掀翻压在自由市场身上的三座大山 Overthrowing the Three Great Burdens on the Free Market

By Timothy Huang

教育、医疗、国防[1]是压在自由市场身上的三座大山，被普遍认为是无法交由自由市场解决的问题。长期以来，自由放任主义（laissez-faire）以及其传统的、后被解释为“涓滴理论”的对弱势群体的关怀路径饱受攻击，被认为是无效的或加剧了不公平。本文将指出，在教育、医疗、国防这三个最具代表性的公共事业领域[2]，自由市场将比任何国家干预主义的措施更好地实现所有社会成员——而不仅仅是优势群体——的相关利益。

一、不真正的公共事业

公共事业必须关注群体利益，而非个体利益的集合；它们必须真正影响了足够广泛的群体利益，以至于在给定范围内的利益相关者具有普遍性，而不能仅仅是抽象的“牵扯甚广”；某个领域的产品的主要提供者是政府、公有制主体或类似机构，并不足以说明其公共性或公益性。

从这个意义上讲，教育和医疗不是真正的公共事业，因为它们归根结底是个体的私人事务。教育和医疗产品的供应者将产品提供给了个体自身，个体也十分清晰地区分了自己的教育和医疗支出所对应的个别服务；不仅如此，教育和医疗产品本身也是独特的和不可复制的，尽管他们可能来自同一教师或医生，学校或医院，教材或药品。“因材施教”、“千人千方”并不仅仅是某种要求或理想，而是一种事实。个体享受的教育和医疗服务，其受益者仅仅是个体及其利益相关方，而不是任何抽象的群体，也不可能自觉地惠及任何无关个体。

公立教育、公立医疗，以及对应的社会福利政策并不意味着教育和医疗从此便属于公共事业，相反，仅仅因为教育和医疗产品来自政府，或供应者在很大程度上受到政府资助，并不会改变上文提到的个别使用、个别付费的事实。事实上，政府在绝大多数行业都在进行补贴行为，甚至直接作为市场参与者或通过国有企业提供产品，但对于行业本身的属性并无直接影响。

相反，国防则与教育和医疗有着不同的属性。对应地看，国防产品[3]并没有直接提供给个体，而是提供给抽象的群体——国家安全被提供给全体公民，武器装备被提供给全体军队（而非具体的士兵）[4]。国防产品不存在“你的”或“我的”，而仅仅是“我们的”；不仅如此，从理论上讲，作为同一国公民，“我”享受的国防服务和“你”享受的国防服务在性质、程度、效果上都是一致的，“我们的”国防服务是没有差别的——尽管这并不能保证我和你在一场正义战争中的结果是同等的。

再一次地，如果我们观察国防服务提供者的资金来源，事实已经证明，除了本质上是源自服务接受者的税收以外，私营的军工企业已经取得了相当大的成功，由地方性的基金或团体资助的国民卫队组织也发挥着不可替代的作用。某行业服务提供者的资金来源与其是否属于公共事业完全是不相干的。

不真正的公共事业在道德上不具有使用公共资金——来源于公民个体的税收——的先天的正当性。如果服务提供者收取服务接受者的报酬，而提供的服务所需成本却是由服务接受者缴纳的税款所支持的，这种将羊毛围巾出售给羊的做法与抢劫和欺诈无异。

这并不是说，任何接受公共资助的教育和医疗首先是不正义的。我必须首先澄清这一点。事实上，当今世界，各国的教育和医疗行业都广泛地受到公共资金的支持，这类支持也在很大程度上促进了教育和医疗事业的发展。但是，作为不真正的公共事业，我们必须对于任何使用公共资金的行为首先进行公正性的考察，而非简单地认为公共事业使用公共资金是理所应当的——它们既非公共事业，也非理所应当。使用公共资金的教育和医疗事业可能是公正的，也可能是不公正的，但是它需要具体和微观的考察。在此基础上，我们进一步研究，自由市场能否做的更好？

我必须重申，本文并不是在探讨，对于特定的领域，干预主义政府的支持和管控是否公正的问题，而是在探讨自由市场能否更公正、更有效地发挥作用和实现相应福祉的问题。显然，对于公共事业和不真正公共事业领域，我们必须采用不同的判断标准。

因此，我们必须首先区分，所谓的自由市场不能“有效配置资源”的领域究竟是否公共事业。对于不真正的公共事业，以这种直觉式的论断要求政府力量介入，不仅是错误的，也是荒谬的。

二、公共事业与自由市场

我们必须首先反驳公共事业与自由市场是相互排斥的这一充斥在学界和人们头脑中的错误观点[5]。

经验上，世界上绝大多数国家的绝大多数（真正的和不真正的）公共事业领域都广泛地引入了私人企业和其他非国营的供应商，并且在很多时候都取得了良好的效果。如同上文所述，即使是军工领域，也有大量的私人企业参与（至少是名义上的）自由竞争。认为公共事业与自由市场相冲突的观点，首先在经验上是站不住脚的。

但是必须在这里指明其中的道理。公共事业并不排除价格信号，相反，它们对价格信号的依赖丝毫不亚于一般私人经济领域。例如，水电气费、学费、医药费等，同样受到价格信号的调节，同样符合基本的供求定律。通常而言，作为一种社会福利，他们受到国家指令的调节，过分低于本应达到的价格区间，从而使得绝大多数公民都能支付得起相关产品，而由此导致的供给不足，则通过国家补贴、税收优惠等形式加以弥补[6]。

需要澄清的是，这类产品显著低于市场价的价格，并非国家对此进行免费供应，仅收取“意思意思”的价格。实际上，此等价格仍然是供应者综合考虑供求关系、生产成本、补贴和税收政策、国家指令等因素得出的，甚至大型综合性企业考虑到自身可通过为政府解决某类公共产品的供应问题而获得其他形式的优惠甘愿制定略微亏损的价格。价格信号仍然在发挥作用，只不过它在戴着镣铐起舞。

诚然，价格信号不是自由市场的专属，计划经济也可以容纳或容忍价格信号。供应票证在黑市上的流通即是明证。如果这应被解释为计划经济阴影下的隐蔽的自由市场的话，我们可以很轻易地发现，计划经济下小到粮油肉蛋奶，大到汽车冰箱彩电，都是有价格的，并且这一政府指定或指导的价格与票证共同发挥着体现政府意志的调节需求的作用。

但是，只有通过自由市场，价格信号才可以真实地、自主地、准确地发挥作用。先后经历过计划经济和市场经济的人都对计划经济下价格信号的扭曲程度有着直观和深刻的感受。价格信号源于供求关系，形成于个别协商。供应者通过价格信号调整生产，减少或增加供给，需求者通过价格信号（并比较自身的经济实力）释放或抑制需求。而如果生产在很大程度上被政府控制，需求也通过票证被政府控制，价格信号的扭曲就毫不意外了。

因此，既然公共事业离不开价格机制，那么他就更需要——而非排斥——自由市场的作用。姑且不论其他任何方面，单从自由市场可以帮助政府发现公共事业供给和需求的矛盾点一项，政府就没有理由排斥自由市场。

三、对私营国防力量的质疑和回应[7]

国防在直觉上通常是国家和政府提供的产品，尤其是在武装部队的组织、建设、指挥和战争方面。军工装备的市场调节实际上是很容易接受的，如上文所述，这不仅在许多国家都已经得到了经验证明，在原理上，也不过是政府作为买方的物品交易而已。仅仅因为交易的物品是军工产品，并不意味着自由市场就要望而却步，尽管军工企业确实需要接受比一般私营企业严格的多的监管与审查（无论是否正当）。

真正令人迷惑的是武装部队的组织、建设、指挥和战争。很少有人会在直觉上同意国家的武装部队可以交由特定的私人机构来募集、管理并且在战争中依靠。历史上确实有着很多拥有良好声誉和战斗记录的雇佣兵团，但是他们有的并非真正意义上的私营（例如瑞士军团），或者只是在特定的战役中作为（其他）国家武装的补充（热那亚十字弩雇佣兵）。我们似乎确实缺少某国在相当长的一段历史时期内仅以私营军队作为主要国防力量的经验证据。

当然，我们必须认识到，“没有”与“不好”之间并不存在直接关系。牛顿发现并总结出力学定律之前，世界上也存在自发地利用力学定律进行的种种发明创造和工程技术，我们必须细致考察对私营军队的各类怀疑，判断其是否足以证明私营军队是不可行的，是否足以证明国防事业对于自由市场而言是禁区。

对于私营军队的第一个质疑是其忠诚性。通常而言，对于民族国家的武装力量，其士兵并不单纯是为了履行法律规定的兵役义务（如有），或为了获得服役的报酬和津贴，或为了践行自己的某种品格，而更多地——至少是很大程度上——代表了公民对国家的忠诚和认同。人们普遍认为，这种认同会极大地增加军队的战斗力，包括作战意志和士气、对艰苦环境和劣势战局的忍耐力、战斗的投入程度、对危险命令的服从性等，尤其是将国运兴衰寄托于民族军队的信心。人们会问：为了金钱而战斗的雇佣兵会为了保护我而牺牲自己吗？事实上，由于国防服务的最终受益者——公民——并不可能直接挑选私营武装力量，无论如何他们都只能通过民主国家的选举制度间接决定此事，他们在主观上显然更倾向于信任他们直接选举出来的政府，而非通过某种程序再次选择的私营武装力量。而政府显然乐于接受这一扩张其权力的民意。

对于私营军队的第二个质疑是其履职能力。如果私营军队必须自费募集人员、训练士兵及指挥官、采购武器装备、保障整支军队的后勤，人们会怀疑是否有私营企业会具备这样的财力、能力和风险承受能力，以及进一步地，是否有足够多的有如此实力的私营企业，使得自由市场的竞争得以充分展开。国防预算向来在各国财政预算中占相当的分量。例如，美国2022财年的国防预算为7530亿美元，若考虑到其绝大多数武器装备都可以在本国采购和维护（这意味着此类花费要低于别国购买和维护此类装备的花费），这一数额其实已经低于与其地位相匹配的公允数额。这一数额及其对应的风险足以令绝大多数市场主体望而却步。政府只需要每年公布这一骇人听闻的数字，就足以使人们心中产生国防不得不由政府主导的意愿，而非质问为何要将从自己身上榨取的税收用于军事目的。与之类似的，国防事业所需协调的人力、土地等资源，不一而足。

