Uyghur group urges Steinmeier to raise rights concerns with Xi as China visit begins
Updated: 50 minutes ago
HEFEI / GENEVA, 27 October 2026 — Compiled from public sources
As German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier began his programme in China on 27 October, the World Uyghur Congress issued a statement urging him to raise Xinjiang human rights concerns directly with Xi Jinping, including alleged forced labour and transnational repression. The appeal is confirmed; the material reviewed does not establish that Germany has adopted its demands or raised them in bilateral talks. [1] [4]
The German Presidency lists the trip as running from 26 to 31 October, while China’s Foreign Ministry announced a state visit from 27 to 31 October. The different starting dates should be retained rather than treating departure and the first day of activities in China as interchangeable. Both official sources confirm the visit; China says it is taking place at Xi’s invitation. [2] [3]
Anadolu reported on 27 October that Steinmeier arrived in Hefei, Anhui province, with a visit to Volkswagen China Technology Company on his programme. This supplies reporting on the day’s activities separately from the two governments’ announcements. The new developments here are the start of the visit and the same-day rights appeal. The UN and European Parliament documents discussed below are background, not decisions taken on 27 October. [4]
The WUC also seeks the release of arbitrarily detained Uyghurs, repeal of the ethnic unity law and unrestricted access to Xinjiang for independent UN experts. Its description of the abuses as genocide is attributed to the organisation, not presented here as a court ruling. [1]
The public diplomatic context includes cooperation as well as disagreement. A visit preview on China’s government website quoted Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning as expressing hopes for stronger mutual trust, deeper cooperation and progress in China–Germany and China–Europe relations. These are China’s stated aims for the visit. They do not establish whether specific rights cases will feature in private talks, nor constitute a direct answer to the WUC’s subsequent statement. [6]
DW’s analysis on 26 October placed the visit in the context of Germany’s efforts to maintain engagement while reducing economic risks. It quoted China specialist Michael Laha of the German Council on Foreign Relations as expecting human rights to have a limited role. That is an analyst’s forecast, not evidence that the Presidency has excluded rights issues. Planned speeches and meetings must likewise be distinguished from events that have already occurred. [5]
The dispute over ethnic policy has a documented UN record. Addressing the Human Rights Council in Geneva on 15 June, High Commissioner Volker Türk expressed concern about the effects of China’s counter-terrorism and assimilation policies on minorities in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibetan regions. He warned that the new ethnic unity law risked further restricting language, education, religious practice, culture, expression and assembly, and called for repeal. The UN Geneva transcript records those remarks. [7]
That warning concerns the law’s potential effects and cannot replace factual investigation of particular enforcement actions. The High Commissioner’s position confirms that the rights risks have been raised at the UN; it does not establish that any individual surveillance or intimidation incident in Germany was directed by Beijing. This report therefore separates legislative risks, allegations about specific incidents and judicial findings, rather than inferring individual responsibility from a general policy criticism. [7]
Concerns about transnational repression also appear in an open communication sent to China by eight UN experts on 16 April. They highlighted Article 63, concerning legal responsibility for organisations and individuals outside mainland China. They warned that undefined concepts such as undermining ethnic unity could cast external criticism and minority advocacy as hostile acts. This analyses scope and enforcement risks; it does not establish that a particular overseas case has been opened under the provision, or that another government would recognise or enforce a resulting request. [17]
An ISHR analysis published on 29 April connects the dispute with minority-language education, religious autonomy and cultural expression. It cites experts’ concerns about Mandarin teaching requirements and possible penalties for parents passing on their culture. This is a rights organisation’s interpretation of legislation and the experts’ communication, not a separate field investigation. The public-interest questions extend to how state policy affects family life, schools and religious practice. [18]
China’s official explanation differs. A Xinhua report published on the Supreme People’s Court’s English website on 13 March said the National People’s Congress had adopted the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law the previous day, with effect from 1 July. It described objectives including a shared national identity, interaction and integration among ethnic groups, and common development, alongside provisions on infrastructure, industry and public services. This is an official account of legislative aims, not an independent evaluation of implementation. [10]
The European Parliament also adopted a resolution on 30 April concerning the law and the suppression of ethnic identities; its summary calls on China to repeal the legislation. This is the Parliament’s political position, not a statement of the action Steinmeier will take on this visit. Keeping existing European institutional positions separate from the President’s statements avoids reporting international appeals as completed bilateral diplomatic achievements. [11]
The forced labour dispute also predates the visit. On 22 January, UN Special Procedures experts expressed concern about persistent allegations affecting Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tibetan communities, linking their concerns to state labour-transfer policies. Their statement assesses information received; it is not equivalent to a court finding against a particular company. This report does not infer unlawful employment practices at any company or facility connected with the Hefei visit. [8] [15]
Beijing has publicly rejected that criticism. The Foreign Ministry’s English transcript for 23 January records Guo Jiakun dismissing the concerns as unfounded in response to Reuters, while stressing China’s commitment to human rights and development in Xinjiang and Tibet. He urged the experts to act objectively and impartially. This was a formal response to the January statement; it is not labelled here as a response to the new appeal on 27 October. [9]
Assessing forced labour requires attention to actual working conditions. ILO guidance emphasises whether work is performed under threat of a penalty and whether it is voluntary. Pay, an employment programme or a development objective alone cannot resolve questions of consent; geography or ethnicity alone cannot substitute for evidence either. Relevant enquiries include recruitment, the consequences of refusing work and workers’ freedom to leave. [12]
An existing international framework connects business activity with rights. The European Commission’s explanation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights says companies should commit to respecting rights, undertake human rights due diligence and remedy harm they cause or contribute to. The framework concerns impacts on people. It provides standards for assessing corporate responsibility, but an official visit alone demonstrates neither compliance nor breach by a company. [13]
More recently, on 7 September, Türk reiterated concern about conditions in Xinjiang, including detention facilities, and urged review of national-security and counter-terrorism legislation, stronger minority protections and investigation of allegations including torture. This provides continuing policy context for the appeal. It is not a new investigation disclosed today, and cannot be used to calculate current detainee or facility numbers. [14]
At the close of this review, no verifiable German or Chinese response specifically to the WUC’s 27 October statement was located in the Presidency’s itinerary material, Chinese Foreign Ministry material or the English reporting searched. No interview requests were sent, so this cannot be described as a refusal to comment or a failure to answer a reporter. The appeal and visit arrangements are confirmed; inclusion in private discussions and any resulting commitments remain unconfirmed. [1] [2] [3] [16]
Further verification requires specific, attributable material. A readout listing economic cooperation alone would not establish that rights were absent from private talks. A statement that views were exchanged would not identify which individual cases were discussed. Further reporting would require an explicit account from a named official, a verifiable meeting text or reliable evidence of a change in an affected person’s circumstances. Until then, this report reserves judgement on diplomatic outcomes.
Access imposes further limits. Some original pages could not be read directly; relevant content was checked through searchable original text, official transcripts and clearly attributed reproductions. Repetition of one statement is not counted as a second independent witness. This report involves no field investigation in Xinjiang or Germany, no access to private meeting minutes and no independent verification of every allegation in the new statement. Any subsequent official readout or concrete measure would require verification as a further development.
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