commerce—it would effectively amount to donations. In that case I personally would lean towards straightforward fundraising. Of course, crypto can gamify participation, attract interest and increase engagement.

Timothy: We previously attended a Vietnamese protest together. What lessons from the Vietnamese overseas resistance are useful or instructive for Shanghai independence?

Ivan: First I should clarify: overseas Vietnamese anti‑Communist activism is unique globally. Since their exile in 1975 they have organised some of the most effective anti‑Communist communities and activities, developing influence even within US politics. Their will to resist is extremely firm; simultaneously they have preserved traditional Vietnamese culture and spirit—this is exemplary for all the “All Xia” or Baiyue regional movements. While preserving tradition they also integrate diverse Confucian, Catholic, Buddhist and Daoist elements. Among territories occupied by China, perhaps only Hong Kong’s independence movement can compare. I have also observed the Burmese: what I most admire is their unity—they do not engage in internal strife; factions opposing the junta and those opposing the CCP almost never turn on each other. Even the Vietnamese at times have divisions aimed only at North Vietnam; the Burmese display fewer such splits.

Timothy: Do All Xia independence movements generally lack that same will to resist? Many seem merely to harbour a desire for independence without the resolve, technique and practice to see it through.

Ivan: I think such a problem exists. One difference between Vietnamese and Chinese anti‑Communist activism is that the Vietnamese have resistance centres abroad which are hard to dismantle or infiltrate. In our Shanghai case, though numbers remain small, we have formed a similar centre; but for even smaller movements there may be only a handful of individuals declaring independence and opposition to the CCP without forming organised nuclei.

Timothy: Based on your observation, how have the Vietnamese maintained such centres through fifty years of exile and resistance since the fall of Saigon? Are these centres governments‑in‑exile, institutions, or linguistic and cultural anchors?

Ivan: They are not centred on a government‑in‑exile—although there is (indeed more than one) Republic of Vietnam government‑in‑exile. Their cohesion derives from a “Yellow Flag Spirit” symbolising the Republic. Language and script are also crucial. Even ethnic Chinese Vietnamese write in quốc ngữ (Romanised Vietnamese), not traditional Chinese characters—this is a fundamental difference from Hong Kong people. In addition, the overseas Vietnamese resistance is very enthusiastic about mutual assistance and solidarity within the community, with many genuinely contributing participants.

Timothy: How have they obtained support from Western political circles?

Ivan: First, the Republic of Vietnam was a legitimate state; its government, overthrown, constituted a legitimate authority, providing a foundational base. They did not strain to maintain the formal structure of South Vietnam, but in the context of that legitimate government’s overthrow and of anti‑Communist Vietnamese in exile, numerous “provisional” or “exile” governments and parties—Viet Hung, Democratic Brotherhood, Dai Viet, etc.—could emerge, drawing on that legitimacy for doctrinal support. Moreover, many people of Vietnamese descent now serve as legislators in countries like the United States or in its armed forces; their involvement in politics, lobbying for support, and engagement with high levels of government is thus far more convenient.

Timothy: In that light, there may not be much Shanghai can directly copy.

Ivan: Indeed. For now our primary goal is still to establish the concept that “Shanghainese are not Chinese”.

Timothy: That concept is challenging. I observe that many who sympathise with or even support the movement do so only in the sense of backing a breakaway state—they do not go so far as to believe Shanghainese are not Chinese.

Ivan: The slogan “Shanghainese are not Chinese” must be stated explicitly. “Chinese” itself is a vague, muddled term; “Chinese people” are those inhabitants of areas actually controlled by the PRC central government—an occupied zone populace. To break free of that falsehood we must assert that Shanghainese are not Chinese. Just as Koreans are not Chinese, Vietnamese are not Chinese—even if indistinguishable anthropologically—so too should we never call ourselves Chinese. Mongolians and Kazakhs likewise do not identify as Chinese.

Timothy: How do you intend to persuade people of “Shanghainese are not Chinese”?

Ivan: The power to define “China” or “the Chinese” lies with the CCP. “China” was originally a Sino‑centric narrative; viewed closely, Shanghai has its own clothing, cuisine, language and culture distinct from the Central Plains. Not only the CCP but also the KMT cherished Greater‑China or unification concepts—seeking to bring all current so‑called Chinese territories under their rule before positing a “Chinese people”. Today’s “China” is no longer the traditional entity centred in Henan but a construct centred on Beijing and Zhongnanhai. We oppose that China’s control over Shanghai. Consider Sun Yat‑sen giving a speech in the United States in Cantonese proclaiming “We are all Chinese people”—an awkward scene: he was not even using the “Chinese” language to say it. Later he and successors, with Soviet backing, carried out the Northern Expedition, toppling the then‑legitimate Republic of China government (with the Five‑coloured Flag) and erecting a party‑state system—also an effect of the unification ideology’s poison.

Timothy: A fusion of Leninism with the worst strands of traditional Chinese culture.

Ivan: Precisely. East Asia generally lacks a humanistic spirit—there is no broad culture of mutual respect or humane concern; rather, a survival‑of‑the‑fittest ideology prevails. This has likewise encouraged Central Plains regimes to suppress and erode the independence traditions of various regions.