对于私营军队的第三个质疑是其职业伦理。我们必须假设这样的私营企业不会永远接受同一个政府的雇佣（或者至少某个政府不会永远雇佣同一家私营军队企业），否则这就仅仅是披着私有化外衣的国家军队；他们很可能——至少不能排除这一可能性——在战场上面对自己的老东家，或者与曾经的同事作战。律师、会计师等中介服务人员是很容易处理利益冲突的。一方面，市场上有足够的、可供替代的、无利益冲突的优秀律师、会计师，客户在很多情况下并不是非得委托某一位不可；另一方面，此类专业服务人员真正面临的也不过是几桩案件和几个企业及其（至多）成千上万名雇员的的命运，在处理利益冲突时的包袱要小得多——如果是曾为美国服务的雇佣军企业又为中国服务、甚至他们隶属于同一实控人呢？

对于私营军队的第四个质疑是其国际公平性。正如上文所述，国防是很花钱的。任何一个贫穷的国家，穷其全国物力，总归可以组织起一支配得上其野心的、看的过得去的武装力量，如果处理得当，对于国家军队的投入最终会沉淀为国家的底蕴，但是它是否愿意花费同样多的金钱去雇佣一支合同期限届满就拍屁股走人的私营军队呢？前者可能是穷兵黩武的问题，后者则可能纯属当权者的骄奢淫逸。这可能导致在世界范围内，国家之间的强弱分化更加明显，支付得起高额雇佣军队费用的国家可以更加肆无忌惮的进行战争和扩张。最终，如同所有的自由市场一样，最富裕的消费者享受着最高品质的服务，最不富裕的消费者享受着最低品质的服务，尽管这对于具体的个人而言并无不公，但对于抽象的国家以及与其绑定命运的全体公民而言，是否适用相同的原则？

上述质疑实际上已经被各国政府和公民广泛接受，以至于当今世界的所有民族国家的武装力量都由国家军队绝对主导。但是他们在细究下并不合理。

对于私营军队的忠诚性的质疑，实际上预先划分了个体内心驱动力的层级，即为金钱而战的驱动力要低于为忠诚于祖国而战的驱动力。但这是缺乏依据的。个体可以为任何他认为对自己有价值的事物而战，为金钱而战并不比为祖国而战低俗或缺乏动力，也并不因此就具有较弱的战斗力。价值和对价值的衡量都是主观的，有的人认为国家荣誉高于一切，忠诚于国家的义务超过一切义务，这样的人，必然在国家军队中有着更高的战斗力；但是也有人不这样认为，而更追求物质利益，讲求权责对等，重赏出勇夫，对于此类人，前述预设就是错误的。人的价值是多元的，不同事物对每个人的价值排序都是不尽相同的，我们不能自以为是地认定某种价值对所有人而言都高于一切。

与之相关的许多经验证据也是错误的。在国家军队的大背景下，军队吸纳的士兵必然遵从前述前者的标准，即偏好认为忠诚于国家的义务高于一切的成员。在此前提下，其战斗力在事实上必定比仅仅拿钱办事而非承担一国之国防事业的当代雇佣兵群体更强——但这一对比本身并不公平。

一个最基本的道理是，“吃人嘴软，拿人手短”，个体并没有从抽象的国家或政府身上取得半点好处，尤其是对于实行义务兵役制的国家，公民服兵役首先是在履行法定义务，国家给予的报酬和津贴只是为了补偿其为国家服务而牺牲的个人时间。然而，为私营军队企业效力的雇佣士兵，他们是真正意义上的职业军人，他们的收入不仅仅是为了弥补其履行公民义务而花费的个人时间，更是与其服务成果和效果直接挂钩的工作报酬。仗打输了，为国效力的士兵是不需要上军事法庭的，但是为私营军队效力的雇佣兵很可能就名声扫地、失去工作了。从这个意义上，怀疑私营军队士兵的战斗力低于国家武装，是不合理的。相反，私营军队的士兵有着比国家武装更强烈的获得战争胜利的驱动力，以及对个体名誉的更强烈的珍视和追求，这些都是他们赖以吃饭的家伙式和本领，雇佣兵的败绩比国家武装的败绩更致命。可以合理地期待，在同等条件下，他们反而在战场上有着更强大的战斗力。

很多人会进一步论述，战争是一项高风险的活动，前述基于自由市场原理的物质和信誉激励在生命危险面前是否仍然有效，是值得怀疑的。然而，正如为国效力的军人阵亡后，国家会支付其家属一大笔抚恤金以及相关的荣誉、政策优惠一样，为私营军队效力的雇佣兵显然不会享受低于此的待遇，尤其是，私营军队的经营者不得不通过高得多的抚恤金数额来弥补荣誉和政策优惠的欠缺，也会通过商业化的保险等措施进行风险分担。在此基础上，由于维持庞大数量的武装力量所需的对应的高额的保险费用支出，私营武装力量也会恰当地控制军队规模，珍惜其员工“昂贵”的生命——这也变相导致私营武装力量单位作战人员获得的投入要更高，其战斗素养也将相应提高。因此，认为雇佣兵由于为金钱而战而畏惧战火的顾虑是多余的。

对于私营军队履职能力的怀疑，归根结底可以简化为：国防事业投入和风险巨大，超出了私营企业的能力。但是，我们不能张口就说7000亿的问题，而应首先考虑，（以美国为例）同等程度的国防服务由私营企业提供的情形下，其花费是否仍会如此巨大。

正如上段已经提及的那样，国家在控制武装部队规模的问题上是缺乏动力的。他们的确会考虑军队的现有规模、对应花费以及实际需要，包括战斗能力、威胁数量、战争风险等，但是国家从来无法合理地判断，对于特定的国内外局势，维持何等规模的军队是合理的。国防支出来自于税收和印钞，“国家”本身并不付出任何代价，也无法真正的衡量战争的风险收益和利弊得失。私营军队则不同。他们是需要考量成本和收入的私营企业主体，任何多余的支出都是对自身利润的减损，而一旦军队规模无法满足实际需求，则可能因战争的失败而从根本上摧毁其经营的资本和声誉。因此，私营军队先天拥有恰当控制军队规模和成本的动力和地位，也在长期的市场竞争中锻炼出来了相应的能力，而国家和政府永远不可能拥有这种能力，保险的做法只能是多多益善，相对应地，大量的国防支出都被浪费在这种“保险”上——不是每个将军都是韩信，也不是每个国家都有萧何这样的人提供物质支持。

国家和政府不但不善于在宏观上控制武装部队的总体规模和花费，也很难在微观上控制士兵个体和具体武器装备的单位支出。私营企业对于一名士兵的投入与产出，与它对任何其他生产要素和人力资源的判断并无二致，他们会根据实际需要和具体情况控制单一士兵的“用工”成本，尤其会确保每一分钱都花在刀刃上，确保其任何的投入都能起到提升军队战斗力、维持军队士气、更新和维护装备、保障后勤等领域，避免众多的无用花销。此类事项是政府毫不关心的。政府当然关注军队的战斗力是否得到提高，但对于单位国防支出的使用效率并不在意，从根本上讲，国家投入的国防支出是来源于税收和法币体系，他们进行国防支出，既不珍惜，也不谨慎。国防支出是真正的”取之于民，用之于民”，单位效率与之毫无关系。

人们会怀疑，既然美国的军工企业已经在很大程度上私有化，难道装备花费一项不已经处于这一情形之下吗？使用私营国防企业的花费真的会有如此大幅的下降吗？谬也。价格取决于供求关系，如果生产者是私营属性，消费者却是国有属性，那么军方代表国家采购装备时，作为既无法判断自身实际需求，又拥有充足到过量的资金的消费者，实际上没有充分议价的动力，相对应地，企业也缺乏进一步压低成本的动力，转而将更多的资金和精力用于游说，以确保未来的采购订单。而如果是私营武装企业向私营军工企业采购装备，不但总量和单价都能够通过市场的手段得到较好的控制，更可以提高对于有限资金的使用效率，使得装备采购这一重大国防事项彻底摆脱官僚政治的掣肘，增加廉洁性和透明度，反过来也可以通过市场更好地促进武器装备的研发和生产。而摆脱了国际阵营限制的私营军工企业则可以成为真正的全球化企业，进一步降低军工装备的生产成本。在理想的情况下，世界各国军队的武器装备通用性会得到显著提高，这同样有利于武器装备支出（尤其是后期维护方面）的下降。

因此，我们可以总结，私营企业可以以低得多的成本提供同等的国防服务。尽管价格不由成本决定，但是服务提供者普遍的低成本将会提供巨大的议价空间，国防支出的降低最终会得到实现。

即使如此，对于许多国家来说，国防仍然是每年千亿级别投入的事业，这对于私营企业来说仍然是相当大的支出。但是这并不意味着企业需要自费每年投入1000亿，然后将其产品拿到市场上推销，相反，私营企业通过与政府之间的合同，获得了相当坚实的资金保障，企业是否有能力进行前期投入和日常运营，完全不应是学术界操心之事，只要有利润空间和法治保障，市场主体总会闯出一条路来。

对于私营军队的职业伦理的怀疑，则体现了对市场经济和市场主体的无知。诚然，几乎所有国家都通过法律以及行业自律的方式要求专业服务机构遵守利益冲突规范，但是律师和会计师通过严格恪守职业伦理和利益冲突规范以博取客户信任和机会的行为，并不需要通过法律或行业规范加以确认。如果律师在与客户的对话中频繁吐露其他客户的信息，甚至无视利益冲突试图进行双方代理，客户又怎可能信任他呢？他即使真的处于利益冲突之中，也必然会严格要求自己，避免抽象的利益冲突演化为实质的未能勤勉尽职甚至是违背职业伦理。试问，有什么样重要的客户值得赌上自己的职业生涯呢？[8]

