Modi and Xi Stress Border Peace as Official Accounts Diverge over ‘Anti-China Activities’
Updated: 55 minutes ago
New Delhi, 12 September 2026
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in New Delhi on Saturday during the BRICS leaders' summit, with both sides placing border stability, the trade imbalance, restored travel and wider co-operation near the centre of their accounts. Their official summaries nevertheless differ on a point directly touching Tibet, Taiwan and political expression outside China. China's Foreign Ministry said Modi stated that India's policies and positions on Taiwan and Tibet remained unchanged and that it ‘will not allow any force to engage in anti-China activities on its territory’. India's account of the meeting contains no such sentence and makes no reference to either Taiwan or Tibet. Chinese Foreign Ministry; Indian Ministry of External Affairs; The Wire's comparison of the two accounts
Neither account is a transcript. Each is a government-selected summary of a closed meeting. Beijing's attribution is therefore a verifiable public statement by the Chinese government, but it does not independently establish that Modi used precisely the reported words. New Delhi's omission, in turn, is not evidence that India has denied the Chinese version. By the time this report was completed, no separate Indian confirmation or rebuttal of the specific ‘anti-China activities’ attribution could be located, and the two governments had not published a jointly signed bilateral statement. Chinese Foreign Ministry; Indian Ministry of External Affairs; The Wire
The difference has immediate public-interest significance. India hosts the Dalai Lama and a substantial Tibetan exile community, and the Central Tibetan Administration is based in Dharamshala. On the day before Xi arrived, Tibetan groups publicly protested in New Delhi against Chinese policy in Tibet. Other activists displayed Tibetan flags near the summit venue and were taken away by Indian police. The Chinese account does not define ‘anti-China activities’. Available material does not say whether the term is confined to violence, espionage or other offences, or whether it might extend to peaceful protest, advocacy and criticism. If Indian authorities were to translate the language into enforcement policy, it could affect the expressive and associational space available to Tibetans in India. That remains a risk assessment grounded in the wording and current circumstances, not an established policy change. The Wire on the Tibetan protests; ThePrint; Associated Press
Shared objectives, different emphases
India's Ministry of External Affairs said the leaders welcomed steady progress in bilateral relations since they met in Tianjin in August 2025 and agreed to view the relationship strategically and over the long term. Modi said the sides should be guided by mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest, and that differences should not become disputes. Peace and tranquillity in the border areas remained an essential basis for the relationship's continued development, he said, while both states should observe existing agreements and understandings. The leaders reiterated their commitment to a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution of the boundary question, approached through their overall relationship and the long-term interests of their peoples. Indian Ministry of External Affairs; Associated Press
China's account said Xi described the two countries as partners rather than rivals and each other's development as an opportunity rather than a threat. He proposed broader cultural exchange, direct flights and economic co-operation under a ‘win-win’ approach. Beijing said he also called for mutual respect and accommodation in removing obstacles, while advancing the wider relationship and the boundary question in parallel. It presented the resumption of institutional contacts, a longer list of co-operative activity and record bilateral trade as hard-won progress. Chinese Foreign Ministry
Both statements addressed cultural exchanges, business connections and mobility, as well as economic concerns. The Indian account specifically identified the structural trade imbalance, supply-chain questions and meaningful, predictable market access. Bilateral trade reached a record US$155.6 billion in 2025, according to Chinese customs figures cited by Reuters. Indian imports from China amounted to approximately US$132 billion in the 2025–26 financial year, leaving New Delhi with a deficit exceeding US$100 billion. Reuters; Indian Ministry of External Affairs
The meeting took place during Xi's first visit to India since 2019. Relations deteriorated sharply after a 2020 clash in Ladakh killed 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers. The governments have gradually restored senior contacts, direct flights, visa facilitation and pilgrimage arrangements since late 2024. They nevertheless retain substantial military deployments along a roughly 3,800-kilometre frontier, much of which is not demarcated, while progress in boundary negotiations remains limited. Reuters; Associated Press
The ‘anti-China activities’ attribution
