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‘No Such Person’: Mbappé and the Politics of a ‘Blind-Box’ Boycott in Global Football

Yang Xinghua from Voice of Liberation
23 hours ago
18 min read

For forty-eight hours in late October 2026, global sports coverage produced a spectacle as absurd as any in its history. Late on 25 October, Kylian Mbappé scored twice in El Clásico to give Real Madrid a 2–1 away win over Barcelona. The next day he appeared at the London Palladium, where he finished second in the 2026 Ballon d’Or. Yet at virtually the same moment, on the other side of the world, one of football’s most influential stars simply vanished from Chinese view. When the leading sports apps Dongqiudi and Hupu published the Ballon d’Or rankings, second place was either blank or marked ‘no such person’. In the space of a day, Dongpeng Beverage, Mengniu Dairy and the cheesemaker Milkground announced the termination of their deals with him. Weibo and Xiaohongshu muted accounts of his followed by more than a million people. According to Chinese outlets including The Paper, China Media Group suspended all La Liga broadcasts and pulled advertisements featuring him. Even the mainland versions of the football games PES and FC Online, operated by NetEase and Tencent, were quick to wipe his player data.

What set off the storm was neither a racial slur nor a deliberate provocation. It was a backstage clip from the French online talk show The Bridge, filmed in the spring of 2026. His team-mate Aurélien Tchouaméni asked which meme of himself made him laugh most. ‘I think he was a Chinese dictator … I use it a lot when I play PlayStation online with my friends,’ Mbappé replied with a laugh. He never mentioned Mao Zedong by name. It was the programme’s editors who added an AI-generated spoof in which his face had been superimposed on a portrait of Mao in a Zhongshan suit. The outtake had lain dormant for six months. Once it began circulating on social media outside China on 26 October, officials, platforms and businesses in China took less than two days to dissociate themselves from him in remarkably close step.

Two sharply opposed accounts soon emerged. State outlets including the Guangming Daily and Beijing Time, an official account run by Beijing Radio and Television, pronounced it an ‘insult to China’s great late leader’. Here was a man ‘eating China’s rice and smashing China’s rice pot’. A market backlash, they declared, was only to be expected. Some of the sharper Chinese-language commentary abroad blamed the episode on supposed traits of ‘national character’. Chinese spectators, on this account, are born thin-skinned and blind to their own failings. They take for granted the privilege of watching the best football in the world on the cheap and, forever misjudging their place in the scheme of things, smash their own chances with their own hands. To reduce a complicated international episode to either ‘patriotic self-defence’ or ‘a defect in the national character’ is to obscure what deserves closer examination. The Mbappé affair brings four intersecting fault lines into view. Censorship produces a ‘blind-box boycott’, in which people are asked to take part without seeing what they are boycotting. The bargain Chinese football fans enjoy bears little relation to the leverage their market commands. Sacrosanct historical memory collides head-on with global meme culture. And once even an apology ceases to work, using access to a market as a weapon invites a backlash abroad.

No Such Person, an AI illustration of a viewer watching a footballer reduced to a white silhouette on a television screen.

No Such Person · AI Generated by Timothy Huang.

An invisible offence and highly visible anger

The most disconcerting absurdity of the affair was that the offence itself remained invisible in China’s public sphere from start to finish. On the evening of 26 October, Dongqiudi, a leading Chinese football news platform, was first out with a statement condemning Mbappé for inappropriate remarks about China. It announced solemnly: ‘Because his words cause harm to China and the Chinese people, we cannot translate them.’ The next day, the state-run Global Times was equally circumspect in a video commentary: ‘What did he say? Many Chinese people would rather not repeat it.’ Screenshots of Weibo posts cited by Voice of America showed baffled users asking domestic AI services such as Doubao and DeepSeek what had happened, only to receive the same standard refusal. Squeezed by this information blackout, Chinese social media developed its own code. Users wrote du cai, substituting two innocent characters sounding much like ‘dictatorship’, or observed that ‘Tang Guoqiang was an art student’ – an oblique reference to the actor who plays Mao. Many others had to get round the Great Firewall or pay for access just to discover the original handful of words in French.