Timothy: Can an independent Shanghai Republic excise the cultural dross or entrenched defects you mentioned?

Ivan: I believe it can. Consider Hong Kong pre‑2019: also a Han Chinese society yet one that maintained a culture of plural coexistence and open discussion. I therefore believe Shanghai can achieve this. Hong Kong’s development itself was enabled by impediments to Shanghai’s. After 1949 Shanghai lost its status as Far Eastern free navigation hub; Hong Kong inherited the role. Hong Kong’s later rise, to a large extent, carried forward Shanghai’s traits. Many Hongkongers originally migrated or fled from Shanghai; Hong Kong’s culture, customs, cuisine and dress maintain certain links—most iconically the qipao / cheongsam.

Timothy: Do you conduct overseas activities promoting Shanghai culture?

Ivan: Personally I undertake research into language and culture, including integrating (codifying) Shanghainese. I currently face a difficulty: unlike Vietnamese or Korean, which have their own scripts, Shanghainese lacks a standard writing system; speech and writing are disjointed. There have been Shanghainese signboards historically, but never formal written documents or administrative texts in Shanghainese. In independence activism our posts on X/Twitter are in Chinese and English; we have no way to publish in Shanghainese. Even our slogans are shouted in Mandarin Chinese and English—partly for audience reasons: we want more people than just Shanghainese speakers to hear us.

Timothy: So from a cultural heritage angle, the condition of Shanghainese as “dialect without script” is a difficulty.

Ivan: Not necessarily. It is simply the present reality. Compared with Vietnamese or Korean, Shanghainese is still in a pre‑modern stage—oral and written forms are detached. No one has systematised a script; no institutions issue documents in Shanghainese. Similarly, after Vietnamese independence, the Trần dynasty’s administrative documents were still in Classical Chinese rather than Vietnamese. Today’s Hong Kong mirrors this: newspapers there are written in Chinese characters, not in a truly indigenous southern script. A written form for Shanghainese does exist in scattered usage, but no one has turned it into a systematic communicative tool. I am currently developing input methods for several “smaller” languages—Cantonese, Wu, Jin. This is both a hobby and part of cultural transmission. I started with Cantonese because it has richer resources, giving experience for the Shanghainese project. I also want to create a script for Hongkongers / Cantonese speakers enabling fully colloquial written expression. It is not solely for them; once complete I will compare it across languages to seek cross‑intelligibility—ideally allowing more ethnic groups to understand. For example, when I fly from Hong Kong to Saigon or Keelung, the scripts should not differ drastically. My ultimate goal is to afford Cantonese, Taiwanese Hokkien, Hakka—and even Wu and Jin—a degree of written mutual intelligibility.

Timothy: That is quite a project. Can it be realised within our generation?

Ivan: No—in the sense that while I possess the capability to complete the codification itself, dissemination afterwards is the harder part and beyond my personal control. The script organisation work could be done in six months. From what I know, when Vietnam promoted quốc ngữ, it took only four or five months—of course, they had administrative power behind it and the script itself was simpler than Chinese characters.

Timothy: Two years ago, the TV drama Blossoms had a special Shanghainese version. I believe audio‑visual works in Shanghainese help promote and preserve culture. Are you considering that direction?

Ivan: Possibly. But as mentioned, it requires both funding and specialised skills; it’s outside my personal competencies, I cannot undertake it. Still, such work would clearly help the world recognise Shanghai as a distinct cultural entity. When conditions permit, recruiting such talent will be essential. I understand that Hongkongers and Vietnamese have dedicated artistic organisations for preserving and promoting their languages, but Shanghainese currently lacks such groups. Finding talent versed in both language and arts, and willing to resist the CCP overseas, is indeed difficult—again returning us to the population base problem.

Timothy: So Shanghai independence and opposition to the CCP are tightly bound?

Ivan: At present, certainly. Opposing the CCP, opposing Communism, and Shanghai independence are tightly linked; opposing unificationism or Leninist management models is likewise bound up with independence. Historically it need not have been. For example, during the Cultural Revolution, intra‑Communist factional conflict could have created a situation where Shanghai became a small Communist centre opposing the larger one in Beijing. Or in 1980s Vietnam, groups could both support Communism and oppose the CCP—reflecting struggles among CCP, CPSU and pro‑Hanoi forces. Communism inherently breeds factionalism and hatred, so Communist parties fighting one another is common. But now, the CCP and Communism are clearly the enemy. Supporting the Party while supporting Shanghai independence is, to me, impossible.

Timothy: Would a future Shanghai Republic imitate some Eastern European states and enact explicit anti‑Communist legislation?

Ivan: Hard to say. Open incitement to rebellion or opposition to the Shanghai Republic would certainly need to be prohibited by law. But if the target is an abstract Communist ideology, we might rely more on cultural resistance and de‑Communisation—using education to strip out the culture of interpersonal struggle Communism inculcates. How far prohibition would go is difficult to specify. For example, banning all circulation of Communist books would be undefined and unenforceable. Overall, opposition to Communism and related culture would be essential. On the other hand, the industrial system that Communist China left in Shanghai should, where appropriate, be inherited—it is, after all, the labour achievement and creation of the Shanghai people.