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Wafangdianisation Squared and the Historical Gap in Liu Zhongjing’s Wafangdian Studies: Can China’s Technological Development Ever Take a Temporary Lead?

Writer: Timothy Huang from Voice of Liberation
Timothy Huang from Voice of Liberation
Jun 24
16 min read

Updated: Nov 13

By Timothy Huang


Today, people commonly use Liu Zhongjing’s ‘Wafangdian Studies’ to explain the fundamental reason why China’s technological development has long lagged behind the world’s advanced level. On the one hand, more than two thousand years of de-feudalisation within the East Asian mainland made it difficult for stable technical communities to exist, and technical knowledge could not be accumulated continuously through professional associations, industry ethics and intergenerational transmission. On the contrary, under the screening of a highly bureaucratised system, bureaucratic mechanisms have often been guided by short-term interests and administrative objectives, thereby excluding the spontaneous growth and effective application of science and technology. On the other hand, China has long relied on external technological input. In the real circumstances of late-developing countries, purchasing and importing technology often has greater short-term efficiency than independent research and development; technological input possesses an incomparable cost advantage over indigenous innovation, and therefore further weakens the possibility of autonomous research and intergenerational accumulation. The combination of the two has produced a typical phenomenon: already outdated technology imported from outside appears locally to be ‘far ahead’, while the local technological foundation and capacity for iteration continue to deteriorate.


This theory can of course explain why China’s technological development has, at root, long lagged behind the world’s advanced level. Yet it does not fully explain, or at least does not explain in sufficient detail, three further questions.

       

First, why has China’s technological development not only remained behind the world’s advanced level over long historical cycles, but also struggled, at almost every specific historical moment, to reach a genuinely world-leading level? Even during the golden age of globalisation around the turn of the century, when China obtained opportunities for technological importation, industrial transfer and commercial theft on an unprecedented scale, it still found it difficult to stand at the global frontier, even in a few specific fields and even for a brief historical moment.

       

Secondly, since dependence on external technological input is not unique to China, but is a phenomenon commonly found in almost all countries outside the Euro-American core, why does China still have to use relatively lower efficiency, and even resources several times greater than those consumed by other regions dependent on external input, merely to achieve the average effect of imported technology?

       

Thirdly, on the basis of the previous two points, why is it that China today, after targeting particular industries such as AI, electric vehicles and robotics, investing several times or even several dozen times more resources than other countries, and already obtaining technological inputs approaching the world’s advanced level through various lawful or unlawful means, still cannot achieve even a temporary or partial genuine lead in these fields?

       

I call these three questions the ‘historical gap problem’ of Wafangdian Studies. The explanation of these three questions may be called ‘re-Wafangdianisation’, or ‘Wafangdianisation squared’.

       

It must be admitted that Wafangdian Studies provides a basically correct explanatory path. Yet when, for various reasons, some people believe that China has already reached the world’s advanced level in heavily promoted industries such as AI, electric vehicles and robotics, and cheer China’s technological achievements on that basis, the basic version of Wafangdian Studies does not provide an immediately usable explanation. Those who take pride in China’s technological development, even if they are willing to accept Wafangdian Studies at an abstract level, may still believe that China today happens to be situated in a ‘gap’ within the historical explanation offered by Wafangdian Studies: it has just imported genuinely world-advanced technology, while simultaneously using a Leninist system to concentrate greater resources. Even if China is ultimately doomed to fall behind again because of Wafangdianisation in five or ten years, this at least does not prevent them from declaring victory in the present.

       

What this article seeks to discuss and refute is precisely this narrative of ‘winning in the present within the historical gap’. Wafangdianisation squared is intended to show that once advanced technology enters China, it does not form a genuinely leading position even in the short term. From the very beginning of its importation, it has already suffered degradation; thereafter it continues to deteriorate in organisational structure, resource allocation and iterative inheritance. China’s technological development therefore contains no brief window in which Wafangdianisation can be bypassed.

       

Compared with the general form of Wafangdianisation, which applies widely to many countries and regions and results simply from the inability of a technological tradition to accumulate locally across generations, the reason China experiences Wafangdianisation squared lies mainly in three factors.

       

First, the emergence, development, transmission and progress of science and technology depend on feudal technical communities; the application and vitality of technology itself likewise depend on this soil. The moment a flower is picked from its original soil, it is still a flower, but it has already entered the process of withering. Therefore, at the moment when theoretically most advanced technology is imported into China, it is already no longer technology of the same level as that of its place of origin.