That vacuum made for a peculiar public spectacle. The China Media Project at the University of Hong Kong picked up one exasperated Weibo user’s irony beneath a trending topic: ‘I’ve been deeply hurt by what Mbappé said, but I don’t know what he said. I hate him, but I don’t know why. I don’t even watch football.’ Manya Koetse, who edits the Eye on Digital China newsletter and follows China’s online world, told the Guardian that many Chinese internet users without proxy tools remained in the dark throughout the height of the boycott. Within days, the official verdict, the sponsors’ retreat, the suspension of broadcasts and the diplomatic response were feeding off one another. A bit of backstage entertainment had become a broadcasting stand-off that would last for weeks.

This is where the temptation to chalk the ban up to ‘the Chinese national character’ looks particularly crude. As Jennifer Pan, a professor of communication at Stanford, reminded the Guardian, Chinese social media is noisy, unrepresentative and closely censored. When companies, platforms, state media and the foreign ministry move almost as one, how can anyone outside tell ‘whether the institutions were following public anger or whether the institutions themselves generated it’? The Guardian and the Associated Press found quite a range of views in interviews on the streets of Beijing. A 30-year-old shopping centre employee told the Guardian that Mbappé had lost their support for good, and some fans felt strongly enough to burn their shirts. But AP also spoke to a Beijing finance worker who knew next to nothing about the affair beyond a vague sense that politics was involved, and a Beijing lawyer who put it bluntly: ‘Some people and companies have overreacted. It’s no big deal, and it’s hardly the first time.’ Ironically, in an interview with France Football and L’Équipe in September 2026, little more than a month before the row, Mbappé had explicitly criticised memes portraying him as a political strongman. They betrayed ‘a lack of political and human awareness’, he said, and he disliked being compared with ‘historical figures who had brought suffering or death to millions’. That interview, a much better guide to his considered view, went unmentioned on the Chinese internet. A throwaway joke from six months earlier became the verdict against him.

This points to a seldom acknowledged but iron rule of public controversies in China involving foreigners. What drives an all-out ban is often an eminently rational impulse among institutions to avoid risk, rather than an unalloyed burst of popular passion. Mark Dreyer, the sports industry observer and author of Sporting Superpower, put it pointedly to the Guardian: once somebody decides you have crossed a red line, ‘it’s a race to who can cut ties quickest, who can be the most patriotic’. According to Time, shares in Dongpeng and Mengniu had already fallen before either company announced its decision. Dongpeng, Mengniu and Milkground then moved to cut their losses with almost identical declarations of ‘zero tolerance’. Multinationals including Dior, Rimowa, Nike, Hublot and On quietly scrubbed Mbappé promotions from their official Weibo accounts as well. For a specialist outlet, being first to refuse to translate the remarks was less a bid for patriotic clicks than an instinct for survival: get some political cover before venturing near the supreme taboo. When nobody knows quite where punishment begins and its potential cost has no ceiling, each business goes further than it needs to in order to protect itself. The sum of all those decisions looks like a monolithic national ban.

A world-class feast for twenty or thirty yuan, and a misreading of the stakes

Set aside the heated language of national character, however, and a hard question remains. Where do the Chinese market and its fans actually stand in the global sports economy? State media commentaries and trending posts on Weibo accuse Mbappé of ‘eating China’s rice and smashing China’s rice pot’ and demand that his ‘commercial value be reduced to zero’. Have they overestimated the hand they hold and underestimated the bargain they are destroying?

An ordinary subscription bill makes the contrast plain. Many of the world’s finest consumer goods, films, programmes and public services remain beyond the reach of Chinese wage-earners, whether because of price or censorship. Yet European professional football is a world-class cultural offering that an ordinary Chinese viewer can enjoy at very little cost, at the same time as everyone else and with almost no delay.