同样的问题也可以抛给私营军队企业。如果客户政府对自己的职业性和忠诚性产生怀疑，如果自己服务于一家政府却和其他潜在客户暗通款曲，自己又如何能够获得雇佣国政府的信任呢？如果私营企业投入如此体量的资金，却无法解决政府对自己的信任问题，他们也就无法避免被市场本身所淘汰。他们在国防服务上投入的成本如此巨大，以至于根本承担不起任何职业伦理和职业道德的风险，不可能冒着千亿支出打水漂的风险陷入利益冲突，甚至失去职业伦理，潜在受益方如果真有如此巨大的财力能够买通对方，直接买断对方的国防合同岂不更佳名利双收？

必须指明的是，政府实际上面临比私营国防服务提供商更大的伦理风险。政府无非担心私营企业的忠诚和职业性，如果供应商真的存在上述问题，政府面临的最坏后果无非是战争失败，自身垮台，而企业本身则面临社会性死亡，二者的赌注大小，是很明显的。投入小的一方反而怀疑投入大的一方，这是没有道理的。

关于军队普遍私营化带来的国际公平性的问题，可以具体为两个方面：对于弱国而言，穷兵黩武和雇佣更弱的私人武装究竟何者更好？更大的相对优势是否足以成为强国军事扩张的理由？

公平问题从来不能割裂为国际和国内两个彼此独立的维度，而必须综合看待。维持军事力量的均势从来就不是国际公平的追求，也是不现实的，更无法实现宣扬者的设想。冷战高潮期，美苏两国的“核均势”也并没有能够如愿带来持久的和平。人们担心的无非是强国借助优势的武装力量，无视国际规则和国际义务，为实现自身利益滥用军事手段，而弱国虽弱，量全国物力，仍然可以形成有分量的威慑，如果强如美国也拿捏不了阿富汗、伊拉克这样的弱国，人们在心理上会得到某种积极的、安全的暗示。

然而，这种暗示仅仅从国家的视角看待问题，而没有观察穷兵黩武背后的代价。美国丢下的仅仅是面子和几千具尸体，而所谓的帝国坟场们看似顽强抵抗，实则牺牲了全国人民乃至整个国际地区的利益。国家和各种抵抗组织将资源倾尽至武装力量上，而公民的福利和生活水准大大降低，这并不能称之为（相较于不抵抗的）国际公平，而仅仅是将国内的不公甩锅给侵略者。

这并不是说，弱国理应奉行不抵抗政策，也不是在为侵略战争洗白，相反，抵抗侵略的正义战争没有强弱之分，而侵略者敢于侵略也在很大程度上是因为这种非正义战争相比于正义战争并没有额外花钱（原因如上文所述）。对于战争的花费和风险，私营企业要比国家和政府敏感得多；如果世界上的强国的军队普遍实现了私营化，那么私营军队企业出于自身考虑必然会为了雇主国政府指令的非正义战争索要额外的高额的报酬，也会为下一个合同期大幅加价。私营军队“敲竹杠”的天性意味着强国需要为非正义战争支付更高额的费用，这为何不能称为向国际公平的迈进？

进而，我们可以很清楚地看到，军队私营化非但不会导致强国更频繁的军事扩张，相反，它可以很好地——甚至比议会政治更好地——限制强国的扩张野心。它用市场的语言和方式告诉决策者：非正义战争比正义战争花费更多，恃强凌弱非但不会秋风扫落叶，反而会陷入无止境的泥潭，毁灭于人民战争的汪洋大海——侵略者花费数十万、数百万美元培养的士兵，要面对被侵略国源源不断、近乎免费的志愿爱国者——如果被侵略国真的值得她的人民抛头颅洒热血的话。如果我们真的担忧强国的军事扩张，我们就应该支持将市场的手段引入国防服务，通过价格信号刀刀入肉地限制当权者的扩张野心。

对于私营国防服务具有代表性的担忧已经被证明是缺乏根据的。此外，通过自由市场提供国防服务，还有额外的好处。

首先，正如上文所论述的那样，对于战争的花费和风险，私营企业要比国家和政府敏感得多；私营企业也没有能力拉着全国人民做垫背而强行开战。这无疑在很大程度上从根本上确保了使用私营武装一方的战争的正义性。事实上，私营武装力量受限于雇佣合同，其根本目的是——且局限于——为了维护雇主的国家安全，其几乎不可能主动发动一场非正义的战争，并且将为了可能的非正义战争向雇主国政府额外收取高额费用，甚至基于非正义战争的巨大风险终止合同。这会从很大程度上限制非正义战争的发生。

其次，不同于很多人的担忧，对私营武装力量的监管非但不是问题，反而是其相较于国家武装的优势之一。任何私营企业都不可能平白无故地养着百万雄兵，他们需要国家购买其国防产品。这就将文官政府与军队的关系成功地转化成自由市场上甲方与乙方的关系。“甲方爸爸”监管起来，难道不比官僚政客和始终未能融入现代国内民主机制的军队相互鄙视下更容易吗？事实已经证明，如果处理不好军队和政府的关系，处理不好军队在国家政治体系中的地位，即使是设计良好的民主政治也会在军队的干预下灰飞烟灭。在当下普遍的制度设计中，军队国家化被认为有助于解决军人干政的问题；然而，私营军队企业就其本身而言便是与政治隔离的。他们是国防服务提供商，而非某种政治力量。军队国家化当然很好，军队市场化会更好。

最后，私营军队能否用于内战？我们需要首先确认，镇压叛乱对于国家武装而言从来不存在问题，而是普遍被认为是其职责之一。讨论私营军队“能否”被用于内战，首先便证明了军队私营化对于内战的抑制作用。其次，内战通常不属于合同约定的“国防服务”的范围，私营军队企业如果被要求在其服务内容中加入镇压叛乱，则必然在潮水般的志愿抵抗者面前要求显著的额外报酬，这会反过来促使政府思考是否采用军事手段解决反对派——如果同样的钱足够让他们消停，为何自己还要背负武装镇压的骂名呢？这与市场化军队制约非正义战争的原理是相同的。

综上所述，私营企业通过市场机制提供国防服务是完全可行的，且有助于解决国家自有武装力量的诸多问题。将国防服务设定为自由市场的禁区是完全错误的。

四、教育与医疗的公共介入是“公平的机会平等”的要求吗？[9]

如前述，教育与医疗是不真正的公共事业。这意味着，它们不具有使用公共资金的先天的正当性，也意味着，任何政府资助的教育与医疗事业都必须首先接受公平性的考察[10]。而绝大多数要求政府介入教育与医疗服务的理由都是站不住脚的。

根据目前学界泛滥的“公平的机会平等”要求，教育和医疗是平等机会的重要组成部分。我们首先有必要探讨对公平的机会平等的各种解释。罗尔斯（1999：63）提出了一个相当苛刻的理想，“拥有相同水平的天赋和能力，并有同样的意愿使用它们的人们，应该有相同的成功前景，无论他们在社会制度的最初位置为何”。他对公平的机会平等的解释实际上是在呼吁去除社会经济等级制度的影响。然而，他的解释却是自相矛盾的（阿诺德，2014）。罗尔斯的理论是以阶级的存在为基础的，“不管他们最初的位置如何”，意味着实际上存在不同（和不平等的）初始位置。即使作为理想化的理论的问题，是否可能在允许这种等级制度存在的同时，消除社会经济等级制度的影响？在不侵犯父代基本自由和人权的情况下，似乎不可能自由、合法和公正地阻止他们将当前优势传承给下一代。教育、关怀、人脉、家庭结构、居住条件和社区等等，正是受到严格保护的、可以（甚至应该）影响和改变我们生活前景的个人自由。正如贡伯格（2010）所指出的，消除社会阶层对人们生活前景的影响的唯一可能的方法是消除社会阶层本身。[11]因此，罗尔斯（1999：64）承认，“只要存在某种形式的家庭，公平的机会平等原则就无法得到完美实行”，“在实践中，不可能为同样天赋的人授予平等的成就和文化机会……因此，我们可能希望通过一个原则，承认这一事实， 并……减轻‘自然彩票’本身的随机影响”。

这就引向了弗里曼的建议，公平的机会平等只要求个人——特别是最不富裕的个人——应该有机会充分发展自己的才能（2007：98）。这一定义可能会缩小罗尔斯想要实现的功能范围，但这一要求正是典型的社会民主措施所满足的，包括罗尔斯自己的蓝图。公立学校、政府保障的基本医疗和以打破财富集中为目的的税收安排，旨在为同样天赋者保证同样的成功前景，但并不能确保所有公民充分发展其才能。即便如此，干预主义者们依旧声称，这些安排为同等天赋公民提供了同样的前景，特别是对最不赋予的公民而言，这是公平的机会。[12]

托马西对此有不同看法。他首先认为，“教育和医疗保健只有在理想职位的存在情况下才有助于赢得理想的职位”（托马西，2012：488）。自由市场在公平的机会平等方面的唯一优势似乎是它提供了更多的可用机会，因为托马西认为，认为干预主义政府在理论上也实现了公平的机会平等。 [13]然而，这种解释削弱了这种机会与公平的机会平等之间的联系，因为更多的机会并不总是导致更公平的平等，特别是当与之竞争的机制提供的机会较少，但大致足够时。那么，自由市场如何实现公平的机会平等呢？

显然，这里的核心论点不是机会的同质数量，而是机会数量优势背后的个人选择的经济自由和价值。与许多呼吁国家干预的学者不同，崇尚自由至上主义的学者通常将经济自由视为罗尔斯在他的第一原则中应该考虑的基本自由之一；因此，机会数量多寡实际上反映了经济自由的程度高低，亦即罗尔斯第一原则的实现程度。此外，通过提供更多的可用机会，减少政府对相关选项的限制，托马西还将公平的机会平等和经济自由的论点相结合。鉴于个人决策的选项和前景有所改善，个性和主体性也得到了尊重。