       

Secondly, the impact of China’s social structure on technological development and application cannot be understood only from the perspective of the long-term absence of feudalism and the difficulty of forming technical communities. It must also be understood from the perspective of the difficulty of organising social resources. The cost of horizontal trust, organisational stability, inherited responsibility and long-term cooperation in Chinese society is extremely high, to the point that only a Leninist system crouched beneath traditional political culture can, to some extent, achieve effective resource allocation. Yet this mode of allocation itself continues to undermine the formation of technical communities.

       

Thirdly, once the loss incurred in the process of technological importation is combined with China’s extremely high difficulty in organising resources, there is no simple linear relationship between China’s technological level, the level of technological input and the scale of resource investment. It more closely resembles a low-level convergence below the level of the technology’s place of origin. Even with open-source technology, technological theft and resource investment regardless of cost, industries such as AI, electric vehicles and robotics still find it difficult to reach a genuinely world-leading level.

       

The first aspect of Wafangdianisation squared is that, at the very moment technology leaves its native soil, it has already undergone its first degradation in quality.

       

The basic version of Wafangdian Studies usually assumes that externally imported technology is not itself the most advanced level in the world at that time, because transferring the most advanced technology to late-developing regions does not serve the interests of the advanced regions that possess it. This judgement is of course correct. Yet it also makes the basic version of Wafangdian Studies struggle to respond to an extreme scenario: if China, through irregular means, does indeed acquire the most advanced scientific theories, achievements, equipment or engineering experience in the world at that time, how should one explain the fact that it still cannot obtain even a temporary genuine lead? This is the direct reason why Wafangdianisation squared must be introduced.

       

Many Chinese national-pride enthusiasts understand technology in an extremely childish way. They treat technology as a set of drawings, a production line, a paper, a set of model weights, an open-source code repository, a poached engineer, or a batch of equipment purchased from overseas. It is as if, once these things are placed in Chinese laboratories, factories and industrial parks, China possesses technology of the same level. If these technologies are not second-rate leftovers from others, but do indeed represent the world’s top level, then the basic version of Wafangdian Studies would appear unable to explain why China still cannot take even a temporary lead.

       

Yet real technology is never an isolated finished product, but an ecosystem. It includes upstream materials, basic theory, process experience, equipment tuning, quality control, engineering communities, industry standards, customer feedback, legal responsibility, professional ethics, and the long-term stable expectations formed around all of these. In its place of origin, it does not exist in isolation, but resembles a tree in a forest, connected to its roots, soil, microorganisms, hydrological environment and climatic conditions. Whether a sapling can survive after being moved is one question; whether it can grow into a towering tree like those in the original forest is another. A flower is still a flower when it is picked, but from the second it is picked, it has already left its own life system.

       

Therefore, even if the technology China imports is, in theory, the most advanced, and even setting aside any time lag, it is already not technology of the same grade as that in its place of origin when it enters China. This is precisely the gap between a slice and a system. What China obtains is always the result of a particular time slice: fragments broken down into components, manuals, patent texts, source code and expert CVs. If the time factor is taken into account, the technological level of the place of origin, which is continuously iterating and upgrading, is even more certainly superior to the technological level imported or even stolen by China at some earlier point in time. The moment technology is imported, it has already changed from living technology into specimen technology. Living technology can repair itself, reproduce itself and evolve itself; specimen technology can only be displayed, imitated and dissected.

       

For this reason, externally imported technology cannot truly maintain the most advanced level in the world at the time. This is not only because, at the practical level, doing so does not serve the interests of the holders of advanced technology, but also because, as a matter of logic, once externally imported technology leaves its native ecosystem, it no longer possesses advancedness in the complete sense.

       

Someone may ask whether certain advanced technologies might just happen to encounter a more suitable application ecosystem in China, thereby maintaining a leading level or even advancing further. This question in fact confuses two different levels: the ‘application ecosystem’ and the ‘native technological ecosystem’. After entering China, certain advanced technologies may of course encounter a larger market, lower regulatory resistance, cheaper engineers, a more complete manufacturing supply chain, more aggressive capital and local governments more willing to cooperate with industrial policy. These conditions are suitable for diffusion, cost reduction, packaging, mass production and commercialisation, but they are not suitable for source innovation, technological tradition, core toolchains or the definition of the next paradigm.