According to the annual figures released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics in January 2026, disposable income per head in 2025 was 43,377 yuan nationwide (the median was 36,231 yuan) and 56,502 yuan among urban residents. Now take the advertised prices of major Chinese broadcasters in the 2025/26 season and the rates reported by business outlets including National Business Daily and 36Kr. A Migu Video football pass covering the Premier League, La Liga and other major competitions normally cost about 268 yuan a year. Promotions or single-competition annual passes could bring that down to 188 yuan, and monthly packages cost about 20 to 35 yuan. Add iQIYI Sports’ ‘Love Football’ pass, with exclusive rights to the Champions League, at a standard 318 yuan a year, or about 198 on promotion. At the standard rates a dedicated fan could watch almost all of Europe’s five leading leagues and the Champions League legally for just 586 yuan a year. That is less than 50 yuan a month, 1.35 per cent of national disposable income per head (0.62 per cent for Migu alone), or 1.04 per cent of urban disposable income per head. For the price of one or two modest meals, you get a whole month of the world’s most valuable players performing for you in high definition. It is hard to think of another top-flight international service on offer in China at anything like that price.

Now consider Britain, the birthplace of the modern game and one of its core paying markets. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) put median equivalised household disposable income at £39,200 for the financial year ending in 2025. According to the rates compiled in 2026 by the consumer guides MoneySavingExpert and Broadband.co.uk, a British supporter who wants full access to Premier League and Champions League coverage generally needs both Sky Sports and TNT Sports. On rolling monthly terms, NOW Sports at £34.99 and TNT Sports at £30.99 come to £791.76 a year – about 7,284 yuan at roughly 9.2 yuan to the pound, or 2.02 per cent of median household disposable income. Even on a twelve-month contract the two sports add-ons together come to about £647.76 a year, before broadband and basic television charges. That is about 5,959 yuan, or 1.65 per cent. Allow for the difference between Chinese figures per person and the British household median, and the absolute cost of authorised viewing in Britain is still more than 27 times the price of a single mainstream Chinese service and more than twelve times the combined price of the two.

Such cheap access is no unilateral gift from European football. It is what happens when businesses charge what local customers are willing to pay. It also reveals how much China really weighs in European football’s finances. A large fan base, some commentators imagine, puts China’s hand on the throat of Europe’s great clubs. The accounts tell a different story. According to Sportcal, the domestic rights deal La Liga renewed with Spanish broadcasters Movistar Plus+ and DAZN in late 2025 was worth €1.05 billion a season. In the summer of 2026 La Liga signed an exclusive digital deal with Migu covering four seasons, from 2026/27 to 2029/30. No official value was disclosed. Chinese industry sources quoted by NetEase Sports, using prices in the previous cycle as a guide, estimated just €4.5 million to €5 million a year, or about €20 million in all. Even allowing for some error, that is less than one two-hundredth of the Spanish domestic figure. The Premier League is the most commercialised competition of all. Yet, as Sina Finance and Chinese sports industry outlets reported, after PPTV’s £523 million (about US$720 million) gamble on three years of Chinese rights from 2019 ended in default and the loss of coverage, the next three-year digital rights deal shrank to about US$170 million, more than 70 per cent below the peak.

The fortunes of Chinese money in European football over the past decade make the disparity more poignant still. Between 2015 and 2017, Chinese businesses went on a club-buying spree. Suning took over Inter Milan, Sino-Europe Sports acquired AC Milan and Rastar gained control of Espanyol. Within a decade the tide had gone out. According to the International Finance News and an announcement by Oaktree Capital, Suning was forced to surrender Inter in May 2024 after eight years in charge when it could not repay a high-interest loan taken out in 2021 from the US firm Oaktree. Principal and interest came to about €395 million. Company filings reviewed by Huxiu and Jiemian News show that Rastar put at least €221 million into Espanyol. The arrival of Wu Lei helped send revenue to a peak of 1.212 billion yuan and net profit to 224 million yuan in 2019. Repeated relegation and losses running to hundreds of millions of yuan followed. In October 2025 Rastar completed the sale of its 99.66 per cent stake to Velocity, the group behind Premier League club Burnley, for €130 million, half in cash and half in equity. As US funds and Middle Eastern sovereign capital steadily reshape the governance of European football, the Chinese legacy looks more like a footnote about buying in with heavy leverage, haemorrhaging money and being obliged to leave.