当然，这种论述面临来自罗尔斯阵营的挑战。首先，托马西对公平的机会平等的解释被批评为过于狭隘。托马西注意到，罗尔斯的文章表明他可能接受不完美的机会平等， 但斯蒂尔茨（2014：431）认为，罗尔斯的妥协“来自于他讨论的不理想情况，即不能完全建立公平的机会平等”，这种接受只有在非理想的情况下才得证成，因为“机会不平等必须增加机会较少者的机会”（罗尔斯，1999：266）。因此，斯蒂尔茨认为托马西对公平的机会平等和罗尔斯的理解是断章取义的。然而，这也是在罗尔斯的“正义两原则的最后陈述”明言并冠之以“第二优先规则”的（同上），这显然不仅仅是为非理想情况而进行的准备和妥协。不完美的公平的机会平等仍然是公平的机会平等，不平等亦受限于必须增加机会较少人士的机会。与罗尔斯不同，托马西仅仅认为认为不完美可能会降低公平的机会平等的重要性，但不意味着这种解释是错误的。因此，斯蒂尔茨的批评在这里没有说服力。

此外，阿诺德（2014：246）怀疑这种安排是否有吸引力。自由市场也许能够为所有人提供承诺的机会，例如优质教育，但这不可能是最终目标。相反，教育必须被用来去除阶级优势。因此，托马西在自由市场下的教育安排属于满足主义流派。然而，对公平的机会平等的最初和字面解释构成了阿诺德批评的基础。他可能不接受弗里曼的解释，但在旨在“减轻‘自然彩票’的随机影响”，同时承认社会阶级的事实的情况下，无论是教育质量本身还是消除阶级的影响，都不是“最终目标”。相反，高质素教育正是因为存在等级制度而对公平的机会平等有所贡献。在一个阶级社会中，相比于富裕群体，教育所提供的机会（无论是否平等）对不富裕者而言更为敏感、更为急需。[14]否则，教育作为一种充分培养人才的方式，将不是一个与机会平等相关的问题，因为一个非阶级社会将会保证个人的全面发展。

事实上，阿诺德在教育方面的批评引发了一个更重要的问题：通过将公平的机会平等的要求解释为最大限度地利用机会充分培养所有公民的才能，它是否仍然促进平等？具体地说，使这些选项和机会最大化是否“在相关意义上促进主体性”（福勒，2015：351）？托马西认为，自由选择与公平的机会平等之间的联系是稳定和线性的：个人决策的自由选择和空间越有保障，自尊和自我发展就越得到促进。然而，福勒提出"无价值的主体性"和"主体性的错觉"，以反驳这种观点。前一种情况“指公民确实控制了他们生活的某些方面，但这种控制并不保障和促进其自主性”：后一种情况“指公民似乎控制了自己的生活，但实际上并不控制”（同上）。首先，福勒认为，在许多情况下，选项本身并没有为自我发展提供真正的机会。例如，医疗保障的选择可能非常复杂和具有技术性，往往需要专业知识才能对哪怕基础的事项作出基本判断。这就要求患者有足够的信息来做出有效的选择。然而，由于信息不对称，他们不能很好地作出合理、划算的决策，以确定其需要购买的护理程度（阿罗，1963）。显然，这些选择并没有真正为公民提供公平的机会，却通常会产生严重和消极的后果。同时，福勒还指出，最不富裕的公民的知识通常也最少，他们不能为自己做出正确的选择，这减少了而不是增强了他们自我发展的机会。其次，福勒（2015：355）认为，有许多选择看似是主体自行作出的，但实际上并非如此。在一个机会均等完全实现的理想社会中，随机的运气被去除，人们可以根据自己的境况回溯自己的选择。生活在自由市场中的人们做不到。福勒认为，后者的不确定性会削弱主体负责地的自主生活和发展其道德力量的能力，因为“主体的一个重要部分”是了解一个人生命中的各种因素，以便改变其中的某些方面（同上：358）。这种不确定性使得人们不清楚如何利用这些自由来发展自己的才能，并减少对生活的实际影响。

让我们讨论一下福勒的第一个批评。他的核心论点是，在他的例子中，公民不太可能作出真正促进他们自我发展的机会的个人选择。然而，他似乎混淆了两个概念：个人做出正确选择的能力和条件，以及作出个人选择的制度性权利。即公平的机会平等要求后者这种选择权，而制度性的选择权的高自由度将提高个人做出正确选择的能力，这也是自我发展机会的一部分。因此，福勒在这里的论点是站不住脚的。此外，在医疗保健方面，福勒认为公民在用片面和不对称的信息做出个人选择。然而，事实上，那些生活在自由市场中的公民在需要关心自己的医疗保健问题之前，会从父母和旁人的医疗保健决策中学到很多类似的经验。在福勒的看来，面对复杂的技术问题，做出正确的选择仍然具有挑战性。然而，个体自我决策的能力比福勒想象的要好得多。

福勒的第二个批评指出，许多影响公平的机会平等的问题都不受主体的控制。然而，不知何故，个体却基于某些理念或制度认为自己对这些事情享有掌控。福勒暗示，这指的是自由市场和自由放任政策所许诺的最大化的个人选项和促进自我发展的机会。然而，这种幻想并不能挑战前述观点，自由市场最大化的个人选项确实能促进机会。事实上，福勒的“美国梦”的例子反证了其理论的缺陷。美国梦的定义是一个典型的形式上的机会平等，但他指出，许多美国公民相信“一个更平等的机会均等的概念，并相信这种平等存在于自己的社会”（福勒，2015：358）。只承诺形式机会平等的美国梦是否应该为人民的这种幻想负责？同样，承诺公平的机会平等的自由市场，[15]是否应为对公民因错误想象而产生的虚假的控制感负责？答案显然是否定的，这种因对理论的误解而引起的错觉不会减少理论本身的价值。

通过上述分析，我们很容易发现，就教育和医疗领域要求国家干预和公共资金支持的观点在很大程度上是直觉性的，也通常是为了实现抽象的政治哲学原则，而非教育和医疗事业本身的蓬勃发展，以及公民更好的服务享受。用此类理由来反对自由市场对教育和医疗事业的调节是缺乏合理依据的。

五、结论

掀翻国防、教育、医疗三座压在自由市场身上的三座大山，最终是要进行一场关于自由市场的观念革命。

根据前几部分的分析，我们可以得出结论，无论是作为真正的公共事业的国防，还是作为不真正的公共事业的教育、医疗等，均不属于自由市场的禁区，且自由市场在其中有着更加优秀的表现。尽管如此，人们对“自由市场”一词的负面印象和视其为“洪水猛兽”、“计划补充”的思维仍然普遍存在于国内外学术界和民众的脑海中。

从“自由放任”时期的古典自由市场，到20世纪后期的“涓滴理论”，从门格尔的价值主观主义，到霍普对私有财产制度的伦理学论证，原本正常争论的学术派别，因翻译和语境问题而被污名化。“放任”本身在汉语中是具有贬义的，“涓滴”则有“富人吃肉穷人喝汤”的暗示，等等，甚至“主观”、“私”等词汇本不应有的贬义[16]在现代汉语中仍未得到完全祛除。然而，很显然，“laissez-faire”、“trickle down”、“subjective”、“private”等词语在其原本语境中根本不含贬义。此等例子，不胜枚举。

为自由市场正名是一项旷日持久的任务，举重以明轻，国防、教育、医疗不足以成为自由市场的禁区，其余领域更不足以阻碍和污名化自由市场的作用。但愿各种对自由市场的直觉性的污名都能尽快散尽。

[1] 交通、消防、环保、管线等领域，都有类似属性，但从未如同教育、医疗、国防一般如此受到自由市场反对者们的诘难。本文也将指出，此类领域可采用与分析教育、医疗、国防等领域同样的方法。

[2] 本文亦将指出，教育和医疗是“不真正的”公共事业。后文将对此详细论述。

[3] 事实上，国防产品这一概念需要提前澄清（下文会具体论述）：很多情况下，国防产品被认为是国家安全本身，但它也被经常理解为军工企业的产品。这两种理解的差异对于本文的论述不产生影响。

[4] 不难理解，士兵本身并没有选择武器类型和生产企业的选择权——他当然可以表达某种偏好，甚至基于实际使用的体验向有关部门直接提出建议，但就军工企业而言，其消费者永远是国防部门，而非具体士兵。其产品虽然在物理上被发放给具体的士兵，但是在逻辑上是交付给抽象的国家。

[5] 在本章中，真正的和不真正的公共事业并无区分的必要，二者均可通过自由市场提供产品。

[6] 通常而言，这种弥补是不足和无效的，甚至某些政府出于特定原因（包括愚蠢）根本不进行这种弥补，反而变本加厉地抑制供给。这并非本章所讨论的问题。

[7] 我从霍普的著作中获得了极大的灵感。

[8] 对于缺少直观体验的人而言，则可以思考：如果作为客户，自己需要付出怎样的对价，才能够买断一名（出色到可以考虑这一问题的）律师/会计师的职业生涯？

[9] 本部分可详见我的文章“自由至上主义的社会正义理论：为什么自由市场是公平的？”。

[10] 这与国防服务的情况是不同的。我们无需考量国家自行提供国防服务是否正当，国家天然拥有自备武装力量的权利（而不仅仅是权力），但我们认为，国防服务由私营企业通过市场机制来提供是更好的。

[11] 有些人可能会认为，政府可以出台政策来调整此类优势，以便实现公平的机会平等。然而，执行这种政策所需的资源来自对有利成员征税，这些政策使它们的努力贬值。这种对权利的侵犯仍然是不可避免的。

[12] 这些安排也作为一个现实问题，面临着来自“政府失灵”理论的挑战。勒格兰德（1991）指出，这种政府补贴和监管可能会产生不良后果。当时有趣的案例之一是英国的高等教育。它向大多数学生免费提供，但同时受到政府对支出的严格限制。这导致对高等教育的需求远超供给。因此，考试结果被当作分配标准之一。由于来自贫困背景的人在考试中的表现往往更糟（当然，为什么贫困学生在大学的表现更差是有待讨论的问题），因此他们再次处于不利地位，不平等被加剧了（441)。通过对美国社会政策的研究，穆雷（1984），也认为，试图帮助穷人的社会福利项目总是最终伤害他们。

托马西（2012：479）承认，“政府失灵”理论可能会破坏社会善交付机制的可行性，但他也承认，在理论层面上，这种可能性并非致命。

在这里，值得注意的是哈耶克对“政府失灵”原因的解释是不同的。哈耶克认为，缺乏做出正确决定的必要信息意味着这些措施在理论层面上是行不通的：但他不能忽视，许多政策在实践中是有效的。相反，“政府失灵”理论关注的重点是具体的无效公共政策，以及其预料之外的后果；这种“失灵”不能从根本上反驳政策工具本身。

[13] 否则，他只能争辩说，社会民主不能提供足够的机会。

[14] 阿诺德 （同前：246）在这个问题上反对满足主义观点，但它是他对公平的机会平等的平等主义解读使教育成为一个满足的问题。如果教育系统认为消除等级效应是最终目标，当每个人都从中获得了足够的利益（以涵盖等级劣势）时，它便是正义的。

[15] 也许政客们应当为这个错觉负责。

[16] 此类词汇在现代汉语中的贬义多来源于意识形态或政治运动。

Overthrowing the Three Great Burdens on the Free Market

Education, healthcare, and defence[i] are the three mountains that weigh on the free market and are widely regarded as problems that the free market cannot solve. Laissez-faire and its traditional approach to caring for the vulnerable, later interpreted as "trickle-down theory," have long been attacked as ineffective or have exacerbated injustice. This article will argue that in the three most representative areas of public service, education, healthcare, and defence,[ii] the free market will better serve the relevant interests of all members of society, not just the dominant groups, than any state interventionist measures.