       

In other words, China may indeed become a turbocharger for certain technologies, but a turbocharger and an engine are not the same thing. A turbocharger can increase short-term output, but the externally imported engine itself remains the core; moreover, an improperly modified turbocharger will often exacerbate the engine’s own maladaptation to its environment. Wafangdianisation squared does not deny that China may temporarily amplify the effect of advanced technologies at the application level. What it seeks to point out is that, after entering China, advanced technologies suffer losses at the level of source, organisation, transmission and iteration. What China calls a ‘more suitable ecosystem’ is generally suited to the consumption and expansion of technology, but not to the autonomy and inheritance of technology. The former can generate industrial explosions; the latter alone can generate technological traditions.

       

We are all familiar with the typical Chinese-style introduction of technology. It often creates enormous momentum during the propaganda stage, begins to degrade during implementation, begins to deform during mass production, becomes perfunctory during maintenance, and returns to zero again at the stage of next-generation iteration. This also explains why China is particularly adept at producing things that ‘look like’ something else. It looks like high-speed rail, looks like a chip industry, looks like an AI, looks like new-energy vehicles, looks like humanoid robots, looks like modern universities, and looks like world-class laboratories. They can indeed look very similar, and may even surpass others on certain technical indicators, because appearance, process, indicators and commercial packaging can all be copied. Yet the word ‘like’ itself already exposes the problem. A truly world-leading level does not need to prove that it resembles anyone else, because it is itself the object others imitate. The most common sentence patterns in Chinese technological propaganda are precisely ‘domestic X rivals Y’, ‘China’s X has caught up with Y’, ‘a certain field has broken the Western monopoly’, and, more commonly, ‘far ahead’. This propaganda language itself shows that its frame of reference remains external.

       

A practical example is Jensen Huang’s recent lobbying of the US Government to lift restrictions on the export of advanced-process chips to China. His reasoning is that, if America does not sell them, China will make them itself; if so, it would be better to keep China dependent on American technology while allowing American companies to profit. The premise of this judgement is not solid. If the United States does not export advanced-process chips to China, the gap between China’s AI development and that of the United States will clearly continue to widen, rather than China rapidly forming an independent system capable of competing with America.

       

Conversely, however, if Jensen Huang’s critics believe that selling advanced-process chips to China would immediately allow Chinese AI to catch up, that too exaggerates the role of technological input. Chinese AI has indeed made obvious progress in papers, patents, application scenarios and model performance. Yet China’s strengths in AI lie chiefly in catch-up speed, application scale and engineering compression capability. It is closer to rapidly solving problems, running benchmarks and piling up data within an existing paradigm. The power to define the most advanced paradigms, the computing ecosystem, the underlying chips and the core toolchains remain highly dependent on external technological centres. Nvidia chips may have the same technical specifications in China and in the United States, and because some regions in China have relatively stable and cheap electricity supplies, actual operating costs may even be slightly advantageous. Yet technological development is not simply a comparison of benchmark scores. For example, even if Chinese-language data are fed into the latest-generation architecture for training, the actual effect may not surpass a mature English-language ecosystem built on a previous-generation architecture. This is precisely the consequence of China’s three-thousand-year habit of treating writing as what Liu Zhongjing called ‘the trick of exchanging gold-yuan notes for gold’. A Chinese-style narrative needs only a single metric of speed, scale or cost to declare victory; genuine technological leadership is not determined by a single metric. What is more, even if export restrictions are relaxed, China may still not obtain the truly most advanced generation of products. Even if hardware from two generations ago enters China through various grey channels, the eventual state of China’s own AI ecosystem will still depend on underlying toolchains, developer networks, original paradigms and organisational structures, not merely on the hardware itself.

       

Therefore, those cases repeatedly cited by Chinese victory theorists in which ‘advanced technologies become even more advanced after entering China’ in fact prove Wafangdianisation squared: the low-cost, high-mobilisation and high-expansion effects of the lowland do not truly enhance indigenous technological capacity, but may instead accelerate the distortion, overdrawn use and degradation of advanced technology.

       

The second aspect of Wafangdianisation squared is that the cost of organising resources in Chinese society is abnormally high. After any advanced technology enters China, whether in the application of the technology itself or in its further localisation, it must first be consumed by the organisational structure.