The immediate damage when the ban fell was correspondingly uneven. For Mbappé himself, losing Chinese endorsements undoubtedly hurt. Time put the combined value of the Dongpeng and Mengniu contracts alone at about 50 million yuan (roughly €6.7 million), and the Guardian noted that a top player might earn as much as US$30 million a year commercially in China. Little wonder that he, Madrid and La Liga apologised so quickly. But for La Liga and Madrid the four years of Migu rights fees had been locked in at signing on 31 July 2026. Follow-up reporting by Tencent News, Malaysia’s China Press and others found that the real bind was the Chinese rights holders’. Migu dared not pull the whole of La Liga and risk a contractual penalty. It kept showing other teams and removed Madrid’s live games for the entire season along with the archive of replays. iQIYI Sports, holder of exclusive all-media rights to the Champions League, followed by dropping Madrid’s European matches. Chinese sponsors swallowed the cost of useless promotional materials and share-price volatility. Platforms faced the prospect of subscribers declining to renew once their biggest draw had gone. Millions of Chinese supporters who had paid for legitimate subscriptions lost the right to watch Madrid overnight. Meanwhile Mbappé’s form on the pitch showed no sign of disruption. He scored in each of three ‘disappeared’ games: against Racing Santander on 1 November, AEK Athens in the Champions League on 4 November and Valencia on 7 November.

When a national shrine collides with a global meme

With the sums done, another question comes into focus. Two international stars came to grief in the Chinese market. Yet consider how differently they were treated. The Guardian and Fox Sports, citing the organisers Tatler Asia, reported that Lionel Messi’s failure to play in Hong Kong in 2024 prompted half-price ticket refunds (HK$56 million refunded and a HK$43 million loss), as well as the cancellation of an Argentina friendly in Hangzhou. That was a fierce reaction, but nobody made Messi disappear from the internet or took an entire league off air. How did Mbappé’s casual ‘Chinese dictator’ bring the foreign ministry, the football association, central state media and a whole industry down on him within forty-eight hours? Why did even overnight apologies from all three parties fail to lift the ban straight away?

The answer has little to do with football. The AI-generated portrait crossed the hardest line in contemporary Chinese political culture: the boundary drawn around Mao Zedong’s legacy in the year marking precisely half a century since his death (1976–2026).

In mainstream Western historical scholarship and public debate, it is almost routine to describe Mao as an authoritarian ruler, even a dictator. Marc Julienne, director of the Center for Asian Studies at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), explained to Le Parisien that the description reflects a broad consensus among Western historians yet remains absolutely taboo in China. Mbappé had plainly failed to appreciate the distance between the two settings. There is a further cultural mismatch. In European football’s online meme culture, ‘dictator’ is a teasing name for a star who calls all the shots in the dressing room. As the archive Know Your Meme records, the French internet personality Mohamed Henni likened Mbappé to a ‘dictator’ as far back as 2024 in a dispute over the use of his name. During the 2026 World Cup his team-mate Ousmane Dembélé also teased him by invoking Mobutu, the former ruler of Zaire. To Mbappé and many young Europeans, discussing a meme that pastes your face on to a historical political figure expresses neither racial prejudice against Chinese people today nor diplomatic provocation. In an open society there is a clear distinction between passing judgement on a historical leader and showing prejudice against an ethnic group. The joke falls on the former side of that line.

China’s institutions systematically collapse the two categories into one. As the founder of the People’s Republic, Mao occupies a place far beyond historical debate. His image is a cornerstone of the ruling party’s legitimacy. Official historical resolutions adopted since reform and opening up have explicitly acknowledged the grave errors of the Cultural Revolution. The great famine brought on by the Great Leap Forward is a recognised historical tragedy among scholars. Yet the right to pass judgement on Mao remains a strict official monopoly. As Time noted in its account of the background, that red line has only hardened over the past decade. In April 2015 the CCTV presenter Bi Fujian was suspended over footage of him making fun of Mao at a private dinner. The Heroes and Martyrs Protection Law put related words and acts firmly out of bounds. In August 2026, just two months before the Mbappé affair, the artist Gao Zhen, who lives abroad, was sentenced to three years in prison after returning to China to visit relatives. His offence was infringing the reputation of heroes and martyrs, on account of satirical sculptures of Mao he had made years earlier.