1. Pseudo-Public Services

Public services must focus on the interests of the public rather than the collection of individual interests. They must genuinely affect a wide enough range of group interests that the stakeholders within a given range are universal, and not just abstract "broadly involved". The mere fact that the leading provider of products in a particular realm of industry is the government, public ownership entities or similar institutions is not sufficient to indicate its public or public welfare nature.

In this sense, education and healthcare are not genuinely public services since they are ultimately private affairs of the individual. Providers of educational and medical products provide their products to the individuals themselves, and individuals clearly identify the individual services corresponding to their own educational and medical expenses. Furthermore, educational and medical products themselves are unique and non-replicable, although they may come from the same teachers or doctors, schools or hospitals, teaching materials or medicines. "Teaching students according to their aptitude" and "thousands of specific treatments for thousands of patients" are not just some requirements or ideals but a kind of fact. The beneficiaries of the education and medical services enjoyed by individuals are only individuals, not any abstract group, and it is impossible for them to benefit any unrelated individuals consciously.

Public education, public healthcare, and the corresponding social welfare policies do not mean that education and healthcare are public services at the very beginning; on the contrary, the mere fact that educational and medical products come from the government or the suppliers are primarily funded by the government, will not change the fact that the individual use and individual payment mentioned. In fact, the government is subsidizing most industries, even providing products directly as market participants or through state-owned enterprises, but it has no direct impact on the attributes or nature of the business itself.

In contrast, national defence has different attributes from education and medical care. Correspondingly, defence products[iii] are not provided directly to individuals but to abstract groups – national security is provided to and shared by all citizens, and weapons and equipment are provided to the entire military (rather than specific soldiers).[iv] There is no such thing as "yours" or "mine" in defence products, but only "ours". Moreover, theoretically speaking, as citizens of the same country, the defence services enjoyed by "me" and the defence services enjoyed by "you" are the same in nature, degree, and effect, and there is no difference between "our" defence services - although this does not guarantee that you and I will have the same outcome in a war.

Let's observe the sources of funding for defence service providers. It has been proven that private military-industrial enterprises have been quite successful. Organisations such as the National Guard, funded by local funds or groups, play an irreplaceable role. The source of funding for a service provider in an industry is completely irrelevant to whether it is a public service or not.

Pseudo-public services do not have a natural moral justification for the use of public funds, which are taxes derived from individual citizens. If the service provider receives remuneration from the guest and the cost of the service is supported by taxes paid by the guest, it would be a sale of wool scarves to sheep, and there is no difference from robbery or fraud.

This is not to say that any publicly funded education and healthcare is unjust in the first place. I must clarify this. In fact, the education and healthcare industries in various countries are widely supported by public funds, and such support has also contributed to the development of education and healthcare to a large extent. However, as non-genuine public services, we must first examine the impartiality of any use of public funds, rather than simply taking the use of public funds for granted - they are neither public nor should they be taken for granted. The use of public funds for education and healthcare may or may not be just, but it requires a concrete and microscopic examination. On this basis, we further ask, can the free market do better?

I must reiterate that this article is not about the fairness of interventionist government support and control in specific areas, but rather about whether the free market can function more fairly and effectively and achieve the corresponding well-being. Obviously, we have to apply different criteria for judging genuine public services, such as defence, and those that are not, such as healthcare and education.

Therefore, we must first observe the areas where the so-called free market cannot "allocate resources efficiently" and whether it is a public service. It is not only wrong but also absurd to demand the intervention of government forces with such an intuitive assertion of non-genuine public services.

2. Public Services and the Free Market

We must first refute the misconception that public services and the free market are mutually exclusive, both in academia and in the minds of the people[v].

Empirically, the vast majority of the public sector (genuine and not genuine) in the vast majority of countries in the world has introduced private companies and other non-state suppliers extensively, and in many cases, with good results. As mentioned above, even in the military-industrial sector, there are a large number of private companies involved (at least nominal) in free competition. The idea that public services are in conflict with the free market is, first of all, empirically unconvincing.

But the reasons must be pointed out here. Public sectors do not exclude price signals; on the contrary, they rely no less on them than on the private sector of the economy in general. For example, the cost of water and electricity, tuition, medicine, etc., are also regulated by price signals and are also in line with the fundamental law of supply and demand. Generally speaking, as social welfare, they are regulated by state directives to be too low in the price range that should be reached, so that the vast majority of citizens can afford the relevant products, and the resulting shortage of supply is compensated for by state subsidies, tax incentives, etc.[vi]

It should be clarified that although the price of such products is significantly lower than the market price it should be, it is not supplied free of charge by the State. In fact, such prices are still determined by suppliers taking into account factors such as supply and demand, production costs, subsidies and tax policies, and national directives, and large conglomerates are willing to set prices at a slight loss, considering that they can obtain other forms of preferential treatment by solving the supply problem of certain types of public goods for the government. The price signal is still working, but it's dancing in shackles.

It is true that price signals are not exclusive to the free market, and the planned economy can accommodate or tolerate price signals. This is evidenced by the circulation of supply tickets on the black market. If this should be interpreted as a hidden free market in the shadow of the planned economy, we can easily find that under the planned economy, everything from grain, oil, meat, eggs, and milk to cars, refrigerators, and colour televisions all have prices, and the prices and tickets specified or guided by the government play a role in regulating demand that reflects the will of the government.

However, it is only through a free market that price signals can work genuinely, autonomously and accurately. People who have experienced both the planned economy and the market economy have an intuitive and profound feeling of the degree of distortion of price signals under the planned economy. Price signals arise from supply and demand and are formed through individual negotiations. Suppliers adjust production through price signals to reduce or increase supply, and demanders release or suppress demand through price signals (and compare their own economic capacities). And if the government largely controls production, and the government also controls demand through tickets, the distortion of the price signal is not surprising.

Thus, since public services cannot function without the price mechanism, it is more critical to defend - rather than exclude - the role of the free market. Aside from anything else, the mere fact that the free market can help governments identify the contradiction between the supply and demand of public sectors leaves no reason for governments to reject free markets.

3. Objections to Private Defence Forces[vii] - and the Response

Intuitively, national defence is often a product provided by the state and government, especially when it comes to military organisation, construction, command, and warfare. The regulation of the free market for military equipment is actually quite acceptable, as mentioned above, and this has not only been empirically proven in many countries. And in principle, it is nothing more than a transaction of goods in which the government is the buyer. Just because the goods traded are military equipment, it does not mean that the free market is deterred, although it is true that military companies are subject to much stricter regulation and scrutiny (whether legitimate or not) than the average private sector.

What is truly confusing is the organisation, construction, command and warfare of the armed forces. Few would intuitively agree that a nation's armed forces can be recruited, managed, and relied upon in a war by a specific private agency. Historically, there have been many mercenary regiments with good reputations and combat records, but some of them were not really private (e.g. the Swiss Legion) or were only used in a particular campaign as a supplement to the armed forces of (other) nations (Genoese crossbow mercenaries). It does seem that we lack empirical evidence that a country relied solely on private armies as its main defence force for an extended period of time.

Of course, we must recognise that there is no direct relationship between "no" and "shouldn’t". Prior to Newton's discovery and summarisation of the laws of mechanics, there were also various inventions and engineering techniques in the world that spontaneously used the laws of mechanics, and we must examine the suspicions of private armies in detail to determine whether they are sufficient to prove that private armies are not feasible, and that defence is off-limits to the free market.

The first challenge of private armies is their loyalty. Generally speaking, in the armed forces of a nation-state, its soldiers do not simply perform military service obligations under the law (if any), or to receive remuneration and allowances for service, or to practice some of their own qualities, but more - at least to a large extent - represent citizens' loyalty and identification with the state. It is generally believed that this kind of recognition will significantly increase the combat effectiveness of the army, including the will and morale to fight, the endurance under challenging environments and disadvantaged battle situations, the degree of devotion to battle, the obedience to dangerous orders, etc., and especially, the confidence in the national army to pin the rise and fall of the national fortune. People will ask: will mercenaries who fight for money sacrifice themselves to protect me? In fact, since the ultimate beneficiaries of the defence service - citizens - are not directly selecting the private armed forces, and in any case, they can only decide the matter indirectly through the electoral systems of democratic countries, they are subjectively more likely to trust the government they elect directly than to the private armed forces that are re-selected through some procedure. And the government is clearly receptive to this public desire to expand its power.

The second challenge of the private army is its ability to carry out its duties. If private armies have to recruit personnel, train soldiers and commanders, procure weapons and equipment, and support the logistics of the entire army at their own expense, one will wonder whether there are private companies that have the financial resources, the capacity and the risk tolerance and, further, whether there are enough private companies with such strength to allow free market competition to flourish. Defence budgets have always accounted for a considerable proportion of national budgets. For example, the U.S. defence budget for fiscal year 2022 is $753 billion, which is less than the fair amount for its status when you consider that the vast majority of its weapons and equipment can be procured and maintained domestically (meaning that such costs are lower than those spent by other countries to purchase and maintain such equipment). This amount and the associated risks are enough to deter the vast majority of market players. The government's annual release of this staggering figure is enough to instil in the minds of people that national defence must be led by the government rather than questioning why the tax revenues it extracts from it are used for military purposes. Similarly, the coordination of manpower, land, and other resources for national defence are all similar.