       

The problem faced by ordinary late-developing countries is that they lack an indigenous technological tradition, and therefore must import, learn, digest and absorb. According to the general principle of Wafangdian Studies, no matter how hard local researchers work, they will be overwhelmed by externally imported advanced technology with lower cost and higher quality. Local society therefore finds it difficult to generate effective technological development and accumulation; conversely, if it insists on supporting local research, it must invest far more resources than direct importation would require. When comparing the resource consumption of local technology and imported external technology, this basic version of Wafangdian Studies mainly considers differences in technological foundations between advanced and backward regions, as well as differences in social organisational structures related to technical communities. This is a common disadvantage faced by all non-core technological regions, and many Chinese national-pride enthusiasts may not entirely deny it.

       

Yet China’s problem goes deeper: even ‘effective learning’ itself requires an extremely high cost. Technological absorption is not a matter of one person understanding a manual, nor of one company purchasing equipment. It is the result of long-term coordination among many actors. Universities must be able to train trustworthy talent, enterprises must be willing to undertake long-term research and development, suppliers must deliver steadily, customers must put forward high-quality demands, courts must protect contracts, capital markets must reward long-termism, industry associations must form standards, and engineers must accumulate reputations within professional communities. All of these require a relatively high level of horizontal trust, organisational stability and mechanisms for inheriting responsibility within society, not merely a technical community in the narrow sense. Chinese society has extremely high costs precisely in these respects. Between individuals, between enterprises and between localities, stable, predictable and inheritable cooperative relationships are generally lacking. Blood ties, power, administrative hierarchy and short-term interests often become the most reliable, or even the only, organisational bonds. Any technological undertaking requiring long-term accumulation, once it enters such an environment, is first cut up into projects, indicators, political achievements, financing stories and propaganda materials.

       

Thus Chinese-style resource investment appears to mobilise the strength of the whole country, but in reality it passes through layer upon layer of loss. The centre proposes a breakthrough in ‘chokepoint’ technologies; ministries begin setting up projects; localities begin building industrial parks; state-owned enterprises begin investing; private firms begin telling stories; universities begin establishing new schools; the media begin creating heroes; the capital market begins speculating on concepts. Between resource input and real technological capability lies a long funnel. Every layer may intercept resources, every layer may rewrite objectives, every layer needs performance, and every layer must translate complex technical problems into the language of political achievement that superiors can understand. The part that finally settles into engineering capacity may be only a small fraction of the original input.

       

This is precisely why Leninism has a special appeal in China. In a society with an extremely low degree of organisation, spontaneous order is difficult to sustain. It therefore becomes necessary to rely on the Leninist state machine to achieve the largest possible scale of resource input, in the hope that, after layer upon layer of loss, as much real output as possible will remain. Only the Leninist state machine can violate market laws and spontaneous order, forcibly press loose sand into bricks, force mutually distrustful actors into the same project through coercive power, and nominally combine them into a single force. Yet this behaviour itself also destroys technical communities. Technical communities rely on reputation, professional judgement and long-term responsibility; Leninist mobilisation relies on obedience, assessment, ranking and political security. The former cultivates people; the latter consumes people. The former allows knowledge to grow within communities; the latter burns knowledge inside projects. The former forms traditions; the latter manufactures campaigns.

       

Moreover, China’s Leninist system is not an unadulterated Soviet import, but a product of its combination with traditional Chinese culture. This combination has weakened the professionalism of the planned economy in technological management, weakened the efficiency of the secret-police system in controlling society, and further weakened the Leninist ability to draw resources from outside through military conquest and internationalist mobilisation. The problem with the Chinese system is precisely that it often inherits simultaneously those aspects of traditional culture and Leninism most unfavourable to technical communities.

       

Therefore, the problem of Chinese technological investment does not lie only in what the basic version of Wafangdian Studies identifies: local research and development is less efficient than external importation, and therefore often ends halfway. More importantly, it is also constrained by China’s social structure itself, which further reduces the already low efficiency with which late-developing countries use resources for autonomous research. The crisis of this social structure also goes far beyond the disappearance of technical communities caused by de-feudalisation and bureaucratic systems. It is a continuing internal attrition of the entire society under the combination of traditional political culture and Leninist organisational logic. Chinese victory theorists and national-pride enthusiasts often focus only on the total quantity of resources before they enter this system, while ignoring the process by which those resources are consumed, distorted and rewritten in layer upon layer of filters. Precisely for this reason, they arrive at the mistaken conclusion that China can reverse Wafangdianisation by relying on the institutional advantage of producing miracles through sheer force.

       

The third aspect of Wafangdianisation squared is that, after the losses from technological input and the losses from resource organisation are combined, a low-level convergence relationship forms between China’s technological level, technological input and resource investment.