Within Chinese society, too, feelings about Mao pull in different directions. Mobo Gao, professor of Chinese studies at the University of Adelaide, told the Guardian that for most ordinary Chinese people Mao’s image is far less negative than Westerners imagine. As growth slows and social mobility comes under pressure, some younger people have even become nostalgic for the egalitarian streak of the Mao years. There is real tension between Mao’s admirers and his critics. It leaves the authorities needing to defend his standing to sustain their claim to political orthodoxy, while remaining acutely wary of any spark from outside that might introduce ‘dictator’ into Chinese public discussion. Hence the spectacle of Chinese media denouncing Mbappé at full volume while keeping a tight lid on what he actually said.

Against this background the decades-old diplomatic formula ‘hurting the feelings of the Chinese people’ once again worked its political alchemy. Wang Horng-luen, a sociologist at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica, counted 319 uses of the expression in the People’s Daily between 1949 and 2013. As the China Media Project has observed, a highly formulaic piece of language can turn a particular political taboo into a wound supposedly shared by 1.4 billion people. A description of a historical leader automatically becomes an insult to an entire people. Yet the Chinese public is scarcely oblivious to the sleight of hand. CNA, citing figures from the South China Morning Post, reported what happened when a 2023 draft revision of the Public Security Administration Punishments Law proposed to ban clothing that ‘hurts the feelings of the Chinese nation’. During consultation, 93,975 citizens submitted more than 125,000 comments. On Weibo, Shanghai law professor Tong Zhiwei publicly demanded to know ‘who, precisely, is to determine the feelings of the Chinese nation, and by what procedure?’ The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the revised law on 27 June 2025 without the disputed wording. The law came into force on 1 January 2026. That legislative contest showed that, where the system allows even a little room for reasoned discussion, Chinese society will not blindly accept an ever-expanding catalogue of red lines. In the profoundly unbalanced debate over international sport, however, voices like those have scarcely a foothold.

When apologies stop working: the Streisand effect and the cost of shutting oneself off

Place the Mbappé affair of 2026 in the context of the past seven years of dealings between international sport and the Chinese market, and a particularly instructive turning point comes into view.

In October 2019 a tweet about Hong Kong by Daryl Morey, general manager of the Houston Rockets, triggered a sweeping boycott of the NBA. As the Guardian and the sports business outlet Front Office Sports reported, NBA commissioner Adam Silver resisted Chinese pressure to sack Morey. The league absorbed losses running to hundreds of millions of dollars (probably less than US$400 million, Silver estimated) and several years off CCTV. Time, however, demonstrated the resilience of elite sport with no obvious substitute. In March 2022 CCTV quietly resumed NBA coverage. In October 2025 the NBA returned to Macao for pre-season games under a five-year deal with Sands China. As the scholar Victor Cha told the Guardian at the time, you can find a substitute for Norwegian salmon, but ‘there really is no substitute for the NBA’.

Seven years on, European football proved far more commercially pragmatic than the NBA had been. Confronted with the boycott, Mbappé issued an apology in French, Chinese and English the following evening. La Liga president Javier Tebas apologised promptly, met the Chinese ambassador to Spain and promised to establish ‘guidelines for cross-cultural communication’. Even Real Madrid, which had initially defended the player’s right to express himself, gave way. After CCTV’s sports and youth programming centre signalled bluntly that ‘until the apology is adequate, there is nothing to discuss’, the club issued a formal apology on 28 October. Player, club and league had all bowed their heads. The ice did not melt. China’s foreign ministry said on 28 October that it ‘took the apologies from those concerned seriously’. By mid-November CCTV had still not resumed live La Liga broadcasts, and Migu and iQIYI continued to keep Madrid off air.

Inside China the cycle was closed: suppress the original remark, race to cut ties, suspend the broadcasts and leave the fans and platforms to carry the cost. Outside China there was deadlock: three swift apologies had failed to lift the ban. Together these outcomes are producing two kinds of backlash in international politics and business, both reaching well beyond sport.