The third challenge of the private military is its professional ethics. We must assume that such a private enterprise will not be hired by the same government forever (or at least that a government will not hire the same private military enterprise forever). Otherwise, it will only be a national army in the guise of privatisation. They are likely, at least not ruled out, on the battlefield against their former employer states or against former colleagues. Lawyers, accountants and other intermediary service personnel can easily deal with conflicts of interest. On the one hand, there are enough excellent lawyers and accountants in the market that can be substituted and have no conflict of interest, and in many cases, clients do not have to entrust one or the other. On the other hand, what such service professionals really face is only a few cases and the fate of a few companies and their (at most) thousands of employees, and they have much less baggage when dealing with conflicts of interest - what if the mercenary companies that used to work for the United States and China are even affiliated with the same controller?

A fourth challenge to private armies is their international fairness. As mentioned above, defence is expensive. Any poor country, with its entire material resources, can, after all, organise an armed force that can be used for its fair ambitions, and if it is handled properly, the investment in the national army will eventually precipitate into the foundation of the country, but is it willing to spend the same amount of money to hire a private army that will leave at the end of the contract? This may lead to a more pronounced divide between countries around the world, where countries that can afford to pay high fees for mercenary armies can wage wars and expand more recklessly. In the end, as in all free markets, the most affluent consumers enjoy the highest quality of services, and the least affluent consumers enjoy the lowest quality of services. While this is not unfair to specific individuals, does the same principle apply to the abstract state and to the entire citizen whose destiny is bound to it?

The above doubts have, in fact, been widely accepted by governments and citizens, so much so that the armed forces of all nation-states in the world today are absolutely dominated by national armies. However, they don't make sense on closer inspection.

The questioning of the loyalty of private armies actually pre-divides the order or hierarchy of the individual's inner drive; that is, the drive to fight for money is lower than the drive to fight for loyalty to the homeland. But this is unfounded. An individual can fight for anything he deems valuable to him, and fighting for money is no less vulgar or less motivated than fighting for his homeland, nor does it make him less combative. Value and the measurement of value are subjective. Some people think that the honour of the state is above everything else, and the obligation of loyalty to the state exceeds all obligations; such people must have higher combat effectiveness in the national army. However, there are also people who do not think so and pursue material interests more, pay attention to the equality of power and responsibility, and reward brave men; for such people, the above presupposition is wrong. The values of human beings are diverse, and the value of different things is different for everyone. We cannot be self-righteous and say that a certain value is above everything else for everyone.

Much of the empirical evidence associated with this is also false. In the context of the national army, the soldiers recruited by the army must conform to the former criterion, that is, the preference for members who believe that the duty of loyalty to the state is above all else. Under this premise, it must, in fact, be more effective than the modern group of mercenaries who only pay to do things rather than undertake the defence of a country - but this comparison is not fair in itself.

One of the most basic truths is that individuals do not get the slightest benefit from the abstract state or government, especially in countries that implement compulsory military service. Citizens are, first of all, fulfilling their legal obligations by performing military service, and the remuneration and allowances given by the state are only to compensate for the personal time sacrificed in the service of the state. However, mercenary soldiers who work for private military enterprises are professional soldiers in the true sense of the word, and their income is not to compensate for the personal time spent in fulfilling their civic duties, but to pay for their work that is directly linked to the results and effectiveness of their service. If the war is lost, the soldiers who serve the country do not need to go to court-martial, but the mercenaries who serve the private army are likely to be discredited and lose their jobs. In this sense, it is unreasonable to suspect that the combat effectiveness of soldiers in the private army is lower than that of the state armed forces. On the contrary, the soldiers of the private army have a stronger drive to win the war than the national armed forces, as well as a more decisive cherishing and pursuit of individual honour, which are the ways and skills on which they depend, and the defeat of the mercenaries is more deadly than that of the national armed forces. It is reasonable to expect that, under all equal conditions, they will have a stronger fighting capacity on the battlefield.

Many would argue that war is an extremely risky activity, and it is questionable whether the material and reputational incentives based on the principles of the free market are still valid in the face of life-threatening conditions. However, just as the state pays a large pension to the family of a soldier who has served his country in battle, as well as related honours and policy preferences, mercenaries who serve in the private army obviously do not enjoy any lower treatment, especially since the operators of the private army have to compensate for the lack of honours and policy preferences through much higher pension amounts, and also share the risk through measures such as commercial insurance. On this basis, due to the correspondingly high insurance costs required to maintain a large number of armed forces, the private armed forces will also appropriately control the size of the army and value the "expensive" lives of their employees - which in turn will lead to higher investment and higher combat literacy of the combatants of the private armed forces units. Therefore, it is superfluous to think that mercenaries are afraid of war just because they fight for money.

Doubts about the ability of the private military to perform their duties can be concluded that the investment and risk of defence are enormous beyond the capabilities of private enterprises. However, we should not just talk about the 700-billion problem but should first consider whether the same level of defence services (in the case of the United States) would still be so expensive if private companies provided the same level of defence services.

As already mentioned in the previous paragraphs, there is a lack of motivation on the part of the State to control the size of the armed forces. They do take into account the current size of the army, the corresponding costs, and the actual needs, including combat capability, the number of threats, the risk of war, etc., but the state can never reasonably judge what size of the army is reasonable to maintain for a given domestic or international situation. Defence spending comes from taxes and money printing, and the state itself does not pay any price, nor can it truly weigh the risks, benefits, and disadvantages of war. Private armies are different. They are private companies that need to consider costs and revenues, and any excess spending is a reduction of their own profits. If the size of the army does not meet the actual needs, the defeat of the war can fundamentally destroy the capital and reputation of its operation. Therefore, the private army has the motivation and measures to control the size and cost of the army properly and has also exercised the corresponding ability in the long-term market competition. The state and government can never have this ability, and the most straightforward solution can only be as much as possible. Correspondingly, a large amount of defence expenditure is wasted on this "guarantee" - not every general is Han Xin, and not every country has people like Xiao He to provide material support.

Not only are the state and the government not good at controlling the overall size and expenditure of the armed forces at the macro level, but it is also difficult to control the unit expenditure of individual soldiers and specific weapons and equipment at the micro level. The input and output of a soldier by a private enterprise are no different from its judgment of any other factor of production and human resources, and they will control the "employment" cost of a single soldier according to actual needs and specific circumstances, especially to ensure that every penny is spent on the cutting edge, to ensure that any investment can be used to improve the combat effectiveness of the army, maintain the morale of the army, update and maintain equipment, support logistics and other fields, and avoid many useless expenses. Such matters are of no concern to the Government. Of course, the government is concerned about whether the combat effectiveness of the army has been improved, but it does not care about the efficiency of the use of defence expenditures per unit; fundamentally speaking, the defence expenditures invested by the state come from the tax and fiat currency systems, and they neither cherish nor be cautious in their defence expenditures. Defence spending is truly taken from the people and used for the people, and the unit efficiency is not the thing that the government cares about.

One may wonder why, since the U.S. military-industrial complex has been largely privatised, isn't that already the case with equipment spending? Will the cost of using a private defence business really drop so dramatically? Prices depend on supply and demand. If producers are private, yet consumers are state-owned, then when the military procures equipment on behalf of the state, as consumers who are unable to judge their actual needs and have sufficient excessive funds, they actually have no incentive to negotiate prices. However, if a private armed enterprise procures equipment from a private military enterprise, not only can the total amount and unit price be better controlled by market means, but it can also improve the efficiency of the use of limited funds, so that the major national defence matter of equipment procurement can be completely freed from the constraints of bureaucracy and politics. The integrity and transparency will be increased, and in turn, the research, development, and production of weapons and equipment can be better promoted through the market. Private military enterprises, which have been freed from the restrictions of the international camp, can become truly global enterprises and further reduce the production cost of military equipment. In an ideal world, the versatility of weapons and equipment in the world's armies would be significantly improved, which would also be conducive to the decline in weapons and equipment expenditure, especially in long-term maintenance.

Thus, private businesses can provide equivalent defence services at a much lower cost. While prices are not determined by cost, the generally low costs of service providers will provide significant bargaining space, and a reduction in defence spending will eventually materialise.

Even so, for many countries, defence is still an annual investment of hundreds of billions of dollars, which is still a considerable expenditure for private enterprises. But this does not mean that enterprises need to invest 100 billion per year at their own expense and then put their products on the market to sell. On the contrary, private enterprises obtained quite a solid financial guarantee through contracts with the government. Whether enterprises have the ability to carry out early investment and daily operations should not be a matter of concern to the academic community; as long as there are profit margins and legal protection, market players will always break away.

Scepticism about the professional ethics of the private armed forces reflects ignorance of the market economy and market players. While it is true that almost all countries require professional service providers to comply with conflict-of-interest norms through laws and industry self-regulation, the behaviour of lawyers and accountants to gain the trust and opportunities of clients by strictly adhering to professional ethics and conflict-of-interest norms does not need to be confirmed by law or industry norms. How can a client trust a lawyer who frequently confides information about other clients in his conversations, or even tries to represent them despite a conflict of interest? Even if he is really in a conflict of interest, he will inevitably be strict with himself to avoid the abstract conflict of interest from evolving into a substantive failure to perform his duties diligently or even violate professional ethics. What important customers are worth betting on their careers?[viii]

The same problem can be thrown at private military enterprises. If the client's government doubts its professionalism and loyalty, and if it works for a government but has a secret deal with other potential clients, how can it gain the trust of the government of the employing country? If private companies invest such a large amount of money yet fail to satisfy the government's trust in themselves, they will not be able to avoid being eliminated by the market itself. The cost of their investment in national defence services is so huge that they simply cannot afford any professional ethics and professional ethics risks, and it is impossible to risk hundreds of billions of dollars of expenditure to fall into a conflict of interest or even lose professional ethics.