       

Many people assume that, so long as China obtains sufficiently advanced technology and invests enough money, it will one day catch up with the world number one. The error in this idea is that it assumes technological input and resource investment can be linearly transformed into indigenous technological capacity. It is as if the world’s advanced level is 100 points, China imports technology worth 80 points, then invests twice the resources and obtains 160 points.

       

Wafangdianisation squared shows that this relationship is not linear. China’s actual technological level is closer to the following formula: actual technological level equals input technological level, multiplied by the soil fidelity rate, multiplied by the organisational conversion rate, with iterative lag then deducted.

       

If the soil fidelity rate discussed in the first part is less than one, and the organisational conversion rate discussed in the second part is also less than one, then importing 90-point technology may leave only 60 points in the end; investing ten times the resources, after passing through the organisational funnel, may leave only twenty per cent of effective input; and during the five years spent catching up, the place of origin has already moved another five years ahead. Thus China’s technological development often produces a paradox: the more an industry is designated for priority breakthrough, the more likely it is to generate a huge propaganda bubble; the greater the investment, the more likely it is to produce inefficient and repetitive construction; the livelier things look in the short term, the more easily the weakness of the foundations is exposed again in the next change of technological paradigm.

       

This is why AI, EVs and robotics are especially suitable for explaining Wafangdianisation squared. They share common features: external technological input is extremely abundant; open source, supply chains and globalised division of labour have lowered the threshold for catching up; the Chinese Government and capital are willing to invest regardless of cost; application scenarios are vast, commercialisation is rapid, and the propaganda effect is excellent. According to the national-pride enthusiasts, these industries should best prove that China has already bypassed Wafangdianisation, or can at least win in the present. Yet precisely these industries best demonstrate the fragility of ‘winning in the present’. AI can use open-source models, purchase computing power, absorb talent, pile up data and rapidly polish products through vast application scenarios. But once the issue enters the realm of frontier model architectures, advanced chips, training-set quality, basic software ecosystems, global developer networks and original paradigms, China’s catching-up once again faces external technological centres. Electric vehicles can rely on scale, supply chains, price and policy to build a world-class industry, yet still have to confront profit margins, overseas regulation, brand trust, intelligent-driving safety, reliability of core components and geopolitical obstruction. Robotics can rely on the enormous manufacturing market to build the world’s largest installed base, yet still faces tests in high-end components, generalisation across complex scenarios, software intelligence, reliability and genuine human-machine collaboration. China can perform brilliantly on one indicator, form an overwhelming scale in one market, and push prices in one product phase down to a level that frightens the world. But this does not automatically translate into a world-leading level. Market share may indicate genuine technological attraction, or it may indicate cheapness, subsidies, low profit margins and an external environment that has not yet built defences. Single indicators, short-term scale and price advantages cannot directly prove that the technological system itself already possesses indigenous leading capacity. So-called leadership often consists of using localised indicators to impersonate systemic leadership, commercial scale to impersonate technological originality, subsidised capacity to impersonate innovative capacity, open-source catching-up to impersonate paradigm definition, and short-term hit products to impersonate long-term tradition.

       

In summary, Wafangdianisation squared means that, on the first day advanced technology enters the lowland, it has already been downgraded by leaving its soil; during application, it is downgraded again by excessively high organisational costs; and during the process of catching up, it can never catch up because the place of origin continues to iterate. It is not five years later that it falls behind, nor ten years later. Rather, at the very moment when it announces that it is ‘far ahead’, the narrative of leadership itself has already fallen behind the real technological ecosystem.

       

There is no genuine historical gap in Wafangdianisation. Under the theory of Wafangdianisation squared, Chinese technology, at any point in time and under any scale of resource input, can hardly reach a genuinely world-leading level. The common way in which Chinese technology attempts to bypass Wafangdianisation is constantly to package partial achievements as overall breakthroughs. It cannot stably define technological routes, cannot form independent and durable professional communities, cannot accumulate tacit knowledge across generations, and cannot continue to iterate without external input. It can only return, again and again, to the convergence curve of Wafangdianisation squared. What national-pride enthusiasts call ‘winning in the present within the historical gap of Wafangdianisation’ is merely shouting victory from a temporarily constructed stage before technological input has been fully exhausted, before fiscal subsidies have been fully depleted, before external markets have fully erected defences, and before the next generation of technology from the place of origin has fully unfolded. When the lights go out, the scenery is dismantled and the backstage is revealed, people will discover that beneath the stage, Wafangdian is still there.

 
 
 

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