In its summary of Modi's remarks, China's Foreign Ministry said India pursued an independent foreign policy and that its relationship with China was not affected by any third party. The reference to unchanged policies on Taiwan and Tibet, followed by the undertaking attributed to Modi concerning ‘anti-China activities’, appeared immediately afterwards. India's account covers the strategic perspective, the border, economic concerns, mobility and multilateral co-operation, but contains none of those references to Taiwan, Tibet or activities described as anti-China. Chinese Foreign Ministry; Indian Ministry of External Affairs; The Wire
This is not the first divergence between the countries' public records on sovereignty-related subjects. The Wire reported that, after the foreign ministers met in Manila in July, China's version attributed to Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar an unchanged position on Taiwan and ‘Xizang’, alongside respect for Chinese sovereignty. India's Foreign Ministry then publicly challenged that sovereignty narrative, saying India had consistently respected China's sovereignty while China had violated Indian territorial integrity. After another ministerial meeting in August 2025, Beijing said Jaishankar had stated that ‘Taiwan is part of China’. New Delhi subsequently said its Taiwan position had not changed and emphasised India's economic, technological and cultural links with Taiwan. The Wire; The Wire on the July dispute
Those precedents do not prove that Beijing's present account is inaccurate. They do show how each government uses its summary to establish a national diplomatic narrative, particularly on Taiwan, Tibet and territorial sovereignty. India's decision not to repeat the wording means, at a minimum, that it is not part of a shared public record. The accurate formulation at present is that the Chinese government says Modi made the undertaking, not that both governments have confirmed it as an agreed fact.
Tibetan protests and detentions before Xi's arrival
On 11 September, demonstrators led by the Tibetan Youth Congress marched in New Delhi's Majnu ka Tila neighbourhood against Xi's visit and called for the repeal of China's Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which came into force on 1 July. Student activists separately displayed Tibetan flags and signs critical of Xi near Bharat Mandapam, the principal BRICS venue. Reports differ on the number taken away by police: ThePrint reported three detentions, while The Wire, citing The Hindu, reported five. Neither published complete detention records or the ultimate outcome. This report consequently does not assign a definitive number and cannot determine the lawfulness of the detentions or whether they followed any specific Chinese request. The Wire; ThePrint; Outlook India
The Tibetan Youth Congress describes the new law as a grave threat to Tibetan identity and has used the term ‘genocide law’. That is an advocacy organisation's political and human-rights characterisation, not a legal finding by an international court or another judicial body. Amnesty International said before the law took effect that its focus upon national unity and a common identity could reinforce assimilatory pressure upon Tibetan, Uyghur and Mongolian culture and language. It also expressed concern that the law's provisions relating to conduct abroad could be used for transnational repression. China's official rationale is the opposite: when the National People's Congress adopted the statute, it presented it as a foundational law for ethnic affairs intended to advance equality, unity, mutual assistance, harmony and shared development. Amnesty International; Reuters on the law and competing assessments; Outlook India
The demonstrations give the term ‘anti-China activities’ a practical context. If it is confined to violence, espionage or other conduct punishable under ordinary law, peaceful expression should in principle remain outside its reach. If Indian institutions applied it to criticism of the Chinese government, display of a Tibetan flag or minority-rights advocacy, it would engage freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. No public India–China agreement, Indian administrative order or police guidance currently establishes either interpretation. There is likewise no evidence that Friday's detentions implemented the undertaking described after Saturday's meeting. Sequence alone cannot demonstrate causation.
Responses
The Chinese government's position appears directly in its Foreign Ministry account: it wants India to maintain its existing approach to Taiwan and Tibet and prevent what Beijing terms ‘anti-China activities’, while also promoting border tranquillity, trade and travel. India's public position is represented by its own account: mutual respect, sensitivity and interests should guide the relationship; peace along the frontier is essential; and the parties need to address trade, supply-chain and market-access problems. New Delhi's statement neither adopts nor rejects the ‘anti-China’ label. Chinese Foreign Ministry; Indian Ministry of External Affairs
Tibetan organisations made their opposition to Chinese policy clear before the meeting. By the time of completion, no post-meeting statement addressing the discrepancy between the two summaries could be located from the Tibetan Youth Congress, Students for a Free Tibet or the Central Tibetan Administration. Their actions on 11 September and earlier criticism of the ethnic-unity law provide immediate context; they should not be represented as a direct response to words attributed to Modi after the meeting.
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