It is important to note that governments actually face greater ethical risks than private defence service providers. The stakes are obvious for the government to worry about the loyalty and professionalism of the private sector. If the suppliers have the above problems, the worst consequences for the government are nothing more than the defeat of the war and its collapse, in which situation no single personnel suffer anything. But the death of the enterprise itself, is the end of everything for the enterprise. It doesn't make sense that the one who invests in the small ones suspects the one who invests in the big ones.

The question of international equity arising from the general privatisation of the armed forces can be regarded in two ways: is it better for a weaker country to use militarism or to hire weaker private armies? Is a greater comparative advantage sufficient to justify the military expansion of a great power?

The issue of equity can never be separated into two separate dimensions, international and domestic, but must be viewed in an integrated manner. Maintaining the balance of military power has never been a global pursuit of fairness, nor is it realistic, much less can it be realised as envisioned by its proponents. At the height of the Cold War, the "nuclear balance" between the United States and the Soviet Union failed to bring about lasting peace. What people are worried about is nothing more than that powerful countries rely on superior armed forces, ignore international rules and obligations, and abuse military means to achieve their own interests, while weak countries, although weak, can still form a weighty deterrent by measuring the country's material resources; if they are as strong as the United States but cannot handle weak countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, people will get some positive and safe hints psychologically.

However, this implication only looks at the problem from the perspective of the state and does not look at the costs behind the recklessness of militarism. The United States has only lost face and thousands of corpses, while the so-called cemeteries of empires seem to be resisting stubbornly, but in fact, they have sacrificed the interests of the people of the whole country and even the entire international region. The fact that the state and the various resistance groups pour their resources into the armed forces, while the welfare and living standards of the citizens are greatly reduced, cannot be called international fairness (as opposed to non-resistance), but merely blame the aggressor for the injustice of the country itself.

This is not to say that a weak country should pursue a policy of non-resistance, nor is it whitewashing a war of aggression. Still, on the contrary, just wars against aggression have no relation to the resister's strength or weakness.

The thing is, the aggressor dares to invade to a large extent because this unjust war does not cost more than a just war (for the reasons mentioned above). Private enterprises are much more sensitive to the costs and risks of war than countries and governments. If the armies of the world's great powers are generally privatised, then private military enterprises will inevitably demand additional high remuneration for unjust wars directed by the government of the employer country and will also raise the price significantly for the next contract period. Why can't the "rip-off" nature of private armies mean that powerful countries need to pay more for unjust wars, so that a step towards international fairness is realised?

As a result, it is clear that the privatisation of the armed forces, far from leading to more frequent military expansion by powerful countries, can do a good job – even better than parliamentary politics – in limiting the expansionist ambitions of the mighty powers. It uses the language and methods of the market to tell decision-makers that unjust wars cost more than just wars and that bullying will not triumph easily. Still, it will fall into an endless quagmire, ruined in the vast sea of people's wars - the soldiers trained by the aggressors at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars will have to face a steady stream of almost free volunteer patriots in the invaded country - if the invaded country is really worthy of the blood of its people. If we are genuinely concerned about the military expansion of the great powers, we should support the introduction of market instruments into defence services and the use of price signals to limit the expansionist ambitions of those in power.

Concerns about the representativeness of private defence services have proven unfounded. In addition, there are additional benefits to providing defence services through the free market.

First, as discussed above, private enterprises are much more sensitive to the costs and risks of war than states and governments. Nor is it possible for private enterprises to force a war with the people of the whole country on their backs. This undoubtedly fundamentally ensures the justice of a war on the side of private arming to a large extent. In fact, the private armed forces are bound by employment contracts. Their fundamental purpose is – and is limited to – that in order to preserve the national security of their employers, it is almost impossible for them to start an unjust war on their own initiative. They will charge the government of the employer country a high additional fee for a possible unjust war or even terminate the contract on the basis of the significant risk of an unjust war. This would limit the occurrence of unjust wars to a large extent.

Second, contrary to many fears, the regulation of the private armed forces is not a problem but rather one of its advantages over the state armed forces. It is impossible for any private enterprise to raise a million soldiers for nothing, and they need the state to buy its defence products. This successfully transformed the relationship between the civilian government and the military into one between Party A and Party B in the free market. Isn't it easier for "sugar daddy" to supervise the private armies than it is for bureaucratic politicians to supervise the state armies, given that the military has never been integrated into modern domestic democratic mechanisms? Facts have proven that if the relationship between the armed forces and the government or the position of the armed forces in the country's political system is not correctly handled, even well-designed democratic politics will be wiped out by the intervention of the armed forces. In the current general system design, the nationalisation of the military is considered to help solve the problem of military interference in politics. However, private military enterprises are inherently isolated from politics. They are defence service providers, not any political force. Thus, the nationalisation of the armed forces is good, and the marketisation of the armed forces will be even better.

Finally, can private armies be used in civil wars? We need to begin by acknowledging that suppressing rebellions is generally recognised as one of its responsibilities. The discussion of whether private armies can be used in civil wars is by itself a start of inhibiting the effect of privatisation on civil wars. Second, civil wars are often outside the scope of the defence service contract. Private military companies that are required to include the suppression of rebellion in their services will inevitably demand significant additional compensation in front of a flood of volunteer resistance, which in turn will prompt the government to consider whether to use military means to deal with the opposition - why should they bear the stigma of armed repression if the same amount of money is enough for them to stop? This is the same principle as the principle of a market-oriented army to restrain unjust warfare.

In summary, it is entirely feasible for the private sector to provide defence services through market mechanisms, and it can help solve many problems with the state armed forces. Setting the defence service as a no-go zone in the free market is entirely wrong.

4. Is public intervention in education and healthcare a requirement of "fair equality of opportunity"?[ix]

As mentioned earlier, education and healthcare are pseudo-public. This means that they do not have the inherent legitimacy to use public funds, and that any government-funded education and healthcare must first be tested for equity[x]. Most of the arguments for government involvement in education and healthcare are untenable.

According to the "fair equality of opportunity" that is currently rampant in the academic world, education and healthcare are essential components of equal opportunity. It is first necessary to explore the various interpretations of fair equality of opportunity. Rawls (1999: 63) puts forward a quite demanding ideal that “those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system”. This interpretation of FEO calls to neutralise the effect of socioeconomic hierarchy. However, his interpretation proves to be somewhat paradoxical (Arnold, 2014). Rawls’s property-owning democracy is class-based, and “regardless of their initial place” means there are, in reality, different (and assumedly unequal) initial places. Is it possible, even as a matter of idealistic theory, to neutralise the effect of socioeconomic hierarchy while allowing such a hierarchy to exist? It does not appear feasible to freely, legally and justly stop transferring current advantages to the next generation without violating the fundamental liberties and human rights of the parent generation. Education, care, social relationships, family structures, residential conditions and communities, and so on, are just some of the realms where strictly protected personal liberty can (even should) influence and vary the prospects of success from the very beginning of our life.[xi] As Gomberg (2010) notes, the only way to eliminate the influence of social class on people’s life prospects might be to eliminate social class. As a result, Rawls (1999: 64) concedes that “the principle of fair opportunity can only be imperfectly carried out, at least as long as some form of the family exists”, and “it is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed… therefore we may want to adopt a principle which recognises this fact and… mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself”.

This leads to Freeman’s suggestion that FEO only requires that individuals, especially the worst-off, should have opportunities to fully develop their talents (Freeman, 2007: 98). This definition of FEO may narrow the range of functions that Rawls wants to achieve, but this requirement is exactly what the typical social democratic measures fulfil, including Rawls’s own blueprint. Publicly funded schools, government-guaranteed basic healthcare and taxation to break the concentration of wealth are arrangements that aim to assure the same prospects of success for those similarly endowed, but are not more capable of assuring the development of the talents of all citizens. Even so, social democracy claims that these arrangements offer the same prospects for the similarly endowed, especially fair opportunities for the least advantaged citizens.[xii]

He firstly argues that “education and healthcare are only useful toward winning desirable positions if there are desirable positions on offer in the first place” (Tomasi, 2012: 488). It appears that market democracy’s only superiority in terms of FEO is that it offers more available opportunities, since Tomasi argues that deems social democracy realises FEO at the level of ideal theory as well.[xiii] However, this interpretation weakens the connection between such opportunities and fair equality because more opportunities do not always lead to fairer equality, especially when the rival regimes offers less but roughly sufficient opportunities. So, how can market democracy achieve FEO?

It turns out, perhaps, that the core argument here is not about the quantity of opportunities but the economic liberty and value of individual choice behind the superior number of opportunities. Tomasi values economic liberty as one of the basic liberties that Rawls should have considered in his first principle. Furthermore, by providing more opportunities available and less governmental restriction on related choices, Tomasi also coheres his arguments for FEO and economic liberty. Given improved choices and prospects for individual decisions, personality and agency are also respected.

This approach faces challenges from the Rawlsian camp. First, Tomasi’s interpretation of FEO is criticised for being too narrow. Tomasi notices that Rawls’s writings show that he may accept imperfect FEO, but Stilz (2014: 431) argues that Rawls’s compromise “comes from his discussion of unfavourable circumstances where fair equality of opportunity cannot be fully established”, and this acceptance is justified only in non-ideal circumstances, where “an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity” (Rawls, 1999: 266). Consequently, Stilz considers Tomasi’s understanding of FEO and Rawls as out of context. However, it is also in Rawls’s “final statement of the two principles of justice for institutions” and titled with the “second priority rule” (ibid.), which is obviously more than a preparation and compromise for non-ideal circumstances. Imperfect FEO remains FEO, and the inequalities are also restricted to enhance the opportunities of those with fewer opportunities. Unlike Rawls, Tomasi only considers the imperfect one. This may reduce the importance of FEO, but it cannot be a mistaken interpretation. Thus, Stilz’s criticism is not convincing here.