The first is a textbook Streisand effect. The more thoroughly a voice is suppressed, the more loudly it is heard around the world. Before 26 October hardly anybody had noticed an offhand joke in an outtake from a French podcast. Then China brought down the hammer of cancelled sponsorships, an internet-wide ban and suspended broadcasts. The New York Times, the Guardian, Time and Le Parisien all ran substantial pieces that turned global attention back to Mao’s political legacy fifty years after his death, the Great Leap Forward famine and the trauma of the Cultural Revolution. The US House Select Committee on China said Mbappé ‘should not apologise for calling Mao Zedong a dictator’ and called the multinationals falling over one another to bow in return for business in China ‘the real disgrace’. French fans took to social media to deplore his surrender to censorship. Philippe Diallo, president of the French Football Federation, acknowledged to Ouest-France that the Chinese criticism had been ‘rather too forceful’. A punishment intended to defend a leader’s dignity and a nation’s honour had become a weeks-long public seminar across Europe and America on China’s historical wounds and its methods of censorship.

The second, more far-reaching consequence is that the world outside China is reassessing what it actually gets for making concessions. On 11 November 2026 Bloomberg columnist Gearoid Reidy published a commentary in the Japan Times under a strikingly blunt headline: ‘French soccer star Mbappe said sorry to China. Takaichi shouldn’t.’ Mbappé had promptly apologised and remained blacklisted. Madrid’s matches were still off air. From that predicament Reidy drew a coldly realist lesson for Japanese politicians facing friction with China. Bowing to Beijing buys next to nothing. It merely proves that pressure works and invites a still more exacting round of demands. When a footballer’s public relations crisis goes straight into the hardliners’ geopolitical textbook, the signal could hardly be clearer. Access to the ‘Chinese market’ was once a magnet strong enough to induce self-censorship among Western politicians and businesses. Unpredictable political minefields and a price for compliance that buys no certainty are rapidly eroding its attraction at the margin.

In that sense the sharper pessimists have put their finger on one unforgiving truth. The indulgence that came with globalisation was never going to be a free lunch for ever. For thirty years China’s low-cost access to the world’s finest sports coverage and commercial entertainment rested on a tacit bargain. The global content giants saw room for growth in China and generally made allowances when cultures rubbed up against one another. Ordinary Chinese consumers, in turn, shared in some of the finest public spectacles modern commercial culture has to offer. But let the political risk premium on market access keep rising, to the point where even an immediate admission of fault cannot buy certainty about the rules, and the business case for appeasing Beijing will quietly fall apart. For years to come, rational investors drawing up their priorities will have little choice but to protect themselves by treating China as a marginal source of extra growth with high political risk and uncertain returns.

After the screens go black, who pays?

On several late nights in November 2026, Real Madrid strung together away wins over Racing Santander, AEK Athens and Valencia. Time and again Mbappé spread his arms to celebrate under the floodlights of Europe. On the screens of paying viewers in mainland China there was only a silent blank.

There were no winners in this affair, only losers of very different kinds. Mbappé forfeited a sizeable sum in Chinese endorsements and earned the taunt in Europe that he had bowed to money. A political shadow of incalculable size now hangs over La Liga’s and Madrid’s commercial ambitions in East Asia. Chinese businesses including Mengniu, Dongpeng and Migu once again footed the bill for vast sunk costs after a political hurricane blew in without warning. Yet at the far end of that chain stand the people for whom the cost is least visible and most enduring: perfectly ordinary Chinese football fans and citizens.

A society genuinely confident in its culture and generous in the way it wields a great power’s influence would hardly treat a young footballer’s gaming joke, made thousands of miles away, as a national emergency. Still less would it rush to pull the plug on the outside world when it dare not even show people what he said. When officials can confiscate citizens’ choice of what to watch at any moment in the name of ‘protecting feelings’, and businesses can survive only by racing to cut ties first, every grand-looking ‘victory’ for a ban raises the invisible wall between that society and the rest of the world a little higher. Football, in the end, is football. Madrid and Mbappé hurtle on through their season under the floodlights. The question worth worrying about, after each baffling new case of ‘no such person’, is who is quietly being pushed to the margins of the world – and whose hand closed the window that twenty or thirty yuan used to buy the right to open.

The Runner-Up, an AI illustration showing an empty place between two footballers’ portraits.

The Runner-Up · AI Generated by Timothy Huang.

 
 
 

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