In addition, Arnold (2014: 246) doubts whether such arrangements are appealing. Market democracy may be able to provide the promised opportunities, such as high (even higher) quality education for all, but this can’t be the final goal. Instead, the education system (if aiming for FEO) must be used to cancel out class advantages. Thus, Tomasi’s educational arrangements under market democracy fall within the sufficientarianism threshold. However, the original and literal interpretation of FEO forms the basis of Arnold’s criticism. He may not accept Freeman’s interpretation, yet in a situation designed to “mitigate the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery” while admitting the fact of social class, neither the high quality of education itself nor the elimination of hierarchical effects is the “final goal”. On the contrary, high-quality education contributes to FEO exactly because of the existence of hierarchical effects. In a class society, education offers opportunities that less advantaged citizens are more sensitive to and in greater need of.[xiv] Otherwise, education, as a way to fully develop the talents, will not be a question of FEO since a non-class society reassumes the full development of individuals.

Indeed, Arnold’s criticism solely in terms of education inspires a more significant question: by interpreting the requirements of FEO as maximising the opportunities to fully develop the talents of all citizens, is it still working for fair equality? Specifically, does maximising such choices and opportunities “promote agency in the relevant sense” (Fowler, 2015: 351)? Tomasi believes that the link between free choice and FEO is solid and linear: the more free choice and space for individual decision that is assured, the more self-respect and self-development will be promoted. However, Fowler proposes “valueless agency” and “the illusion of agency” to demonstrate this is untrue. The former situation “occurs when citizens do indeed have control of some aspect of their lives but not in ways that foster self-authorship”; the latter situation “occurs when citizens appear to have control over their lives but do not” (ibid.). First, Fowler argues that in many cases, choice by itself provides no real opportunity for self-development. For example, healthcare choices can be very complex and technical, and expert knowledge is often required to make even basic judgements about courses of action. This demands that patients have adequate information to make effective choices. However, due to information asymmetry, they are not best placed to make rational, calculated decisions about what level of care to purchase (Arrow, 1963). Clearly, these choices do not really serve the fair opportunity of citizens and usually have severe and negative consequences. At the same time, Fowler also notes that the worst-off citizens have the least knowledge and wealth to make good choices for themselves, which reduces, rather than enhances, their opportunity for self-development. Second, Fowler (2015: 355) argues that there are many choices that are treated as resulting from the agents’ control but actually do not. In an ideal society where equality of opportunity (in the egalitarian conception) is perfectly realised, and brute luck is eliminated, people can trace their position back to their own choices. People living in a market democracy cannot do such a thing. Fowler believes that the latter uncertainty will undermine agents’ ability to live as responsible self-authors and develop their moral powers because “one important part of agency” is understanding the causes in one’s life so that aspects of it can be altered (ibid.: 358). In Tomasi’s design, individuals are given the liberty and space to develop themselves fully. However, such uncertainty makes it unclear how one should use these liberties to develop one's talents and reduces their real influence on one’s life. This obviously undermines Tomasi’s intention.

Let’s consider Fowler’s first criticism. His core argument is that in his examples, citizens are not very likely to make individual choices that promote their self-development opportunities. However, it seems that he confuses two concepts: an individual’s ability and conditions to make the right choices, and the institutional right to make choices. It is clear that FEO requires the latter to promote the former. That is, FEO requires the right to choose, while the institutional right to make individual choices will improve the individual ability to make the right choice, which also forms part of one’s opportunities for self-development. Thus, Fowler’s argument here is not convincing. Furthermore, in the case of healthcare, Fowler assumes that citizens are making individual choices with temporary and asymmetric information. In fact, however, those citizens living in a market democracy will have obtained a lot of experience with similar practices and have learnt enough from their parents’ healthcare decisions before they need to concern themselves with their own healthcare issues. In Fowler’s example, it remains challenging to make good choices in the face of a complex and technical issue. However, they should perform much better than Fowler imagines.

Fowler’s second criticism points out that many of the issues that affect FEO are out of the agents’ control. Nonetheless, somehow, individuals consider themselves responsible for these issues by believing specific ideas or institutions. For “somehow” here, Fowler implies that this refers to Tomasi’s market democracy promise of maximised personal choice and promotion of opportunities for self-development. However, such illusions do not challenge Tomasi’s argument that the choices maximised by market democracy do promote opportunities. In fact, Fowler’s example of the American Dream reduces the persuasiveness of his argument. The definition of the American Dream is a classic formal equality of opportunity trope. Yet, he notes that many citizens in the U.S. believe in “a more egalitarian conception of equality of opportunity and believe that this kind of equality exists in their own society” (Fowler, 2015: 358). Should the American Dream, which promises only a formal equality of opportunity, be held responsible for this illusion?[xv] Similarly, should free market fairness, which promises FEO, be deemed responsible for the illusion of control citizens have due to their own imagined ideas? The answer is clearly no, and such illusions caused by the misunderstanding of a theory do not undermine the value of the theory itself.

From the above analysis, it is easy to see that the argument that requires state intervention and public funding in the fields of education and healthcare is largely intuitive and often motivated by the realisation of abstract political-philosophical principles rather than the flourishing of education and healthcare itself and the better access of citizens to services. There is no rational basis for using such arguments to oppose the regulation of education and healthcare by the free market.

V. Conclusions

Overthrowing the three burdens of national defence, education, and healthcare that weigh on the free market is ultimately a conceptual revolution about the free market.

Based on the analysis of the previous sections, we can conclude that neither national defence, which is a real public service, nor education, healthcare, etc., which is not a genuine public service, are forbidden areas of the free market. The free market has a better performance in it. Despite this, people's negative impression of the term "free market" and the idea of seeing it as a "flood beast" and "replenishment to planned economy" are still prevalent in the minds of academics and people at home and abroad.

From the classical free market during the "laissez-faire" period to the "trickle-down theory" of the late 20th century, from Menger's value subjectivism to Hoppe's ethical argument for the institution of private property, what was originally a commonly debated academic school has been stigmatised by translation and contextual issues. In Chinese, "laissez-faire" itself has a derogatory connotation; "trickle" has the implication that "the rich eat meat and the poor drink the remaining soup", and so on. Even the undeserving derogatory connotations of words such as "subjective" and "private"[xvi] have not been completely eliminated in modern Chinese. However, it is clear that the terms "laissez-faire", "trickle down", "subjective", "private", etc., are not at all derogatory in their original context.

Justifying the free market is a protracted task. If defence, education, and healthcare are not enough to make it off-limits, the rest of the realms are certainly not sufficient to hinder and stigmatise its role. Hopefully, all the intuitive stigma against the free market will soon be dissipated.

[i] Transportation, firefighting, environmental protection, pipelines, and other fields all have similar attributes, but they have never been so criticized by opponents of the free market as education, healthcare, and national defence. This article will also point out that the same approach can be taken in such areas as in the fields of education, healthcare, defence, etc.

[ii] This article will also point out that education and healthcare are "not real" public services. This will be discussed in more detail below.

[iii] In fact, the concept of defence products needs to be clarified in advance (more on this below): in many cases, defence products are considered national security itself, but they are also often understood as products of the military-industrial complex. The difference between these two understandings has no bearing on the discussion in this article.

[iv] It is not difficult to understand that the soldier himself does not have the right to choose the type of weapon and the production enterprise - he can certainly express a certain preference and even make a direct recommendation to the relevant department based on the experience of actual use, but in the case of the military-industrial complex, its consumer will always be the defence department, and not the specific soldier. Its products are physically distributed to concrete soldiers, but logically to abstract nations.

[v] In this chapter, there is no need to distinguish between genuine and non-genuine public services, both of which can provide products through the free market.

[vi] Often, such remedies are inadequate and ineffective, and even some governments, for specific reasons (including stupidity), do not make such remedies at all, but instead intensify their efforts to suppress supply. This is not the issue discussed in this chapter.

[vii] I was greatly inspired by Hoppe's writings.

[viii] For those who lack intuitive experience, ask yourself: What consideration do you have to pay as a client to buy out the career of a lawyer/accountant who is good enough to consider it?

[ix] This section can be found in my article "Libertarian Theory of Social Justice: Why Free Markets Are Fair?”

[x] This is different from the situation of the defence service. We do not need to consider whether it is legitimate for the state to provide its own defence services, which naturally have the right (not just power) to have their own armed forces, but we believe that it is better for defence services to be provided by the private sector through market mechanisms.

[xi] Some may argue that the government can introduce policies to adjust social provision so that FEO is achieved. However, the resources needed to enforce such policies come from the taxation of advantaged members, and such policies devalue their endeavour. This violation is still unavoidable.

[xii] These arrangements also face challenges from government failure theory as a practical matter. Le Grand (1991) points out that such government subsidy and regulation may have undesirable consequences. One of the interesting cases at that time was British higher education. It was offered free to most students but was at the same time subject to severe government restraints on spending. This contributed to the demand for such education substantially exceeding its supply. In consequence, examination results were used as a rationing device. Since people from poorer backgrounds often did worse in examinations (of course, why the poorer students perform worse in colleges is open to discussion), they were thereby disadvantaged once more, and inequality was enhanced (ibid.: 441). Drawing from research on U.S. social policy, Murray (1984), also argues that social welfare programmes that may try to assist the poor invariably end up hurting them.

  Tomasi (2012: 479) acknowledges that the theory of government failure may undermine the feasibility of the goods delivery mechanism, but he also admits that it is not fatal at the level of ideal theory.

  Here, it is worth noting the differences in Hayek’s explanations of why government failure may occur. Hayek argues that the lack of necessary information to make the correct decisions means that such measures will not work at the level of ideal theory; but he cannot ignore that many policies work in practice. On the contrary, government failure theory focuses on the detailed mechanism of enforcement of public policy, where undesirable consequences could occur; this failure cannot undermine the policy itself essentially.

[xiii] Otherwise, he could just argue that social democracy cannot provide sufficient opportunities.

[xiv] Arnold (ibid.: 246) argues against the sufficientarian view of this question, but it is his egalitarian reading of FEO that makes education an issue of sufficiency. When the education system regards elimination of hierarchical effects as the final goal, it will be just if everyone has obtained enough from it (to cover the hierarchical disadvantages).

[xv] Perhaps the politicians who promise this hypothetical future should be responsible for this illusion.

[xvi] The derogatory connotations of such words in modern Chinese are often derived from ideological or political movements.